Lorenzo G. Luisetto

The Antitrust (Residual) Regulation of U.S. Labor Markets

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A growing body of empirical literature shows that labor markets are not competitive as traditionally thought. This article analyzes the rationales behind the importance of studying labor markets’ competitive dynamics on the buyer side (rather than, or in addition to, the seller side), and the potential role antitrust remedies. As shown by the cases and examples briefly recalled, in the absence or inadequacy of other regulatory tools, U.S. antitrust authorities have been playing the role of labor markets residual regulator, aimed at limiting some firms’ anticompetitive behaviors and promoting competition.


  • Antitrust
  • Labor monopsony
  • Competition
  • U.S. labor markets


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