Pier Luigi Parcu, Antonio Manganelli

Powerless Monopoly: call termination and new entrants

  • Abstract

Informations and abstract


The paper deals with competitive concerns deriving from interconnection between asymmetric telephone networks and especially from call termination on new entrants' networks. Starting from a brief overview of the evolution of competition models in telecommunications, the paper underlines ambiguities in the new European regulatory framework. Within this framework, call termination on each single network has been considered a relevant market with the consequence of attributing a "de facto" monopolistic position to each network's owner, independently of size and relevance on the retail market. This regulation of call termination is at high risk of failure and is causing paradoxical applications to competition law, incentives to off-net price discrimination for incumbents and excessive regulatory and litigation costs. The normative part of the paper examines an alternative regulatory method of interconnection, "bill and keep" in its integral and generalized version, which seems able to overcome problems previously highlighted.

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