Sergio Filippo Magni

Understanding Ethical Relativism

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This article focuses on the theory of metaethical relativism and points out the ambiguity of the notions employed in its formulation (validity, correctness, justification, and so on). The author maintains that these notions can be taken both in an epistemic and in a normative sense, and holds that the negligence of such a distinction has led to different interpretations of metaethical relativism. That negligence also explains why alleged implausible consequences have been derived from metaethical relativism.


  • Ethical Relativism
  • Metaethics
  • Validity
  • Moral Disagreement


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