Julian Go

Globalizing Sociology, Turning South. Perspectival Realism and the Southern Standpoint

(doi: 10.2383/85279)

Sociologica (ISSN 1971-8853)
Fascicolo 2, maggio-agosto 2016
Globalizing Sociology, Turning South

Perspectival Realism and the Southern Standpoint

by Julian Go
doi: 10.2383/85279

1. Introduction

An intellectual revolution against the provinciality of social science has begun. The premise of this revolution is that disciplinary sociology’s concerns, categories and theories have been formulated, forged, and enacted within Anglo-European metropoles in the interest of those metropolitan societies, and so a new “global sociology” that transcends this provinciality is necessary. The institutional dimension of this project involves a critical reconsideration of the inequalities between the wealthy universities of the United States and Europe and the poorer institutions in the Global South [Patel 2014]. But the intellectual dimension is also crucial. How can we craft sociologies that escape sociology’s Anglo-European provenance? Ulrich Beck [Beck 2006; Beck and Sznaider 2010] urges sociology to reach beyond the confines of methodological nationalism and reorient itself as a “cosmopolitan” project. Behbehanian and Burawoy [2011] suggest that sociology should reach beyond its “provincialism” by scaling up the concept of “civil society” in order to analyze “global civil society.” These calls join long-standing pleas for social theory to shift its analytic focus from Europe to the entire “world-system,” to the various “civilizations” and “multiple modernities” that traverse the world-system, or to the “connected histories” by which modernity has been constituted [Bhambra 2007, 2013 and 2014b; Go 2013d; Eisenstadt 2000; Wallerstein 1996 and 1997].
This paper advances an alternative analytic strategy for overcoming sociology’s provinciality and cultivating a more global social science. I refer to this strategy as the Southern Standpoint, and I ground it in a philosophical framework I call perspectival realism. Rather than beginning by rescaling existing theoretical categories (e.g. “civil society”), proliferating differences based upon existing concepts (e.g. multiple modernities), or tracking economic or social connections (e.g. world-systems or connected histories), this strategy begins by attending to the concerns, categories, experiences and practices of subaltern subjects at the bottom of global hierarchies. This is a social science from below; a sociology that starts not with the standpoint of the metropole but the standpoint of subjugated groups. There are two thus moves here: one, to explicate the basic idea of the Southern standpoint for overcoming sociology’s provincialism, and two, rooting that strategy in an epistemological and ontological frame – perspectival realism – that renders this strategy feasible and desirable.

As for the first move, the Southern Standpoint approach proposed in the present essay is a friendly extension of an already-existing intellectual movement partly emerging from the Global South. This movement can be variously called “Southern Theory,” “epistemologies of the South,” or “indigenous sociology.” It has received renewed attention of late, but it has a longer history. We could trace it back to some strands of postcolonial theory in the humanities, for instance, and before that, to the anticolonial thought of writers like Du Bois, Fanon, and Cesaire [Go 2013d]. As Connell [2007] suggests, it also includes work since the 1980s by African sociologists to indigenize sociology [Akiwowo 1986] and Alatas’s [2006a] concept of “alternative discourses” in sociology. The latest incarnation, which has received increasing attention in recent years, is seen in work by Connell [2007], Sousa Santos [2014], Jean and John Comaroff [2012] and those working in the “decolonial” school such as Mignolo [2000]. Though this is a diverse movement, it is united around a critique of the parochial “Northern” or “Eurocentric” character of conventional sociology and an injunction to transcend it. It therefore marks an alternative to the foregoing approaches that promote “cosmopolitanism,” “global civil society,” the “world-system,” “civilizations,” or “multiple modernities” as the dominant orienting categories for a global sociology. It instead seeks to harvest knowledges from the Global South and thereby cultivate alternative sociologies that can be then articulated together.

1 For overviews or examples of what I am covering under the term “indigenous sociology,” besides those discussed below, include Chilisa [2012], Connell [2006; 2007], Keim [2008; 2011], Patel [2006; 2010a] and Sitas [2004]. The Comaroffs offer a different notion of “Southern Theory,” which they call “Theory from the South,” but this is not so much theory that comes from the South as it is theorized about the South [Comaroff and Comaroff 2012].

2 Scholars see the end result of this Southern approach differently: for some, like Sousa Santos
While the Southern Standpoint approach advanced in the present essay draws upon this indigenous sociology/Southern theory movement, it also surmounts it by first overcoming some of the intellectual barriers upheld against it. It is notable, for example, that the indigenous sociology/Southern theory movement is not new. It is long-standing. This should make us wonder: why has the movement not resonated sufficiently to transform the theoretical landscape? Why must sociology’s Anglo-European provenance and its limitations be repeated over and over again – over the course of decades even? Surely, part of the problem is institutional: Southern theory challenges mainstream sociology, which will always fend off barbarians at its gates, and which has the resources to do so. But it is also the case that there are substantive intellectual barriers that have yet to be confronted and surmounted. Skeptics rightfully wonder, for instance, whether indigenous sociology and Southern theory inscribe a reverse essentialism, promote epistemic relativism, or overlook structural forces, institutions and global patterns. Such critiques have long plagued the movement, and in as much as they have not yet been tackled or absorbed, the movement cannot advance.

Hence the second step in developing the Southern Standpoint as a basis for global sociology: to advance a philosophy of knowledge I call perspectival realism as an ontology and epistemology upon which to mount the Southern standpoint approach. This approach draws upon “scientific perspectivism” in science studies and post-foundationalist standpoint theory as found in postcolonial and recent feminist thought. My claim is that this philosophical framework enables us to advance a Southern standpoint approach that draws upon the indigenous sociology and Southern theory movement without resorting to essentialism or relativism.

Below I first briefly outline the calls for global sociology and how different approaches have tried to meet them. I then discuss the Southern standpoint approach and perspectival realism before turning to two theoretical examples to concretize the approach: the theoretical innovations of Franz Fanon and Raúl Prebisch.
2. The Provincialism of Sociological Knowledge

What exactly is the motivation for a more global social science? Those who advocate indigenous sociology/Southern theory share with others who call for global sociology a simple recognition: social science is provincial. It is provincial in the sense that it was first formed and institutionalized in the context of industrializing Anglo-European societies in order to meet the specific needs of those societies [Wallerstein 1996, 23]. Even more to the point, it was formulated and promoted to meet the particular the needs in those societies of a specific group: the white male élite. As Connell [2007, 14] reminds us, sociology “developed in a specific social location: among the men of the metropolitan liberal bourgeoisie” in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries.

This original orientation of social science has shaped sociology’s categories, theories and research. We know, for example, that the very Comptean idea of the “social,” as a space distinct from the natural or the religious, was taken up by white European males in the face of threats to social order. Amidst the tumult of Nineteenth century crises in Europe, social theories emerged as explanations of and remedies for the increasingly violent demands of labour, natives and women [Owens 2015, 18-19].

In the early Twentieth century, sociology in the US, along with other social sciences in formation, was oriented around social evolutionism and questions about the “race struggle,” immigration, urbanization and industrialization – all of which embedded the concerns of metropolitan élites [Breslau 2007; Connell 1997; Go 2013a e 2013c; Vitalis 2010]. And because sociology was founded and institutionalized within imperial metropoles at the height of imperialism, it also means that early sociological theory and methods adopted an “imperial gaze” that theorized non-Western populations through racialized lenses that essentialized and homogenized those populations while occluding alternative perspectives, not least those of W.E.B Du bois [Boatcâ 2013; Connell 1997; Seidman 1996 and 2013; Bhambra 2014a; Morris 2015; Zimmerman 2006].

Today, sociology does not necessarily or directly partake of the older imperial episteme, but its legacies persist. According to Wallerstein [1997] among others, for example, Eurocentrism persists in sociology in various forms. One of these forms is metrocentrism: the tendency to take the categories, concepts, and theories developed

---

3 And even when not intellectually Eurocentric, there remains a global hierarchy of privilege, whereby social science is produced primarily in the Global North, thereby reflecting the concerns and viewpoint of the Anglo-European metropoles [Burawoy 2010; Wallerstein 1996].
and deployed of and for the specificities of Anglo-European modernity and uncritically apply them everywhere [Go 2013a and 2013d]. Despite its provincial origins, sociology thus purports to have universal status while denying its own parochiality. As Keim explains:

General sociological theory, by definition encompasses in the scope of its statements any society, North or South, and claims to be valid for all of them equally [2008, 562].

Sociology, the so-called “Science” of society
pretends to produce generally valid, universal statements, concepts and theories,
but it is actually distorted because
the claim for universality so far has been formulated from a Eurocentric perspective [Ibidem, 559].

One among many problematic results is that colonized, postcolonial, and Southern societies are treated analytically as a lesser version of western societies that are held up as the “model system” [Krause 2016].

To the degree that, from a Western perspective, the Global South is embraced by modernity at all,

explain Comaroff and Comaroff [2012] of this view,

it is as an outside that requires translation, mutation, conversation, catch-up [Ibidem, 2].

And the problem here is not simply that this metrocentrism makes subaltern peoples look bad. It is that it arguably impedes a richer understanding of social processes and social relations in other societies. The concepts and theories analytically domesticate the rest of the world into their narrow fold, thereby possibly blinding us to a range of important processes and relations going on in these diverse contexts.

Examples of metrocentrism abound. The tendency in the 1960s and 1970s to transpose modernization theory, modeled after the so-called “development” of metropoles, to other societies is a prime example [Gilman 2003; Rostow 1960]. But

---

4 As Keim [2008, 559] warns further, according to the assumptions of social theory: “The social realities of the Southern hemisphere are thus always thought of as fitting into a universally valid scheme produced elsewhere.” It thereby “blurs the distinction between the universal and the particular, equating the North-Atlantic particular with the universal” [Keim 2008, 562]. Wallerstein notes how “European social science universalism” ends up “asserting that whatever happened in Europe in the Sixteenth to Nineteenth centuries is applicable everywhere” [1997, 93].
there are many other examples. Connell [2006], in her sustained critique of what she calls “Northern theory” – that is, theory that

embeds the viewpoints, perspectives and problems of metropolitan society, while presenting itself as universal knowledge” [Ibidem, vii-viii] –

gives the so-called “structure-agency problem” as one such example [Connell 2006]. This is a dominant issue in North American and European social science, inviting theorists like Giddens [1986], Bourdieu [1977] and Sewell [1992] among others to try to “solve” it. It is subsequently taught in many contemporary sociology courses. So why are we bothered with this theoretical construction, such that we apply to all social situations everywhere? Whence does it come, except from within metropolitan societies? And why is “agency” in this debate theorized mainly in terms of individual capacities, consciousness or intentionality, which is a very specific way of thinking about agency that occludes group action and the agency of non-humans?

According to Connell [2006], the answer is that it is because the metropolitan societies of its birth have special privilege. They are not exploited from the outside or politically managed as colonies. The standpoint is one of power. And bourgeois individualism is the norm and value. The terms of the “structure-agency” debate thus emerges from this particular context, and the fatal flaw of Northern Theory comes when it transposes its concerns and categories – developed in this particular context of intellectual habitus, and formulated from the standpoint of power – to the peripheral world, where the local experience and context is different. After all, peripheral societies do not occupy the seat of power. They have been subjected to foreign imposition or colonization. They have been and are constrained in ways that are peculiar. To transpose the categories and concerns of metropolitan sociology (whether of structure/agency or rational choice) runs the risk of occluding important things going on in those societies. It is, in short, the realization of the analytic dangers of metrocentrism which follow from sociology’s unproblematic parochiality.

3. Routes to a Global Sociology: From Rescaling to Turning South

The project for global sociology emerges in full or at least in part from these critiques. The goal is to transcend the provinciality of conventional sociology in Euro-

5 This universal pretension comes in the form of social theory’s abstraction or “context-free generalization.” “Social science usually prefers context-free generalization. Special prestige accrues to a theory which is so abstracted that its statements seem universally true” [Connell 2007, 196]. And the problem with Northern Theory is not that it seeks generalizability. It is rather that the source of generalization is provincial but Northern Theory claims universality.
American contexts and make sociology more adequate for a global setting [Bhambra 2013 and 2014b; Burawoy 2010; Keim et al. 2014; Patel 2010a and 2014]. But if there is agreement on the problem and the goal, there is less agreement on the route. Some suggest to globalize sociology by shifting our geographic focus, either away from European societies and towards non-Western societies or upwards to capture global social forms. As is well-known, Wallerstein’s world-systems theory was meant exactly to shift our provincial lens away from Western nation-states to the “world-system” as a whole [Wallerstein 2004]. Those who are not interested in the economism of this approach turn to other theories and concepts. Beck and his colleagues argue that

we need to pen up perspectives on the world beyond Europe [Beck and Grande 2010, 411],

and therefore suggest that the way to do so is through “methodological cosmopolitanism” rather than “methodological nationalism”. This means recognizing the “plural” character of “modernity” and tracing the multiplicity of “modernization paths, of Western and non-Western experiences and projects [Beck and Grande 2010, 412]. Others, inspired by the seminal work of Eisenstadt [1986 and 1987], similarly call for a “multiple modernities” approach and for a recognition of diverse “civilizations” and their particular social formations and cultural systems [Eisenstadt 2000; Spohn 2011]. Meanwhile, Burawoy invites sociologists to embark upon global ethnographies that look at the impact and operations of global capitalism upon diverse locations through the “extended case method” [Burawoy 1998 and 2000]. Most recently, Behbehian and Burawoy [2011] call for a “third stage” of sociological analysis that is more adequate to the globalized world in which sociology now exists. Whereas sociology’s “first stage” studied communities, and its second stage studied nation-states, the third stage “studies the world from the standpoint of global civil society.”

The indigenous sociology/Southern theory movement points to a different path. Foreground the problem of metrocentrism, this movement would arguably be critical of even the foregoing attempts to globalize sociology. Take Wallerstein’s [1997] world-systems analysis. While scaling up the concept “society” to cover the entire world through a Marxist perspective might help overcome the Eurocentric focus upon Western societies, it does not overcome metrocentrism. For Wallerstein, what he calls the “world-system” first develops in Europe and then spreads to the rest of the world, and in as much as the theory parallels in logic what capitalism purportedly did

---

6 For alternative readings of sociology’s history which do not fall along these methodologically-nationalist lines can be found in Go [2013a and 2013c], Kennedy and Centeno [2007], Steinmetz [2013].
in history, the theory retains a questionable universalism. This is the same problem pinpointed by postcolonial thinkers and theorists of critical race studies who critique certain strands of Marxist thought on similar grounds. Had not Marx based his entire theory of capitalism upon the experience of white workers in England, who confront their employers (behind the “hidden abode”) in a situation of free wage labor? He developed his theory of value not from looking at slave labor on the colonial plantation but instead by looking behind the hidden abode of the English factory door. His brief discussion of “primitive accumulation” as it occurred in the non-European world was an aberration, a deviation from the supposedly pure form of value extraction which was modeled after English factory production. Cedric Robinson, in his seminal work *Black Marxism* [2000] which could be seen as a precursory and corollary to Southern theory, points out the provinciality of Marx’s theory in this sense.

The “masses” whom Marx presumed would be “seized” by theory were European male wage labors and artisans in the metropoles of Western Europe, Britain and the United States [Robinson 2000, xxviii].

From the perspective of indigenous sociology/Southern theory, Beck’s solution of globalizing sociology through “methodological cosmopolitanism” would run into the same criticism, for it too universalizes the particular. Beck models his “cosmopolitanism” after the European Union and élite experiences in Europe. This is meant to be the way to epistemically globalize sociology, by universalizing from European experiences? The same goes for attempts to pluralize modernities by studying “multiple” or “alternative” modernities. The attempt is noble but, as critics aver, it remains metrocentric in its conception if not in spirit. So-called “multiple” or “alternative” modernities turn out to be merely variants of European modernity, emerging initially from “Western civilization” and then diffusing to other “civilizations” [Bhambra 2007, 67]. The approach thereby marshals an essentialism that would make Orientalists blush with pride. Dirlik points out that the approach is an improvement over an earlier Eurocentric modernization discourse [but] it perpetuates the culturalist biases of the latter, relegating to the background social and political differences that are the products not just of past legacies but of modernity, and cut across national or civilizational boundaries [Dirlik 2003, 285].

---

7 Recall that, in Marx’s view, Adam Smith carried out a form of fetishism because he transposed the categories and theories specific to one society, capitalist society – such as those relating to rational actorhood and *homo economicus* or supply and demand – to all societies in the world, extending them back to pre-capitalist societies. It is telling that Marx’s term “fetishism” derived from Europeans’ colonial encounters with Africans.
Sousa Santos [2012], foremost proponent of “epistemologies of the South,” likewise questions the universalization of the “public sphere” concept. The concept, he avers, “reflects the political practices of the European bourgeoisie at the beginning of the Eighteenth century,” such that its theoretical and cultural presuppositions are entirely European: it is based on the individual bourgeois and life experience; it assumes the separation between the state and civil society; it sees the bourgeois citizen and his public sphere as external to the structure of power; it takes for granted its informal and equal inclusiveness…its dynamic component is the reasonable discussion and a culturally shared discourse…; political action consists of political discussion, not political action and transformation. These presuppositions are today highly problematical, even in the global North [2012, 44].

Entailed in this charge is an implicit critique of attempts to globalize sociology by rooting it from “the standpoint of civil society” [Behbehanian and Burawoy 2011]. Globalizing sociology cannot be done simply by universalizing Anglo-European concepts.8

So what, then, is the alternative? The solution offered by indigenous sociology/Southern theory is to turn South. The indigenous sociology, or “alternative discourses” approach since the 1980s, initiated the strategy.9 The idea was to draw upon the experiences and folk wisdom of peoples in the South as the basis for new theorizing; or to draw upon Southern intellectuals who think in terms of local categories and concerns. Akiwowo’s initial intervention [1986 and 1999] represents the former. Aiming to counter Eurocentric social science and “reorient the discipline to African reality,” he drew upon ritual oral poetry in Yoruba as the basis for a new sociology [Akiwowo 1986, 67]. He thereby excavated the idea of asuwada, or the “clumping of diverse iwa (beings)” as the key new concept. Founded in the “intellectual soil of a non-Western community,” the concept emphasizes social bonds of self-sacrifice and spiritual commitments, as opposed to bourgeois individualism, and therefore is more appropriate to African communities, according to Akiwowo [1999, 119-120; see also Sitas 2004]. The work of Syed F. Alatas [2006a and 2006b] is another example of the movement, but he suggested to draw foremost upon Southern intellectuals rather...

8 On the other hand, this sort of geo-critique should not be entirely controversial. When critics confront Bourdieu’s theory of culture or cultural fields, for instance, one common critique is that it is “too French:” i.e. bound to the particularities of the French context which birthed it. If this is a valid critique, why not also ponder the particularities or, more precisely, the provinciality of sociology? Bourdieu and Wacquant [1999] themselves speak of how certain concepts (like “race”) are imposed upon other societies problematically, which they call “the cunning of imperialist reason.”

9 It also parallels, and in some way prefigures, the movement in philosophy for “decolonial” theory Mignolo [2000].
than folk concepts. To formulate “alternative” sociologies not rooted in European experiences, Alatas suggests that thinkers indigenous to colonial and postcolonial societies offer a way out. They produce

alternative (sociological) discourses [that] constitute a revolt against intellectual imperialism [2006a, 81].

Alatas thereby turns to thinkers like the Islamic philosopher Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406 AD), showing how Khaldūn’s theory of state-formation is grounded in the history of the Arabs and Berbers of North Africa and therefore might be useful for studying state-formation in non-Western contexts [Alatas 2010 and 2006b]. In short, rather than relying solely on a handful of theories from Northern theorists, this version of indigenous sociology urges sociologists to look elsewhere [Patel 2010a]. Instead of Max Weber for insights on the societies of the Middle East, we should instead turn to Abd al-Rahmān Ibn Khaldūn; or instead of just Karl Marx to think about Latin America, we might instead look at Simon Bolivar, Jose Martí, Octavio Paz or more recent thinkers like Nestor García Canclini [Kozlarek 2013]. Or rather than using Foucault to examine Indian society, we should heed the insights of Ashis Nandy or Benoy Kumar Sarkar [Goswami 2013].

A more recent intellectual movement, which we might think of the “Southern Theory” movement, builds upon these seminal steps. Sousa Santos’ [2012] represents one version, seeking to overcome Eurocentrism by turning to subjugated knowledges from the South that have been repressed through “epistemicide.”

[If] the theories produced in the global North are best equipped to account for the social, political and cultural realities of the global North, [then] in order adequately to account for the realities of the global South other theories must be developed and anchored in other epistemologies – the epistemologies of the South [2012, 45].

Sousa Santos thus calls attention to “the immense variety of critical discourses and practices” in the world [2014, 42], with special attention to the critical discourse and practices of those who have suffered at the bottom of global hierarchy. We must retrieve the “valid knowledges” of those

social groups that have suffered, in a systematic way, the oppression and discrimination caused by capitalism and colonialism [Sousa Santos 2012, 51].

Connell [2013] likewise turns to the South “to subvert the structures of Northern hegemony in world social science” and recover subjugated knowledges: the insights, wisdom and experiences of subjugated groups. These local insights offer the possibility of constructing “dirty” theory; that is, concepts and theories rooted in the experiences and interests of the postcolonial Global South rather than upon the
confines of North American or European terrain. Connell makes the argument by referring to Aikowowo and Alatas’s projects, as discussed above. She also discusses the Subaltern Studies project in India, the Cepalism-dependency theory framework from Latin America, and others [Connell 2007 and 2013]. Connell does not valorize these approaches as the sole solution: she criticizes each of their weaknesses. But she points to them as examples of theory that begins from local experience and thereby as theories that warrant more consideration than they are typically given. For example, rather than start our sociologies from the binaries and categories of “Northern theory,” like “structure-agency,” she suggests that paying attention to the concerns and experiences of those in the Global South would lead us to different starting points, such as experiences of colonial subjugation or dispossession from the land. These experiences have been foundational for many people in the Global South, but they are either occluded or undertheorized in Northern sociology [Connell 2007, 206-207]. Southern theory must fill the gap.

In short, the solution for globalizing sociology is as elegant as it is deceitfully simple. If, for too long, sociologists have relied upon theories constructed from and directed at the concerns and categories of Euro-American contexts, this movement proposes to shift or even unseat the canon entirely. But rather than doing so by simply extending or scaling up prior categories and theories developed in relation to the Global North – such as “cosmopolitanism” or “civil society” – sociology should go native, turning to the experience, practices, and voices of subaltern populations and thinkers in the Global South to cultivate a more global sociology. But what are the limits and possibilities of this approach?

4. The Limits of Indigenous/Southern Sociology

Part of the issue with the indigenous/Southern theory solution is that it has been subjected to numerous criticisms. These warrant attention, because they arguably undercut the promising power of the approach unless they are confronted head-on. The first criticism points to the seemingly limited lens of indigenous sociology. Because indigenous sociology appears to be grounded in the standpoint of individuals, it fails to illuminate larger institutions or structures. Bhambra [2007] worries that “subaltern scholars” run the risk of failing to provide an account of the systematic relations of domination [Ibidem, 29].

10 For an excellent debate on Connell’s Southern Theory, see the book forum in Political Power and Social Theory, volume 25 [2013], whit commentaries by Patricia Hill Collins, Raka Ray, Isaac Reed, and Mustafa Emirbayer.
How do Yoruban concepts unearthed from deep oral traditions help us grasp the global logics of capitalist domination? How can theories or concepts derived from particular local contexts speak to global social processes?

This relates to the related problem: does not a local sociology resort to particularism, crafting social knowledge that is only relevant for grossly limited contexts and hence not generalizable? Social knowledge requires generalizability but indigenous sociology – emphasizing as it does the particular, the local, the specific – seems to offer precious little by way of offering generalizable concepts. Put differently, if Anglo-European social theory falls short because of its provinciality, would not indigenous sociology suffer from the exact same problem? At best, we would end up merely a “plethora of particularisms,” as Burawoy [2014, xvi] worries.

Another problem has to do with the rationale for what counts as “indigenous” or “Southern” sociology. Burawoy summarizes usefully:

If there is a Southern sociology then what makes it Southern and sociological? [2010, 14]

Too often, proponents of these approaches are silent on this issue. At most, adjudication is based upon identity: if a thinker or sociologist comes from the global South, then their sociology is “Southern.” But does not the idea of a “Southern” or “indigenous” thinker presume a cultural essentialism? Or, in regards to Sousa Santos’ [2014] attempt to locate “alternative epistemologies” in the Global South, is an epistemology “alternative” just because it comes from Brazil? Santos argues that The West, or global North, claims the right to the dominant view of the world. But, on the other hand, the global South is entitled to have its own view of the world (and of the global North) [Sousa Santos 2012, 45].

But it is unclear how to adjudicate whether a “view of the world” is from “the South” or from “the North.” Does Portugal count as “Southern” too? Note the irony if these questions are not addressed: heralding “Southern” as opposed to “Northern” or “metropolitan” theory itself reproduces the very binary essentialism that this approach laments [Burawoy 2010: 13-15; Sitas 2006, 363]. It likewise threatens to es-
sensualize the cultures of the “South” in the same way that Orientalism does, thereby replacing Eurocentrism with Afro- or Asian-centrism and reifying cultural difference [Hanafi 2016]. The critique by Sitas is to the point:

The peripheral sociologist’s claims for difference and differentiation rotate usually around “meaning” or “culture,” around a distinct “life world” or around “values” and “norms.” Asserting such differences is hardly liberatory because that sphere has been the domain and hunting ground of colonial anthropology – the discipline that not only “understood” but came to define the cultural “other:” the tribal or the native […]. Those “others” of colonial rule are defined by their unique essential cultures, their ways of life, their dialectical antitheses to modernity [Sitas 2006, 363].

A final criticism is that the epistemic warrant for indigenous or Southern theory is obscure at best, which renders it subject to various shortcomings. Conventional sociological positivists base their claims upon rules that are presumably “objective,” “scientific,” and hence universal. This is the “aperspectival warrant,” grounded in the assumption of the possibility of and desirability for the Cartesian subject. Southern theory, by its critique of metropolitan knowledge and its attempt to universalize its knowledge to the entire world, would seem to reject this. But what, then, is the alternative? Proponents of Southern theory implicitly suggest that all theories from the South are inherently better, at least better than knowledge from the North, but only because of they are from the “South.” Bhambra [2007, 60-62] thus criticizes this approach on the grounds that it insinuates a problematic “epistemic privilege” which in turn runs into the problem of essentialism problem noted above. Arjomand adds:

Our concern should not be with the ethnic identity and geographical location of social scientists and public intellectuals, but with comparisons of the concepts used to understand the phenomena and developmental patterns of the metropolitan and peripheral regions of the world [2008, 549].

If not grounded in essentialism, what is the other alternative epistemic warrant? The only other response would be to get rid of any notion of epistemic privilege rooted in identity and instead resort to subjectivism and epistemic relativism. If we refuse positivism or identity-based essentialist warrants for knowledge, we are left without criteria for adjudicating knowledge claims, except for appeals to plurality and multiplicity – or what Sousa Santos [2008] calls a “pluriverse.” The problem is that objectivity is then impossible; indeed “truth” is impossible. All we are left with are multiple perspectives from various Southern locations, and so turning South does not yield better knowledge, only relativist knowledge which can never be validated [McLennan 2013]. Skeptics rightfully wonder: can theorizing from the standpoint of
Yoruba poetry yield anything universally valid or “scientific” at all? Is social scientific truth still obtainable? Is “truth” at all possible? If the answer is “no,” the irony is that we do not even have grounds for claiming that there is social injustice, domination, or exploitation at all; nor even that there is such a thing as “Eurocentric theory” in the first place.

5. The Southern Standpoint As Perspectival Realism

What, then, can be done? Are we back to the attempts to rescale existing theories and concepts drawn from the North as the solution for global sociology? My suggestion is to draw exactly from the Southern theory/indigenous sociology movement but articulate it with a distinct ontology and epistemology that can absorb the foregoing criticisms of the movement. I refer to this approach not as Southern theory but the “Southern standpoint.” I use the term *standpoint* deliberately in order to signal an affiliation with post-foundationalist feminist standpoint theory and standpoint theory as developed in the philosophy of science [Harding 2004a and 2004b]. Standpoint theory highlights the *social situatedness* of knowledge and feminist standpoint theory in particular theorizes the gendered position of the knower. By *Southern standpoint*, then, I mean a social position of knowing akin to a feminist standpoint but one that is rooted not necessarily in gender but rather in geopolitics and global social hierarchy. It is captures the position, and hence the activities, experiences, concerns and perspectives, of globally peripheral (e.g. colonized and postcolonized) populations.\(^{14}\) A Southern standpoint approach for global sociology would thus overcome metacentrism by adopting the Southern standpoint as the beginning point for social theory, just as indigenous/Southern sociology would suggest.

While this approach draws upon the Southern theory/indigenous sociology approach, it also mounts it upon a particular ontology and epistemology that can manage critiques against it. My claim is that this move is absolutely necessary for overcoming the critiques of the indigenous/Southern theory movement noted above. Part of the reason for the proliferation of criticisms against the movement is that the latter has not made its philosophy of social knowledge – its ontology and epistemology – sufficiently explicit, nor has it systematized it. For example, criticisms that it tends towards relativism suggest that Southern theory/indigenous sociology is radically constructivist; that its critical suspicion of the positivism affiliated with Euro-American

\(^{14}\) Obviously, in the context of gendered global capitalism today, women would be part of if not constitutive of the southern standpoint. The key point here is that the southern standpoint is a relational status.
social science evinces the claim that all knowledge is merely a constructed tool of power. Is this the case? Few if any answers are provided in the existing discussions of indigenous sociology and Southern theory. My own approach systematizes an ontology and epistemology that, I argue, is appropriate to the Southern theory/indigenous sociology movement. I refer to this as perspectival realism, which draws upon “scientific perspectivism” in STS and the philosophy of sciences and articulates it with post-positivist standpoint theory. 

6. Perspectival Realism

What I refer to “perspectival realism” can be seen as an extension of “scientific perspectivism” – an ontology of scientific knowledge and practice that emerges from science studies and philosophies of science. Leading advocates of scientific perspectivism include the philosophers Ronald Giere [2006] and Helen Longino [2006]. Scientific perspectivism offers us at least two important insights for our purposes. First, it enables us to find a middle ground between the extremism of “objective realism” on the one hand, and radical “constructivism” in science on the other. While “objective realism” insists that there are truths in the world to be discovered and that the truths primarily come in the form of laws, “constructivism” holds that truths are discursively (i.e. socially) constructed by scientists (e.g. before the word “planet” entered the scientific lexicon, planets did not exist) [Giere 2006, 4-7]. Scientific perspectivism claims that what scientific inquiry and research actually shows us is that “truths” are the convergence of the physical world on the one hand and the scientists’ “perspective” on the other and that, therefore, the perspective of the scientist-observer is paramount.

The claim, in short, is that knowledge is always perspectival yet also objective. Knowledge arises neither from pure objectivity or subjectivity but from the convergence of the observer’s perspective and the objective world. Giere’s main example is color vision [Ibidem]. Whereas color “objectivism” claims that colors exist in the world, and are inherent in physical properties, and whereas color subjectivism theorizes color as inherent to the observer, the fact of the matter is that color is a convergence of perspective and the physical properties of that being seen. Color does emerge from physical stimuli in the world, but which color is seen depends upon the perspective of the observer. For instance, most humans are trichomats; they see with

15 In offering perspectival realism as the epistemic frame of Southern Theory, the goal is not to displace Southern Theory or offer an alternative interpretation. The point is to marshal support for it by revealing what I argue are its often implicit foundations.
the aid of three receptors. But some humans are dichromats, and they actually “see”
different colors. And animals that have more than three receptors see more colors
than do humans. Colors are “real enough,” he says, but “their reality is perspectival”
[Ibidem, 14].

Another example is modern astronomy. In modern astronomic practice, differ-
ent observational instruments – or what Giere [Ibidem, 48] calls “means of observa-
tion” – are necessarily used to “perceive” the cosmos, which involves capturing cer-
tain gamma rays. Astronomers use different instruments, and each instrument gener-
ates a different image of the same thing: such as the Milky Way. The Oriented Scint-
tillation Spectrometer Experiment (OSSE) produces a different image of the center of
the Milky Way than does the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory (CGRO): the two
instruments respectively offer different “perspectives” on the same thing [Ibidem,
44-48]. As Giere explains:

Humans and various other electromagnet detectors respond differently to different
electromagnetic spectra. Moreover, humans and various other electromagnetic de-
tectors may face the same spectrum of electromagnetic radiation and yet have dif-
ferent responses to it. […] Each detector views the electromagnetic world from its
own perspective. Every observation is perspectival in this sense [Ibidem, 48].

The second insight of scientific perspectivism is related: since knowledge is al-
ways perspectival yet objective, there can be multiple truths. Knowledge is always
partial. The image of the center of the Milky Way produced from OSSE is no less,
or no more “true,” than the image produced by the CGRO. They are just different
instruments capturing the same reality but capturing different parts of it. They each
capture a part of reality, offering partial knowledge. Even models in biology or chem-
istry, Giere explains, are known to
capture only limited aspects of the world, leaving many unknown interactions to
prevent any significant model from being exactly correct [Ibidem, 67].

Therefore, he insists,

not only is scientific observation perspectival, but also […] there are multiple per-
spectives from which one must choose and no “objectively” correct choice [Ibidem,
56].

The human eye or thirty power telescopes: they are just different perspectives
on the same thing, and each is true. They each capture different aspects of the same
reality, because their “perspectives” are different.¹⁶

¹⁶ Even so-called scientific “advances” are not necessarily the same thing as getting a more
Here, maps are good examples. Giere points out that knowledge always comes in the form of some kind of “representational models,” and these models, or theories, are exactly like maps [Ibidem, 59]. They are always perspectival, aimed a particular purpose, and offer a partial view of the thing or object they seek to represent and they can never represent everything about it. A map of the London subway system is meant to allow someone to use the subway. It will thus be different of a road map of London, which is meant for someone to walk or drive through the city. Both will be different from a map of London’s main buildings, which is meant for tourists to visit London’s sites. They are each equally true, but only relative to their purpose. And they are each partial. A map of London’s buildings says little to nothing about the subway; nor does can it even represent everything about London’s buildings. It does not, for instance, represent the height of the buildings. We could, of course, try to put all of these things on a single map, but even that would not fully represent London. What about the trees in London and their relative density? What about the sewer system? As Giere concludes:

the only perfect map of a territory would be the territory itself, which would no longer be a map at all [Ibidem, 73].

My proposition is that social knowledge is also subject to the same epistemological principles, and that recognizing this offers a warrant for a Southern standpoint approach. But to make this work, we must be able to extend scientific perspectivism to apply to social science. In existing scholarship, scientific perspectivism applies to the natural sciences only. So how can we translate it into sociology? In particular, we must ask: where do the different “perspectives” that ultimately yield new knowledge come from? For Giere, the different perspectives arise from different “means of observation” or instruments. What about social science? Drawing upon post-positivist standpoint theory (and related developments in Science and Technology Studies that emphasize the social situated-ness of knowledge), I argue that the social science equivalent to what Giere refers to as “perspective” is the social entry point of analysis; or, in other words, the standpoint of analysis. It is here where post-positivist standpoint theory helps. 17

“objective truth.” Giere summons Galileo: “Before the Seventeenth century, the Milky Way, as part of a commonsense perspective on the world, was perceived using human eyes simply as a broad band of light extending across the night sky. From the perspective of Galileo’s roughly thirty power telescopes, it was perceived as being made up of a very large number of individual stars. But this was a change in perspective, not a move from a mere perspective to objective truth” [Giere 2006, 58].

17 One different contender for a parallel in social science for what Giere calls “perspective” are different measurement “devices” [Callon, Millo and Muniesa 2007]. This is also worth considering,
7. **Post-Positivist Standpoint Theory**

I stress “post-positivist” standpoint theory to differentiate it from conventional or *positivist* feminist standpoint theory that, in turn, is rooted in Hegel’s master-slave dialectic.\(^{18}\) In the relationship between master and slave, each side sees different things; the slave’s position of oppression enables the slave to attain a privileged consciousness. Lukács later articulated the Marxist variation of this theme. The proletariat, by virtue of their distinct position within the circulation of capital, achieves a liberating consciousness. Conventional feminist theory borrowed from these ideas thought to argue that women (as a parallel to Lukács’ proletariat) see the world differently from men. Men and women each have different perspectives on the world. This is a type of perspectivism: perceptions and understandings of the world are partly determined by the characteristics of the observer, i.e. their “perspective.” But positivist standpoint theory added two further qualifications to this perspectivism that differentiate it from post-positivist theory.

First, in positivist or conventional standpoint theory, some perspectives, in this case, those of women, are *superior* to men. Women have *epistemic privilege*. The implication is that women’s social knowledge is complete and total, while men’s knowledge is partial, if not wrong altogether. Furthermore, positivist standpoint theory grounds this privilege in women’s biological characteristics. Nancy Hartsock famously argued that because women are child-bearers, they had an entirely different orientation to the world than men and, by virtue of that difference, better knowledge of the world. The “female sense of self” is “connected to the world” while the male sense of self” is “separate, distinct and even disconnected.” The former makes better knowledge [Hartsock 1983, 295].

What I refer to as “post-positivist” standpoint theory, emerging from later feminist standpoint theories (e.g. Smith [1997b and 2005a]), philosophers of knowledge [Harding 2004b] and STS [Wylie 2003], differs on both of these counts. First, it eschews essentialism for the more basic sociological claim that all knowledge is shaped socially. Post-positivist standpoint theory abjures the biological determination of standpoints with a recognition of *social* determination. This insight relates but my point here is to make the more extensive claim that different social positions also afford different perspectives.

\(^{18}\) This is partially derived from feminist standpoint theory; it is also derived from the philosopher Sandra Harding’s work and STS scholars who advocate the concept “situated knowledge” and scientific perspectivism, such as Longino [2006]. For some, like Harding [2005], standpoint theory is already post-positivist, but so “post-positivist standpoint theory” is redundant. But some versions of standpoint theory are not post-positivism, such as conventional feminist standpoint theory as discussed here.
to constructivist sociologies of science, whether of the “Strong Programme” (e.g. Pickering, Shapin [Longino [2006, 7]]) or the weaker version (e.g. Knorr-Cetina), that show that scientists’ knowledge is determined by social context. In this scholarship, the type or form of “context” varies: it can be the social interests driving the research, the social experiences of the researchers, the social dynamics of scientific fields, or the sociological characteristics of laboratories. But the basic shared insight is that all knowledge is socially shaped in one way or another – it is socially-situated – and post-positivist standpoint theory extends this premise to society as a whole. It is not just that the dynamics of the fields of science or the lab shape knowledge, it is that different social positions within society each offer different perspectives or standpoints. Different social positions mean that different groups of individuals have different experiences, and different experiences contribute to different perspectives. What one sees is shaped by where one stands within society.\(^{19}\) As Wylie summarizes:

> social location systematically shapes and limits what we know, including tacit experiential knowledge as well as explicit understanding, what we take knowledge to be as well as specific epistemic content [2003, 31].\(^{20}\)

To contrast this with positivist standpoint theory: it is not the biological characteristics of child-rearing *per se* which is the basis for the distinct standpoint but the fact that women in modern patriarchal societies have been forced into the domestic sphere. This social fact is what gives them different experiences and in turn shapes their different perspectives. There is, as Patricia Hill Collins stresses:

> a commonality of experiences and perspectives that emerge for groups differentially arrayed within hierarchical power relations. [Therefore] groups who share common placement in hierarchical power relations also share common experiences in such power relations. Such shared angles of vision lead those in similar social locations to be predisposed to interpret these experiences in comparable fashion [1997, 377].

If, for instance, there is something like a “male standpoint,” it is only because men have traditionally stood at the apex of institutional hierarchies, and therefore have a different view of the world [Smith 1997b, 119]. Thus, *all* knowledge is of this nature; it is all socially-situated. Rather than the products of disembodied Cartesian

---

19 Harding’s [1995] notion of “strong objectivity” implies that if we adopt the standpoint of subordinated groups we can be “more” objective, which in turn seems to imply epistemic privilege. But Harding also suggests that dominant positions provide important insights into social reality, although different ones. This is because each social position offers particular insights and leads to specific questions than others. For more on this see Hirsh, Olson and Harding [1995, 205-208]. Elsewhere Harding [1993, 58] forthrightly rejects the claim that feminist standpoint theory is “ethnocentric” – that it claims that is knowledge is superior.

20 Standpoint theory no longer aligns with a thesis of automatic epistemic privilege, as Wylie suggests [2003, 28-31].
knowers exhibiting a “view from nowhere,” all social knowledge emerges from a place – i.e. a standpoint.

The second difference with conventional standpoint theory is that post-positivist standpoint theory eschews the belief in epistemic privilege. Post-positivist standpoint theory does not claim that certain standpoints offer superior, better, or more complete knowledge; only that they offer different knowledge. The standpoint of women is not necessarily or intrinsically better than men’s, it is just a different standpoint – a different perspective. Thus, subordinated positions do not offer privileged access to knowledge; it they offer different access [Smith 1997a]. This insinuates the claim that all knowledge is partial and incomplete rather than total and complete. As Pels explains:

[T]here exist opposed locations that generate disparate social experiences, which in turn define divergent, partial points of view [2004, 274].

In other words, all knowledge is socially positioned; so-called objective reality can be differentially perceived – or “known” – in the sense that different aspects of the same thing might be viewed or discovered as opposed to others.

8. For a Southern Standpoint

My claim is that post-positivist standpoint theory and scientific perspectivalism can be articulated together as a warrant for a subaltern standpoint approach that does not fall prey to the criticisms leveled against Southern theory and indigenous sociology. First, when it comes to social knowledge, different social positions contribute to different perspectives – that is, different standpoints. These social “positions” can be different social contexts of research or theorizing (as in STS studies that reveal how different lab conditions and social arrangements contribute to different findings), different social identities in a larger social structure, or some combination of both. The point is not to fix, a priori, which social contexts or social identities matter for knowledge, but merely to highlight that social positions do matter: they are each distinct standpoints. Different social identities are afforded distinct experiences and

---

21 I am admittedly lumping together different theories into a single category which some of the authors might not recognize, but I do so for the purpose of differentiating this approach from conventional standpoint theory that insists upon biologically-based epistemic privilege. The work of Harding best clarifies the “post-positivist” aspect of standpoint theory. Harding [2005]

22 Post-positivist standpoint theory thus goes beyond its Hegelian-Marxian origins (and Lukácsian) articulations that trumpeted the proletariat as the epistemic vanguard and replaces epistemic privilege with an acknowledgement that knowledge is always situated and hence partial.

23 In some societies, race is a salient social identity that is intimately tied to a hierarchy: in those
hence lenses by which to view the world. These different standpoints are like Giere’s observational modes or instruments: each offers respectively different perspectives. They each allow us to see in the world in a certain way, highlighting some things but not others, and helping us to interpret the meaning of some things in ways that might be different from the interpretations that other social experiences might afford.

Second, the particular experiences and meanings from different standpoints serve as the basis for new concepts and/or theories. The distinct lens or social experience constituting standpoints are the necessary bases for social knowledge and hence theory construction; they each offer the data or meanings that in turn enable us to theorize and understand. They enable us to construct a “map” of the social world based upon that original place. If a map of London’s subway system is a “model” or “theory” of London’s topography, what allows one to construct it in the first place is a specific view or standpoint underneath the city. To have a different map of London’s topography – such as, say, a map of the roads – requires a different standpoint: one has to move upwards to the ground level.

My claim is that a Southern standpoint operates similarly. That is, it is a perspective or starting point for crafting maps of the social world, and which does not refer to an essential identity, either racial, cultural or geographic. The Southern standpoint instead refers to a relational position within global hierarchies. This is a geopolitical and social position, constituted historically within broader relations of power, that embeds the viewpoint of peripheral groups. Just as feminist standpoint theory posits a standpoint defined by gendered structures, a Southern standpoint approach posits global hierarchies forged from imperial relations – past and present – as the defining relation. Charges that a Southern standpoint approach involves essentialism can hereby be loudly renounced. A southern standpoint refers not to an essence but a differential position: a position that is different from the imperial-metropolitan position of extant conventional social theory, and the difference does not lie in biological, anthropological or spatial factors but in social experience and history. What constitutes a subaltern standpoint is its positionality: it refers to the subjectivity of subordinated positions within global imperial hierarchies. It refers to a subjectivity attendant with the experience of geopolitical and global socioeconomic subjugation.24 It is an effect of power relations.

Of course, this position of Southern-ness might articulate with ethnic, gender or other identities, not least because imperial and colonial systems often articulated

societies, race might be a standpoint. But in other societies, gender and race will be salient, so either of those, or some intersection of them, will be salient. And so on.

24 Subalternity is “a relational and relative concept.” See Coronil [1997].
them for the purposes of rule. But what makes the subaltern standpoint worthy of theoretical specification is that it brings to the fore global imperial relations and conventional social science’s place within it. It recognizes that social theory and disciplinary sociology adopts a Northern (and hence equally provincial) standpoint and seeks to circumvent it by adopting a standpoint from the geopolitical and socioeconomic South.

Third, the charge that a standpoint is reversely (if not perversely) ethnocentric because it claims epistemic privilege can be dispatched on the same grounds. Privilege is not at stake; at stake is epistemic difference. To admit of standpoints is to recognize that dominant social science knowledge – that is, the knowledge attendant with conventional disciplinary sociology or Anglo-European social theory – represents one standpoint (or perhaps a set of standpoints) among others; and that those other possible standpoints have too long repressed, excluded and marginalized. Or, in the terms of Giere’s scientific perspectivalism, there are always-already only different “perspectives” offering partial knowledge. There is never a single totalizing map; only different maps representing different subject positions and hence offering different points of entry for social knowledge. Hence, a standpoint is a perspective that is, as perspectival realism insists, the only ground for even so-called “objective” knowledge. Subaltern standpoint is neither a recourse to conventional positivist objectivism but neither is it pure postmodern play and subjectivism.

Fourth, the idea that different standpoints occlude the possibility of “objective” truth and runs into pure relativism must be resisted on these grounds too. To advocate for different maps does not necessarily mean that every map is right. Each map is open to falsification. If I have a street map of London and it is wrong, someone else can show me how it is wrong by walking me down the street. Or similarly, the Mercator Project Map, created by the German cartographer Gerardus Mercator in 1569, portrays the world in a way very different from the Peters Projection. It is the “colonizer’s model of the world” [Blaut 1993]. But when considering the map in terms of representing land space in square miles, as well as relative location of the different countries when treating North-South lines at right angles, the map can be said to be incorrect. While it is “true” as a conformal projection, it is not “true” when it comes to representing the area of the contingents [Giere 2006]. In brief, the partial character of knowledge does not mean all knowledge is equally true: that is to say, the co-existence of different theories, rooted in different standpoints, does not

---

25 For a recent exploration of this longstanding concept of intersectionality, see the special issue of Signs, Intersectionality: Theorizing Power, Empowering Theory [38(4), Summer 2013].
necessitate epistemic relativism. Scientific pluralism permits multiple objectivities. The choice between pure Cartesian objectivity and dangerous relativism is a false one that must be thrown out once and for all.

Fifth, and lastly, we can dispute the claim that a Southern standpoint necessarily obscures macrostructures, institutions, or larger patterns of domination. Adopting a standpoint approach is an entry point for analyzing larger structures or systems, not an end point that necessarily obscures them. To return to Giere’s example of maps, every map starts from some fixed point, and from that point the exploration is extended outwards to sketch out wider connections. Just because the starting point is localized does not mean that the analysis and theory ends up as localized. Dorothy Smith’s version of “institutional ethnography,” rooted in a feminist standpoint approach, argues this point exactly. Smith insists that standpoint analysis does analyze “larger patterns of power” (or “ruling relations”); the only difference is that those analyses begin “from below.” Hence in her collaborative research on elementary school education, Smith does not start the analysis from the standpoint of the principals and their administrative order – with all of its timetables, bureaucratic rules, payroll sheets, tables of learning goals, and so on. Rather she starts with mothers of students to see how those mothers experience the school. Based upon this initial step, Smith is led to other considerations: what is it about the social organization of the school that leads to these experiences? What is it about the local economy upon which their households depend that leads to the mothers’ conflicted imperatives between their household economy and their relation to the school? Smith is led to consider and problematize the webs of relations that account for those experiences, from those of the wider public school system to social processes like capital accumulation or patriarchic culture. One begins from the standpoint but ends up with much more. A sociology starting with the Southern standpoint would approach empirics similarly. It would start from the activities, experiences, and perspectives of subaltern groups but it would not end there.

In short: the strategy is to suspend or circumvent the analytic categories constructed from the Northern-metropolitan standpoint and instead start from the ground up. Start, in brief, from the standpoint of the Southern – where “the Southern” is akin to the concept “subaltern”: it marks not a singular or essential subjectivity but a relational location from which to begin. Start with the concerns and experiences, categories and discourses, perceptions and problems of those groups visited by imperial and neoimperial imposition (those very imposers and posers of power

---

26 Harding has been the most ardent defender of standpoint theory against such charges of relativism. See especially Harding [1993, 61-62; 1998, 162-163; 1997, 384].
Go, Globalizing Sociology, Turning South

whose activities have served to subjugate those groups’ standpoints, their alternative knowledges, in the first place). Start from their perspectives, perceptions, and practices, and reconstruct social worlds from there.27

To see how this works, below I explore two sets of innovations in social knowledge: race and colonial theory from Franz Fanon, and economic dependency theory from Raúl Prebisch.

9. The Southern Standpoints of Fanon & Prebisch

Both Fanon and Prebisch have been discussed by existing proponents of indigenous sociology/Southern theory as exemplary [e.g. Connell 2007]. But how did they achieve their innovations? I argue that their innovations emerge precisely through a deployment, however implicit at times, of the Southern standpoint. I also argue that they do so in two different ways: Fanon by first drawing upon his own experiences, and Prebisch by methodologically taking on a Southern subject position. Therefore, by exploring their innovations, we can see how a Southern standpoint approach generates new knowledge that escapes metrocentrism. We can also see how the approach does not necessitate essentialist identities, epistemic relativism, or an occlusion of macro-structures.

Take, first, the innovations of Franz Fanon. Today we take it for granted that colonialism was a racialized system of domination and exploitation that impacted colonizer and colonized alike. But that is a relatively new insight, and one of its initial proponents was Fanon. Prior to Fanon’s writings, popular and even scholarly understandings of colonialism had been mired in colonial ethnologies and administrative discourse that either occluded colonialism as a social object or only thought of it as a neutral expression of governance. They did not think of colonialism as a system in its own right. In fact, French intellectuals had not made colonialism a proper category of analysis in the 1950s. When they discussed colonialism, it was usually in

27 In this sense, the approach would not countenance Burawoy’s [1998 and 2000] global ethnography which already presumes the validity of theoretical categories and which treats ethnography as a demonstration of causal mechanisms specified already by a theory. Instead, the approach is more closely rooted in feminist standpoint ethnographies such as articulated in Smith’s “institutional ethnography” [Smith 2005a e 2005b]. It is also more akin to what Timmermans and Tavory [2012] call “abduction,” where the important element is the “surprise” of empirical. For another helpful statement on ethnography and theory, see Wilson and Chadda [2009]. None of this, of course, gets around the problem of representing experience identified by Joan Scott [1991] that reiterates Spivak’s question about representing the subaltern and which gives up on capturing experiences at all for the project of analyzing the historical construction of identities. On the other hand, Scott’s methodological injunction is exactly the same I am arguing here, that we must not impose pre-given categories (in Scott’s case, categories relating to identity) upon our historical subjects.
terms of colonial policies (debating the policy of “assimilation” versus “association,” for instance). Colonialism was merely a medium for other social forces. Missing was a proper colonial studies: theories and research that treated colonialism as a social force, as an object or a structure that had definite impact upon social relations and identities [Cooper 2002; Go 2013b: 50-53]. The idea that colonialism had structuring principles and causal power had been barely raised. At the same time, thinking on race had been dominated by colonial sociology and ethnology [Fanon 1967 (1952): xiii]. These sociologies and ethnographies, produced since the founding of the Institut d’Ethnologie in 1925, often worked from biological or anthropological categories of culture while often deploying nascent modernization theories to portray colonized racial groups as timeless entities awaiting intervention or preservation. Colonialism was intrinsically benign; and if violence or exploitation occurred, these were aberrations or deviations from an assumed norm [e.g. Tillion 1958].

Fanon innovated on both counts. For Fanon, colonialism was not just a neutral medium but a distinct type of social order, one that was racially bifurcated into a Manichean binary.

The colonial world is cut in two. The dividing line, the frontiers, are shown by barracks and police stations […] The two zones are opposed, but not in service of a higher unity. Obedient to the rules of pure Aristotelian logic, they both follow the principle of reciprocal exclusivity [Fanon 1968 (1961), 38-39].

Thereby theorizing colonialism as a social system in its own right, he likewise theorized it as one that shaped the identities of both the colonized and the colonizing and tied his theory to his seminal insights on race. French settlers and officials had justified colonial rule of Algeria on the grounds that black Algerians were racially inferior and primitive. Fanon argued instead that it was the colonial system that must be taken into account [Fanon 1967 (1952), 97-100]. The colonized’s inferiority does not countenance colonialism; the colonized’s inferiority was produced by colonialism – and this exactly because colonialism is a structuring force rather than a neutral medium. He relatedly critiqued the dominant ontologies of race that manifested “epidermalized thought” and exposed the relational and socially-constructed nature of racial categories [Gilroy 2010, 157]. The colonial relationship itself constructs race: the colonized exist only in relation to colonizer, and so blackness constructed only in relation to whiteness.

As Fanon declares in Black Skin, White Masks:

28 The only exceptions included Georges Balandier’s [1951 (1966)] theory of the “colonial situation” and nascent Marxist anthropologies that saw colonialism as an engine of primitive accumulation.
For not only must the black man be black, he must be black in relation to the white man [Fanon 1967 (1952), 110].

For his time, Fanon’s approach to colonialism and race was a revelation, yielding an innovative social theory, a different “map” on colonialism and race. But how did Fanon begin? What was Fanon’s analytic entry? Fanon did not begin by transposing categories like “structure-agency” or “civil society” onto the colonial site. Of course, given that Giddens’ formulation of structure-agency, or Habermas’ theory of civil society, had yet to enter social science, Fanon could not have done so. But Parsonian structural-functionalism as well as French structuralism had been available at the time. Frueidian psychoanalysis, Marxism, liberal theories of society had also been available. But Fanon did not begin his analyses of colonialism with categories derived from these systems of thought. Nor did he begin by transposing other ideas from the conceptual toolkit of the Northern standpoint. While he would later employ psychoanalytic categories, he notoriously criticized attempts to apply Freudian categories to places like colonial Algeria. Based upon the narrow experiences of the Austrian middle-class, why, Fanon opined, should we automatically and unproblematically apply the categories to other contexts?

Freud and Adler and even the cosmic Jung did not think of the Negro in all their investigations. And they were quite right not to have. It is often forgotten that neurosis is not a basic element of human reality. Like it or not the Oedipus complex is far from coming into being among Negroes [Fanon 1967 (1952), 151].

In crafting his account and critique of race relations, Fanon first drew from his own experiences and observations as a black subject of the French colonial empire. His experience of being interpellated on the train in France after coming from Martinique was foundational: “Look, a Negro!” [Ibidem]. Starting from this experience of being racialized, Fanon then went on to probe the features and functions of race in the French empire. He traced the devastating impact of racism upon colonized peoples as well as the mutual constitution of racial categories and identities. Throughout, Fanon indeed engaged with European theoretical categories, nut he did not begin analytically them. He instead started from the standpoint of the racialized colonial subject: their activities, experiences, and perceptions. Recall his famous opening to Black Skin, White Masks:

What does the black man want? [Ibidem, xii].

By this standpoint analysis, Fanon eventually came to theorize colonialism as a social form with its own dynamics and impact: a racialized system of violence and domination that impacted the psyches and identities of both colonizer and colo-
nized. His Southern standpoint enabled him to see new things about race and colonialism that the dominant imperial-colonial standpoint (expressed in colonial ethnologies, administrative discourse or even social scientific theories in Europe) had repressed or at least had not seen. This in turn enabled Fanon to craft new concepts and theories for capturing certain social experiences and processes under colonialism. Fanon offered a new “map” that charted the complexities of colonialism from below.

But Fanon did not stop there. While Fanon started with specific local experiences, the local site was merely scaffolding for moving upwards to apprehend larger social formations. Much of his theorization on French colonialism, its effects, and its racial as well as economic logics began with distinct experiences, not only as a colonial subject in the imperial capital of Paris but also working as chef de service in one of the largest psychiatric hospitals in Algeria. By then, the French “civilizing” mission had taken on an especially violent form in Algeria, not least as the French state sought to repress the rising anti-colonial movement in the 1950s with heightened aggression. In the hospital, Fanon saw the results of the repression first-hand, treating both Algerian fighters and French police officers. Starting from that experience, Fanon moved upwards, analyzing not just his own experience or offering merely an ethnography of a hospital. His experience in the hospital with these patients – these victims of violence – bore witness to larger patterns and institutions of colonialism and racism [Fanon 1968 (1951)]. He built upon the perspective of the individual to map the larger system of power in which the individual is embedded. Fanon thus began with the Southern standpoint but moved upwards, enabling him to critically rethinking what colonialism is and how it works, and to ultimately theorize its systematic features. The claim by critics of standpoint theory that standpoints only result in localized or individualized social analysis can hereby be dispatched.

Note that Fanon’s standpoint approach began with Fanon’s own direct experiences, reflecting the standpoint of a colonized Black male subject in the French empire. But the Southern standpoint is not inextricably tethered to bodies. Rather

---

29 This was different from Balandier’s [1951 (1966)] theory because it emphasized violence and racism.

30 We might posit that a Southern standpoint approach facilitates this theory-construction by “defamiliarizing” both the observers’ common sense and the theories derived from the metropolitan-imperial standpoint with which the observer might be most comfortable with. In this case it works by “abduction” rather than induction: generating theory by surprise [Timmermans and Tavory 2012]. This is where it differs from the famous “grounded theory” of Glaser and Strauss [1967]. The move is analogous to that made by feminist standpoint theorists. Dorothy Smith’s standpoint approach begins with “people’s experience” and the “issues, concerns, or problems that are real for (them)” [Smith 1997b, 129]. Feminist theories “start from women’s lives.” Similarly, Fanon starts from the lives of colonized subjects.
than an essence, it is a relational subject position. Thus, social analysts’ own direct experiences do not have to form the entry point. To see the world from below, to see the world differently, the social analyst can also step into or adopt the Southern subject-position through empirical research. I suggest that this is how dependency theory came into being. In this case, the analyst is not a black colonial subject of the French empire but rather a professional economist from Argentina, Raúl Prebisch. And the social hierarchy to which the Southern standpoint offers epistemic access is not a racial colonial hierarchy but a global economic system.

It is well-known that Wallerstein’s world-systems theory originates partly from dependency theory. It is also well-known that dependency theory originates with Prebisch, whom Wallerstein himself cites as one of the his inspirations. Indeed, Prebisch essentially invented dependency theory. He had worked out various strands of the theory in the 1930s and early 1940s, but its most complete and seminal statement was in his work *The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems*, later referred to as the “Havana Manifesto” because it was presented at United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) conference in Havana in May 1949 (and printed in English by the United Nations in 1950) [ECLA 1950; Dosman 2008, 243]. In very brief terms, the paper and theorized the world economy as a single interconnected system affected by a common business cycle and specified it as hierarchical structure marked by those in the “centre,” the industrial countries, and those in the “periphery,” the “developing” countries [ECLA 1950].

Prior to the Havana Manifesto, Prebisch had already begun to use the terms “centre” and “periphery” in some of his writings [Dosman 2008, 241]. But in the Manifesto, Prebisch systematized them and connected them to a larger economic theory. This was the innovation: Prebisch conceptualized a unified world economy, or an “international division of labor,” in his terms, consisting of centers and peripheries, each of which preform functionally different roles. The periphery supplies primary products for the manufactured products of the centre. The business cycle begins in the industrial countries and then spreads to the periphery. His main example was Latin America, whose

specific task as part of the periphery of the world economic system [had been] that of producing food and raw materials for the great industrial centres [ECLA 1950, 1].

In hindsight, the theory seems almost banal, but for the time, Prebisch’s paper was almost insurrectionary. The presentation at Havana apparently “electrified his audience” and “created a sensation in the media throughout Latin America.” As Dosman summarizes:
[the paper was] a key event that changed the vocabulary of international development [2008, 243].

Connell, in her discussion of Southern theory, classifies the paper as one of the most important statements in Twentieth century social science [2007, 141].

To be sure, the idea of a unified world economy with centers and peripheries was not only innovative in itself, but it mounted a significant challenge to dominant economic theory. Foremost, it overturned one of the long-standing assumptions of neoclassical trade theory, extending all the way to the Nineteenth century English political economists and even continuing through John Maynard Keynes, that the benefits of export for industry and agriculture were the same and that the terms of trade of industrial manufactures relative to agricultural produce would eventually decrease [Dosman 2008, 244; Toye and Toye 2003, 438]. Prebisch not only showed that agricultural exporters were peripheries to a center in the unified world economy, but also that through this relationship the terms of trade for primary products (i.e. the periphery) actually declined, not for the industrial center [Toye and Toye 2003, 439]. And as the economy goes through its business cycle, it impacts the two positions differently and to the detriment of the periphery. Furthermore, Prebisch historicized this thesis, innovating what became known as the “historical-structural method.” That is, Prebisch pointed specifically to the fact that the United States was replacing Great Britain as the new economic hegemon, and that because the United States was also a major commodity producer, Latin America was more or less forced into a peripheral position, relegated to exporting primary products only, and hence was doomed to see increasing poverty as the its terms of trade declined by its trade with the United States [ECLA 1950, 4-14].

In short, Prebisch challenged the assumption that the division of labor between agriculture and industry was mutually beneficial, and hence, he challenged anyone who said that the international division of labor was mutually beneficial. Rather than “equilibrium” in the international division of labor, Prebisch wrote,

there exists an obvious disequilibrium, a fact which, whatever its explanation or justification, destroys the basic premise underlying the (justification for) the international division of labour [ECLA 1950, 1].

Fittingly, the paper received negative and sometimes “harsh” responses to the paper by leading mainstream economists, including Charles Kindleberger. But this merely
underlined the seriousness of Prebisch’s challenge to traditional economic theory [...] [while creating] consternation among senior UN and US officials in New York and Washington who understood its power [Dosman 2008, 246-247].

But how did Prebisch arrive at his theory? Again, an implicit Southern standpoint approach was at work. Conventional economic thought about Argentina, its trade relations with the rest of the world, and of international economics generally started from and assumed the universality of neoclassical economic theory. Prebisch’s move was to violate that assumption, analytically bracket neoclassical theory, and instead start from the ground up. For example, a key moment in Prebisch’s early work was a review of a book published in 1913 in Argentina by Norberto Piñero, a private banker and Argentinian finance minister of Argentina. Piñero’s book followed the dominant trend of simply applying economic laws from the North to Argentina. Piñero’s book, *La Moneda, el Credito y los Bancos en la Argentina*, was a history of banking in Argentina which was narrated around the assumption that the business cycle in Argentina simply followed the European experience: prosperity produces excessive credit which in turn leads to crisis because of over-consumption and over-importation, and this disequilibrium in turn self-corrects due to the rise of interest rates. This was essentially the assumption of liberal equilibrium theory [Dosman 2008, 37]. Piñero, however, had not used any evidence: much of his argument was anecdotal. Prebisch challenged this. In an effort to better theorize international trade relations, he started by bracketing Northern economic theories – such as liberal equilibrium theory – and instead collected data on business cycles himself. Specifically, he began collecting data on Argentinian business cycles and on other Latin American countries that had not been typically collected or systematically analyzed. Indeed, one of his research innovations prior to his Havana paper was to systematically collect such economic data. Much of his thinking prior to the Havana paper had unfolded as Director of the United Nation’s new Economic Commission for Latin America, and one of the justifications for that Commission was to provide better information on economic conditions in Latin America specifically, because systematic and comprehensive data had been lacking. Data collection was the task that Prebisch led [Toye and Toye 2003, 451].

This is the crucial difference from Piñero’s analytic move, and that of other economists. Whereas Piñero and others universally applied, and presumed the validity of, Northern theory – that is, theories of the economy forged from the experiences of Europe and hence reflecting the Northern standpoint. But Prebisch began with Argentina; that is, by thinking about the world economy from the Argentinian standpoint, as seen through economic data on Argentina. This research into the specifics of Latin American economies was crucial for Prebisch’s thinking. What Prebisch found,
as Dosman explains, was that even Keynes’ *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* [1936] was not adequate for what he had begun to call “the periphery” [Dosman 2008, 214].

He learned that the business cycles did not unfold in the periphery as predicted by extant theories because those models did not see how the periphery was connected to processes in the larger world-economy. He explained:

I have not observed, neither in the cycles I have seen closely nor in those that I have studied in our history, the existence of domestic factors with the sufficient force to (explain the cycles) [Prebisch 1991, III, 371 (my translation)].

Rather than separate economies, he found “interdependence” between them which was the key for explaining the unexplained phenomena of these business cycles [*Ibidem*, IV, 325 (my translation)].

And ultimately, more than discovering such interdependence, he found that it was the interdependence that generated cycles peculiar to the Argentinian experience that were absent in the European experience [Dosman 2008, 37]. Therefore, it was through Prebisch’s continued exploration of business cycles in Argentina that he arrived at the notion of functional difference between center and periphery and how they were linked to the detriment of the latter [Toye and Toye 2003, 444]. By starting from the Southern standpoint for examining the economy – that is, by looking at the economy from the empirics of Argentina’s place within it – Prebisch came to see the fundamental flaw of neoclassical trade theory, which assumed equal benefits for industrial and agricultural exporters and which was assumed to have the same validity in Latin America as in the US or Britain [Dosman 2008, 344].

Prebisch’s innovations thus emerged by first bracketing the Northern standpoint and instead analytically adopting the Southern standpoint. Prebisch viewed the world economy not from the standpoint of the North but from the periphery of the system; and it is precisely by this approach that he could criticize the presumed universality of neoclassical economic theory and arrive at an alternative approach. He himself seemed to recognize his own Southern standpoint approach in his critique of the universal assumptions of economic theory:

It is true that the reasoning on the economic advantages of the international division of labour (by neoclassical economics) is theoretically sound, but it is...based upon an assumption which has been conclusively proved false by facts. According to this assumption, the benefits of technical progress tend to be distributed alike over the
whole community. [...] The flaw in this assumption is that of generalizing from the particular. If by "the community" only the great industrial countries are meant, it is indeed true that the benefits of technical progress are gradually distributed among all social groups and classes. If, however, the concept of the community is extended to include the periphery of the world economy, a serious error is implicit in the generalization. The enormous benefits that derive from increased productivity have not reached the periphery in a measure comparable to that obtained by the peoples of the great industrial countries [ECLA 1950, 1, emphasis added].

Prebisch directly critiques what we have called “metrocentrism”; he critiques economics for “generalizing from the particular.” Relatedly, in a footnote in the Havana manifesto, Prebisch explained why economics had not yet discovered what he had discovered: its lack of a peripheral perspective, and its insistence upon universalizing its own parochial view.

One of the most conspicuous deficiencies of general economic theory, from the point of view of the periphery, is its false sense of universality. It could hardly be expected that the economists of the great countries, absorbed by serious problems of their own, should devote preferential attention to a study of those of Latin America [ECLA 1950, 7, fn 1].

The parallel with Fanon’s innovations are noteworthy. As Fanon offered new theories on race and colonialism to inaugurate postcolonial and critical race theory, so did Prebisch offer a new economic theory on the declining terms of trade that in turn gave birth to what we know as Neo-Marxist “dependency theory.” And both innovated by first starting from the Southern standpoint: Fanon by starting from the experiences of colonized peoples within the French empire, Prebisch by starting from the particular economic experiences and trends of Argentina. But the comparison also reveals an important difference: Fanon first drew from his own direct experiences as a black subject of the French empire for his standpoint approach, while Prebisch adopted the standpoint from the outside, that is, through particular data on Argentina. This is an important difference, not because it negates a Southern standpoint approach but because it shows how the Southern standpoint is not reducible to an investigators’ essential identity or presumed epistemic privilege. Prebisch himself was born in Argentina, but it was not his Argentinian identity that enabled him to innovate, it was his collection and deployment of empirical data on Argentina that offered him the viewpoint of the periphery. It in this sense precisely that a standpoint is akin to what Giere calls the “means of observation:” the Southern standpoint is a methodological tool for seeing the world – it is a tool that any

31 It is notable that Wallerstein’s initial work was on Africa, and Frank’s was on Chile. These suggest the importance of starting theorizing from the South.
investigator, regardless of their racial, geographical or ethnic identity – can pick up and use. Charges that indigenous sociology/Southern relies upon an essentialism can here be dismissed. It is the standpoint that matters, not the identity of those who are standing.\footnote{This also means that a Southern standpoint approach is not restricted to \textit{qualitative} analysis: Prebisch adopted the Southern standpoint through quantitative data on economic cycles.}

10. Conclusion: For More Knowledge

If it is widely accepted that some kind of global sociology is needed to advance social knowledge and transcend sociology’s parochial origins, it is less clear how to do so. This essay follows the route paved by the indigenous sociology/Southern theory movement and completes it by advocating for a Southern standpoint approach. By this approach, we start our theory and research by first bracketing Northern theories and instead attend to the concerns, categories, experiences and practices of people and societies positioned at the bottom of the global hierarchy. This essay thereby suggests that the indigenous sociology and Southern theory movement has it right: one way to overcome social science’s Northern provincialism and cultivate a more global sociology is to listen to voices from beyond social science’s initial domain of metropolitan centers and root social theory in the experiences of other populations besides metropolitan elites in the Global North (not in the experiences, and hence the theories, of metropolitan elites). But it also mounts the approach upon perspectival realism. This offers a number of advantages, and pushes the project of Southern theory further along. First, as argued above, it allows us to listen to propose something akin to indigenous sociology/Southern theory without falling into the traps of essentialism. A standpoint is a relational position, not an essence. Second, and relatedly, perspectival realism allows us to recognize the virtue of theoretical plurality without promoting epistemic relativism, and summons thus the value of Southern standpoints (even as they offer, just like Northern theory, only partial knowledge). Finally, perspectival realism as the epistemology and ontology of a Southern standpoint approach not only helps to absorb critiques that would otherwise plague indigenous sociology/Southern theory, it also gives an epistemic warrant to the project of globalizing sociology. It uniquely articulates the \textit{epistemic necessity} of global sociology. Often, the only warrant given for global sociology is politics and ethics: we should open sociology up to new voices from the global south to be more inclusive and democratic. This is a fine warrant but it might not win over skeptics who still worry about how this might reinscribe epistemic relativism or essentialism; or skep-
tics who do not see the intellectual value of a global sociology. A Southern standpoint approach, rooted in perspectival realism, offers a different warrant than just politics and ethics. It suggests that we need to open up sociology to voices from the global south for better knowledge. It highlights that the more “maps” we have, the better our understanding of the city’s topography will be; in Giere’s terms, the more “means of observation” we have at our disposal, the richer our knowledge of the natural world will be. Similarly, the Southern standpoint approach promulgated in this essay suggests that the more standpoints we have from which to theorize and research, the better our understanding of our social world will be. The problem is that conventional social science has been dominated by theories, concepts, and analyses (i.e. “maps”) that have come from only a single standpoint – that of the Global North – and so our understanding of the world is limited. Theories, concepts and analyses based upon the Southern standpoint are thus needed not just for political, ethical or identity reasons but also for reasons that all social scientists can get behind: a larger repertoire of knowledge by which to think about and engage the social world.

References

Akiwowo, A.A.

Alatas, S.F.

Albrow, M. and King, E. (Eds.)

Balandier, G.


Go, Globalizing Sociology, Turning South


Giddens, A.

Giere, R.N.

Gilman, N.

Gilroy, P.

Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L.

Go, J.


Goswami, M.

Hanafi, S.

Harding, S.


Go, *Globalizing Sociology, Turning South*


Hartsock, N.

Hirsh, E., Olson, G. and Harding, S.

Holmwood, J.

Keim, W.

Keim, W., Çelik, E., Ersche, C. and Wöhner, V. (Eds.)

Kennedy, M.D. and Centeno, M.A.

Keynes, J.M.

Kozlarek, O.

Krause, M.

Kukla, R. and Ruetsche, L.

Longino, H.

McLennan, G.
2013  “Postcolonial Critique: the Necessity of Sociology.” *Political Power and Social Theory* 24: 119-144.
Mignolo, W.  

Morris, A.  

Owens, P.  

Patel, S.  


Pels, D.  

Piñero, N.  
1913 *La Moneda, el Credito y los Bancos en la Argentina.* Buenos Aires: J. Menéndez.

Prebisch, R.  

Reed, I.A.  

Rehbein, B.  

Robinson, C.  

Rostow, W.W.  

Scott, J.  

Seidman, S.  

Go, *Globalizing Sociology, Turning South*

Sewell, W.H. Jr.

Sitas, A.
2004 *Voices that Reason - Theoretical Parables.* Pretoria: University of South Africa Press.

Smith, D.E.

Sousa Santos, B. de.

Sousa Santos, Boaventura de, Nunes, J.A. and Meneses, M.P.

Spohn, W.

Steinmetz, G.

Tillion, G.

Timmermans, S. and Tavory, I.

Toye, J. and Toye, R.

Vitalis, R.

Wallerstein, I.

Wilson, W.J. and Chaddha, A.


Wylie, A.


Zimmerman, A.

Globalizing Sociology, Turning South
Perspectival Realism and the Southern Standpoint

Abstract: It is now recognized that social science needs to “globalize.” The premise is that social science’s concerns, categories and theories have been formulated, forged, and enacted of and for Anglo-European metropoles. But exactly how to overcome this problem of “metrocentrism” and truly globalize sociology remains a dilemma. While some suggest that tracking extensive connections or global “systems” can meet the challenge, a different set of solutions proposes to “indigenize” or draw upon “Southern” theory. Yet, this latter approach has faced charges of reverse essentialism, epistemic relativism, and its inability to theorize structural forces or institutions. The present essay proposes a Southern standpoint approach that extends the existing indigenous sociology/Southern theory movement but transcends its limitations. By grounding the approach in an epistemology and ontology of perspectival realism and post-foundationalist feminist standpoint theory, sociology can begin its theorizing and research from a Southern standpoint without resorting to essentialism, relativism, or microanalytics and thereby advance global sociology. The essay shows how the theoretical innovations of Frantz Fanon and Raúl Prebisch exemplify this Southern standpoint approach.

Keywords: Social Theory; Indigenous Sociology; Southern Theory; Standpoint Theory; Perspectival Realism; Fanon; Dependency Theory.

Julian Go is Professor of Sociology at Boston University. His recent books include Postcolonial Thought and Social Theory [Oxford, 2016], Fielding Transnationalism [Wiley & Sons, 2016], co-edited with Monika Krause, and Postcolonial Sociologies: A Reader, (ed.) [Emerald, 2016]. His earlier books have won awards from the International Studies Association, the American Sociological Association, and the American Political Science Association.