Reregulation of the Italian electricity sector can be assessed with economic methods identifying the adverse impacts of delayed reform and regulatory uncertainty on the production system. Paradoxically, all players will lose, if indecision about conflicting interests to be protected persists. In terms of the fear of exposing the country to energy crisis by triggering the wholesale power market, the paper recalls the capabilities of response to critical events which were observed in different regulatory scenarios: from the catastrophic California crisis (2000) to the severe one successfully managed by Scandinavian countries (2002-2003 Winter). During the latter crisis, the trading in Nordpool (the Scandinavian power exchange gradually built on a market design very close to the Italian one, provided with flexible mechanisms and hedging instruments) helped trigger a virtuous circle on both the demand side and supply side. By contrast, stopping Italian electricity operators at the start line, awaiting the most appropriate and fine tuned market design, will not foster growth.