Leonardo Di Carlo

Concept and Validity of Law in the Hegel’s Element of the Philosophy of Right

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This paper aims to split the Hegel’s "Elements of Philosophy of Right" according three different logics: the first of practical-general nature; the second of political and legal nature, focused about the concept of recognition and of criminal sanction; and the third of legal nature strictly. If the first of these logics changes into the attempt to identify the practical-general problem of freedom in the concept of law, at the opposite the other two logics could represent a draft of a validity’s theory of the individually regarded legal norm. In this way, identifying the problem of freedom with the idea of right, Hegel should have guess a basic become distinction in the contemporary general theory of Law, as between "Concept and Validity of Law".


  • Recognition
  • Criminal Sanction
  • Concept of Law
  • Freedom
  • Validity


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