Omar Chessa

Structurally Balanced Budget, Keynesianism and the Monetary Union

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The essay argues that art. 81 of the Italian Constitution, which was modified by the constitutional reform of 2012, has five principal characteristics: 1) it contains a typical balanced budget rule, which introduces procedural and numerical constraints to fiscal policy choices; 2) it is a new rule, undoubtedly different from those that were contained in the old text of art. 81; 3) it does not impede fiscal choices producing pro-cyclical effects; 4) it is an application of the rules rather than discretion approach which signals a preference for antikeynesian economics; 5) it is not a rule typical of democratic constitutionalism, as it rather relates to a form of neo-liberal constitutionalism.


  • Fiscal Rules
  • Keynesianism
  • European Economic Governance
  • Counter-Limitations


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