Informations and abstract
Keywords: Judicial Review of Legislation; Concentrated and Diffused Systems of Constitutional Review; Erga Omnes Effects; Italian Constitutional Court.
This article evaluates the influence of the kelsenian model of Constitutional adjudication, that was adopted for the first time in the Austrian Constitution of 1920, on the Italian Constitutional Court. The authors review the doctrinal debate on judicial review of legislation during the last century and the role played by Hans Kelsen therein. Moreover, they review the debate within the Italian Constituent Assembly, where the idea of a special Constitutional Court was accepted in order to avoid some inconveniences of the American «diffused» model. One hundred years later, the European model of constitutional adjudication proves successful under many respects, in particular for the power of the Constitutional Court to remove any piece of legislation contrary to the Constitution and to do so through decisions that have general, erga omnes, effects.