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Settling Outside Gateways. The State of the Art, and the Issues At Stake
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Immigrant settlement outside gateway cities is evolving and becoming more and more important for both migration and urban studies. The articles in this symposium explore this issue and the facets of immigrant settlement outside gateway cities via case studies in different local contexts: Bonizzoni and Marzorati on Brianza, an area of Northern Italy close to Milan; Garzón on small towns in Catalonia, Spain; Kreichauf on Genthin, in Saxony-Anhalt, Germany; Scarpa on Landskrona, in Sweden; Mayorga-Gallo on a neighbourhood in Durham, North Carolina. The symposium is closed by a comment by Glick Schiller and Çağlar, the authors that in recent years set the research agenda on localities and migration.

Gateway cities are large hubs attracting huge proportions of migrants – though, as we will see below, they do not attract all migration flows. New destinations outside gateways raise sociological questions related to mobility patterns and incorporation [Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2009].

The aim of the present essay is to frame these cases within a growing body of literature developed in the last twenty years, also using some quantitative information. In particular, we will consider the rescaling approach [Brenner 2004; Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2011] as a key element to interpret ongoing settlement processes.

For this reason, the essay will first analyse different trajectories outside gateways, focusing later on small towns, and defining their specific scalar positions. Then, it will try to explain why immigration outside traditional gateways is selectively gaining momentum in different Western countries. Last, it will question what specific
social, political, and economic incorporation (if any) is taking place in these new destinations.

This symposium lies at the intersection between urban sociology and sociology of immigration, challenging some assumptions that can be found in these two research strands.

For a long time, both immigration and urban studies have been strongly focused on metropolises – i.e., the top level of urban hierarchies, like global cities. Some cities have been considered as paradigmatic of the urban condition, including migration processes [Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2009]. These cities have been particularly studied, either as significant gateways [Singer, Hardwick and Brettell 2008] or because of “academic boosterism” [Beauregard 2003]; however, this type of city does not necessarily represent the daily experience of many urban contexts, including in relation to migrants’ settlements.

In immigration studies, methodological nationalism has added to this narrow focus, supporting limited attention to the intranational variation of migration trends and outcomes among different contexts [Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003; Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2011].

As Bell and Jayne [2006] argue, such neglect of small and medium cities in the literature on urban studies means that there are not yet appropriate ways to understand what smallness and bigness mean, how they fit into the “new urban order,” or what their developments might be.

Undertheorisation is such that it is even hard to define what “small” is [ibidem]. It is not (only) about size, which can vary widely according to the urban system in which the “small city” is inserted. Small-town conurbations in some contexts can be more populous than a metropolitan area in another [Lang and Dhavale 2004]. The notion of “smallness” has more to do with the relationship between size and position in the urban hierarchies and in rescaling processes. If the lack of a larger urban node is a point, the relations among small and scattered urbanisation, and between small and large areas, is an issue to explore.

So, “smallness” is a matter of connections and functions played with and for the surroundings (as nodes for specific socio-economic activities); with and for urban areas in upper tiers; with and for entire global networks. “Smallness” can refer to a lower proactivity, strategic vision and decisional space over its own position and

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1 To provide contextual information, case studies in this issue have quite a range of sizes: Genthin, Germany, has some 15,000 inhabitants; municipalities taken into account by Marzorati and Bonizzoni have some 40,000 inhabitants; the same applies to Landskrona, that Scarpa defines as a medium-size city in the Swedish context; Manresa, Spain, is the main case studied by Garzón, and it has 76,000 inhabitants; Durham, North Carolina, has some 250,000 inhabitants.
trajectory [Osti and Ventura 2012]. It is about the conditions and consequences of local actions in interaction with wider social and economic processes.

This is the reason why we endorse the definition of “small-scale” [Glick Schiller, Çağlar and Gulbrandsen 2006; Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2011]: “smallness” refers here to the position in lower tiers of the urban hierarchies, whose upscaling and downscaling are tied to access to global resources, intersecting with migration flows.

This definition may well apply to the case studies presented in this symposium: Marzorati and Bonizzoni show the role industrial districts play in manufacturing value chains, which equates with the structure Garzón finds in Catalonia; Scarpa shows how Landskrona is downscaling in the urban hierarchy; Mayorga-Gallo places Durham in the wake of new destinations in the US.

In the last twenty years, the focus on the “cities of superlatives” [Beauregard 2003] has been challenged, opening the road for attention to other contexts. More and more studies focus on the “ordinary city” [Amin and Graham 1997], on cities “off the map” [Robinson 2002], and on the heterogeneity of urban forms and functions [Bell 2009]. They all maintain that diversity of scales and mixes of assets are core features of urban experience under globalisation, and that global processes have different shapes in different urban contexts.

However, we lag behind specifically in building theoretically-informed knowledge on migration in urban contexts placed at a lower scale. This may be part of the problem in migration studies, not embedded enough in a more general understanding of contemporary society [Castles 2010].

1. Immigration and Urbanisation: An Overview on a Changing Phenomenon

Immigration outside metropolitan gateways has gained attention in social sciences since the mid-1990s, and more markedly after the results of the 2000 US Census, which showed a change in minorities’ mobility and settlement patterns. Much of the literature is thus based on US cases, even though later evidence has been reported from other Western countries: Canada, Australia, New Zealand [Xue, Friesen and O’Sullivan 2012; Wulff et al. 2008; Hugo 2011], UK, Eire [Gilmartin and Meredith 2014], Mediterranean Europe [Osti and Ventura, 2012; Balbo, forth.; Morén-Alegret 2008], and – more rarely – Continental and Northern Europe [Scarpa and Kreichauf in this issue].

Such immigration trends cannot be considered global. In most developing countries migration processes still push towards metropolitan and megalopolitan
gateways. Here, non-gateway destinations are usually just stop-overs for metropolitan destinations [Hasan and Raza 2009; Li and An 2009]. Though, in strongly economically developed countries, rescaling migration processes appear to be selectively spread. Such processes are taking place both in countries where migration has been mostly metropolitan for decades (like the US), and in more recent immigration countries (like Mediterranean ones).

1.1. The United States

In the United States, we can identify a long period between 1965 (when the Hart-Cellar Immigration Act was signed) and mid-1990s in which immigration was mostly metropolitan: a dozen large urban areas at the top of the urban hierarchy have been containing up to 90% of total migration [Waldinger 1989]. From then on, we can identify increased migration to lower tiers of the urban hierarchy, “to the older inner suburbs, to newer, faster-growing suburbs, to moderate-sized heartland metropolitan areas, and increasingly to smaller communities” [Singer, Hardwick, Brettell 2008: viii; see also Plane, Henrie and Perry 2005]. As a result, migration has made up the largest share of population change in rural and small-town America in the last two decades, involving recently also more isolated rural areas [Johnson 2006; Lichter and Johnson 2006; Massey 2008]. It is strongly related to Mexican – or, more extensively, Latino/Hispanic – migration, which has had the fastest growth rates in new destinations [Johnson 2006; Diaz McConnell 2008].

Such a change is considered a consequence of changed labour market opportunities and migration channels after the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986 [Massey, Durand and Malone 2002].

In the US literature, this process reframed the approach to migration and urbanisation, from notions based on traditional rural-urban, urbanisation-counterurbanisation, metropolitan-nonmetropolitan dichotomies, to definitions such as the so-called “micropolitan areas” – counties with an urban centre with 10,000 to 50,000 inhabitants, in wider “rurban” areas with their own distinctive economic and social milieus [Lang and Dhavale 2004; Vias 2012].

1.2. Europe

In Europe, new destinations seem less studied. There has been attention to new macro-areas of settlement (Mediterranean countries in the 1990s, Eastern Europe more recently; see Okolski [2012]). Notwithstanding evidence that migration flows
do not straightforwardly point to gateway cities [Espon 2010], much less attention has been paid to small and medium-size towns.

Yet, Mediterranean countries have seen quite a steady stream of international migration to non-metropolitan areas for at least two decades now [Simard and Jentsch 2009]. Italy is a good example:

Labour market opportunities in rural areas and cluster economies are attracting migrants to non-metropolitan destinations [Golini and Marini 2010; Lombardi et al. 2011]. Such a process was visible already in the 1980s, and has been reinforced in the recent decades. An economic model based on clusters of small and medium size enterprises; urbanisation of the countryside and urban sprawl in metropolitan, periurban and conurbation areas; and the decreasing profitability of Mediterranean agriculture are processes that helped direct migration towards second- and third-tier urban areas, and to rural destinations [Avallone and Torre, 2012]. Growth in small and medium-size towns is almost entirely due to international migration, while the native populations tend to urbanise or just to shrink due to ageing [Cittalia 2011].

On the other hand, the UK seems to have been less affected by rescaling migration processes. Studies here seem to focus more on spill-over, suburbanisation and deconcentration effects driven by upward mobile selected minorities with higher human, social, and economic capital [Phillips 1998; Simpson, Gavalas and Finney 2008] who may follow counterurbanisation paths similar to natives [Hussain and Stillwell 2008]. This limited attention to new international migration outside gateways may be tied to the magnet role played by London (which is, in any case, seeing a growing suburbanisation of ethnic minorities, see Rees and Butt [2004]; Catney and Simpson [2010]).

There is some evidence of new settlement patterns, tied to changes in employment opportunities: for example, migrants are slowly moving to “small towns and rural areas of Lincolnshire and Norfolk where employment opportunities exist in agricultural and food processing industries” [Robinson and Reeve 2006, 6], as much as to counties like Suffolk and Dorset [Hussain and Stillwell 2008]. However, other middle-size cities – like deindustrialising centres – are losing immigrants.

Much less evidence has been collected in other European countries. Is this because rescaling of migration settlement is less relevant, or because it is less explored? Given the lack of available quantitative data, we will preliminarily explore this issue in the following section.
2. Immigrants Outside Gateways in Western Europe: An Empirical Comparative Attempt to Assess the Relevance of This Phenomenon

The relevance of small and medium towns for the settlement of immigrant populations in Europe is hard to estimate, especially if an international comparative perspective is adopted. When using a quantitative approach, there is a problem with the comparability of migration statistics – even at the national level [Bonifazi 2008].

The attempt made here is based on one of the most important databases on individuals and households in the European Union, EU-Silc (EU Statistics on income and living conditions), in order to develop a comparative idea of the territorial diffusion of immigrants in some Western European countries.

The following countries were chosen: two Scandinavian countries (Denmark and Sweden); the UK; the two largest and most populated Continental countries (France and Germany); and the two largest and most populated Southern European countries (Spain and Italy).

These countries were observed over time (in 2004 and 2012) in order to understand the dynamics at play in relation to spatial settlement of immigrants.

In EU-Silc, the only variable related to territorial settlement is the “degree of urbanisation,” which classifies individuals and households in three types of geographical areas: “densely populated areas” (contiguous grid cells of one squared km with a density of at least 1,500 inhabitants per squared km and a minimum population of 50,000 inhabitants); “intermediate areas” (clusters of contiguous grid cells of one squared km with at least 300 inhabitants per squared km and a minimum population of 5,000 inhabitants); and “thinly-populated areas” (grid cells outside urban clusters).

This variable was used in two different ways: as a simple indicator of the share of immigrants living in “intermediate” or “thinly-populated” areas; as an indicator of the spatial distribution of foreign-born residents versus natives in relation to the urbanisation typology. Table 1 illustrates the main results.

First, there was a generalised trend toward the movement of immigrants from densely populated areas to intermediate and thinly populated ones. Apart from France and partially Sweden (where the level was already very high), in all other countries there was an increase between 2004 and 2012 in the percentage of foreign-born residents living in these areas. The increase was particularly evident in Germany.

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2 We also performed a similar analysis on the database of EU-LFS (Labour Force Survey). The results are not reported here, given the fact that they are similar to the ones obtained with EU-Silc.
Second, in all the countries considered here, apart from France and the UK, no less than half of foreign-born residents live in intermediate and thinly populated areas. This phenomenon is particularly relevant in Germany and Sweden.

Third, although there is a clear trend of diffusion of immigrants out of larger urban areas, in most countries they still tend to be relatively more concentrated in densely populated areas than natives. The last two columns of Table 1 show that the percentage of natives living in intermediate and thinly populated areas is usually higher than that of foreign born residents. Though, in Italy, Spain and (partially) in Germany, the relative territorial distribution of immigrants follow settlement patterns similar to natives.

**Table 1. The Distribution of Immigrants in Areas with Different Levels of Urbanisation (2004-2012)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Foreign-born in intermediate and thinly populated area (% of all foreign-born) (a)</th>
<th>Natives in intermediate and thinly populated area (% of all locals) (b)</th>
<th>Difference between the percentages of foreign-born and natives living in intermediate and thinly populated areas (a - b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>8.4*</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>25.5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>40.4*</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>54.0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data on Germany and the UK are from 2005

Source: own elaborations on EU-Silc microdata

Fourth, although differences in settlement patterns are strong in many countries, they diminished over time. From 2004 to 2012 the gap became smaller in Denmark, Germany, Spain and Italy, whereas it stayed almost unchanged in Denmark and France. The UK is the only country where the difference increased: in relative terms, foreign-born residents are more and more concentrated in big cities than natives.

Thus, even though we cannot equate gateways with all densely populated areas and even though we cannot assess clearly what kind of rescaling process we had
(suburbanisation, counter-urbanisation, etc.), we can state that rescaling of migration is also relevant, though less explored, in Europe.

3. Making Sense of Immigration Outside Gateways: Features and Types

According to both previous literature and the research cases presented here, we can identify some trends common to different contexts, both European and American. First, immigration to new destinations is made up both by new migrants from abroad and by internal mobility of older migrants and minorities [Lichter and Johnson 2009]. “Counter-urbanising” migration has often been the first step [Singer 2008]. Later, migration from abroad leading directly to new destinations bypassed gateways and became more and more important [Light 2006; Lichter and Johnson 2009].

Given the age structure of migrant populations, their increase is first driven by net migration, and later by fertility, significantly changing communities in new destinations. This has a complex effect on belonging and participation, as we can see with the struggles for recognition led by generations from immigrant backgrounds in different countries, from undocumented migrant youth in the USA to denizens in Europe [Koopmans et al. 2008; Nicholls 2013].

The most important reasons for these settlement processes are related to three dimensions [Goerman 2006]: changing economic conditions, which open up job opportunities; explicit or implicit changes in immigration policy at national and local levels; and new network migrations. A mix of housing and labour opportunities frame most mobility towards new destinations, with the interaction of push and pull factors: spill-over effects from larger metropolitan areas and specific pull factors [Vivas 2012].

Policies play a role in pushing or pulling migrants in some locales, for both security and economic reasons [Carter, Morrish and Amoyaw 2008; Akbari 2013]. For example, refugees’ and asylum seekers’ dispersal policies are aimed at a territorial redistribution of the “burden” of “wasted lives,” to be placed in peripheral “landfills” or refunctionalized to be productive for suffering areas [Bauman 2003; Larsen 2011; Robinson, Andersson and Musterd 2003; Robinson and Reeve 2006; Bloch and Schuster 2005; Scarpa in this issue]. In the Australian case, for example, schemes to distribute migrants toward areas with labour shortages and less intake have been implemented since the 1990s [Hugo 2011]. Enforcement of immigration controls at national borders and within urban areas can deflect migration toward less “guarded” areas [Goerman 2006].
This also has consequences for integration policies. Many new destinations have limited experiences of diversity, triggering the perception of the loss of an “idealized” community and resentment toward newcomers. At the same time, anti-immigrant discourses are firmly tied with another sense of loss, related to changes in the economic structures of local societies. Often, these changes precede (and anticipate) new migration, but newcomers become easy scapegoats [Barberis, 2014].

We will make sense of these issues in sections 4 and 5. Here, it was enough to show that migration outside gateways is characterized by similar processes. However, we also have to account for specificities, as the world outside large metropolitan hubs is far from simple.

3.1. Main Destinations Outside Gateways

Migration outside gateways is far from being a clear, straightforward process, and includes different paths. In the relevant literature, we distinguish four types of new destinations: suburban areas of main gateways; new metropolitan destinations; small and medium-size towns; and rural areas.

3.1.1. Suburbanisation

As for the processes of suburbanisation, we can include case studies of “edge gateways,” “suburban ghettos” and “ethnoburbs” [Price and Singer 2008; Li 2009]. Studies on migrant suburbanisation focus on the continuing attractiveness of gateways, widening their attention from the core of a city to the whole metropolitan area. New job opportunities, as much as harsher working and life conditions in central cities (housing prices, traffic, crime, and factors related to wellbeing such as schooling, leisure and shopping) cause mobility within metropolitan areas [Hardwick 2008]. In this respect, suburbs are no longer “sub” to the “urb” [Muller 1997, 47], and make up a more polycentric urban area.

Relevant literature relates migrant suburbanisation to wider economic changes. Jobs in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and innovative services are often located outside traditional inner city areas [Singer 2008]. The availability of (good) jobs and the affordability of housing with less competition from coethnic and other minorities can ease social and economic participation [Light 2006].

The mix of ethnic enclaves and suburban features, jointly with less significant concentrations of specific ethnic groups, may create a new scenario: “compared with the old ethnic enclaves, ethnoburbs offer ethnic populations more space and more diversified economic activities. Economic activities in ethnoburbs not only incorpor-
ate the traditional ethnic economy, but also involve functions that result from the globalization of capital and the international flow of commodities and labor, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled” [Li 2009, 42].

In addition, research on minority suburbanisation often focuses on social class differences between “suburban migrants” and inner city migrants. On the one side, there is a process of upward mobility out of enclave areas; on the other side, there is new international migration of professionals and skilled workers who make new suburbs their first homes abroad.

However, there is also poor suburbanisation of those expelled from gentrifying or overcrowded inner-city areas, which turn to poorer suburbs (e.g. dormitory towns). There is also an impoverishment of formerly upward-mobile but fragile suburbanite minorities, hit hard by the crisis that began in 2008 [Fennelly and Orfield 2008; Anacker 2015]. These groups can fall into a downward spiral of marginalisation and new forms of segregation, becoming trapped in downscaling neighbourhoods.

Social incorporation in suburban destinations can be affected by the institutional features of receiving areas: suburbs lacking effective governance structures may be less effective in deploying institutional answers, while those that are more ethnically homogeneous and dominated by more affluent classes may be far less welcoming.

These results come mostly from US cases, though we can see evidence also in European contexts: the sprawl of urban regions, the growth of peripheries in large cities [Arbaci and Malheiros 2010], and the shortage of housing in concentration areas [Simpson, Gavalas and Finney 2008] may create the conditions for the dispersal of immigrant settlement within and around gateway cities.

If sprawl in urban regions can produce effects similar to US suburbanisation, the peripheries are subject to different conditions, which marginalize disadvantaged group in the outer city more than at its centre.

3.1.2. New Metropolitan Gateways

As for the rise of new metropolitan gateways, they are made up of large, second-tier urban areas that have never received huge migration flows (emerging gateways), or have not received them for a long period (re-emerging gateways) [Singer, Hardwick and Brettell 2008]. They have become alluring for international and internal migration (both from first-tier and lower-tiers areas; see Plane, Henrie and Perry [2005]) as their economies have blossomed; they have assets useful for upscaling in international competition (e.g., important airport nodes), they attract successful
companies thanks to low taxes and wages, and they have nodes of the knowledge economy (e.g., universities and research centres).

Again, literature focuses mostly on US cases, taking into consideration cities in the American “Sun Belt” such as Las Vegas, Phoenix and Orlando, which have become some of the fastest growing destinations for immigrants [Frey 2006]. In some respects, Mayorga-Gallo’s case study on Durham, North Carolina, can be placed in this segment.

### 3.1.3. Small and Medium-Size Towns

In the US, interest in the increased migration towards small and medium-size towns has been enhanced by the creation of so-called “micropolitan areas” in 2003. They cover a quarter of US counties, including 20% of its land and 10% of its population. Micropolitan centres are much more attractive than rural areas, and also show growth rates higher than most metropolitan areas [Johnson and Cromartie 2006].

Migration to these destinations seems to lie between an extreme form of sub-urbanisation and the fourth trend (migration to rural areas) described below – although research show distinctive features compared to migration to metropolitan, suburban, and rural areas, respectively. A plurality of push and pull factors and short- and long-distance mobility converge in the growing migration towards new destinations on lower levels of the urban hierarchy, and contribute to their complexification [Vias 2012].

Migration towards small and medium-size towns is not limited to areas close to metropolitan centres [Johnson 2006]. Migrations come from metropolitan areas, directly from abroad, and also from rural areas, as part of the “restructuring in the rural economy, and the clustering of tertiary sector activities in small urban centers, as well as the continued depopulation of the more remote rural areas of the US” [Vias 2012: 26]. In our case studies, Marzorati and Bonizzoni show the connections Brianza has with national and international value chains, and the opportunities this position opens up for migrants; Scarpa finds evidence of the link between downscaling Landskrona and its immigration; and Garzón analyzes the link between migration to small-town Catalonia and labour market segmentation.

Some micropolitan areas have experienced a new industrialisation, with activities servicing surrounding economies, such as meat and agricultural processing [Donato et al. 2007]. Newcomers make up a labour force fit to increase productivity and profitability in competitive markets. This may happen both in newly opened industrial sites and in more established firms. In the latter case, new migrants replace the traditional workforce, in a process of precarisation and price-competition in ma-
ture industries [Gonzalez Wahl, Breckenridge and Gunkel 2007]. Such a process has also been observed in cluster economies in Europe [see Barberis 2014].

Later, growth opens up new opportunities in sectors servicing the growth itself, like restaurants and building sectors. So, immigrants also become embedded in petty capitalism, as owners of small businesses, especially in markets that see decreasing profitability, but have still an active demand at neighbourhood level.

However, migration is directed also to downscaling areas, where “good jobs” have been taken away by outsourcing and technological transformations. Quite a number of poor jobs may be vacant due to labour mismatch. This opens up opportunities (although marginal) for newcomers [Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2011].

### 3.1.4. Rural Areas

With different timings, in the last decades, rural areas have again attracted the labour force in many Western countries [Jentsch 2007]. The new workforce is made up both by mobile, short-term sojourners inserted in circular, transnational migrations, and by settlers, who blur the boundaries of self-perceived homogeneous communities [Haley 2009].

As in larger cities, rural migration of low-skilled and poor workers can also been linked to rural gentrification and the amenity-seeking, leisure mobility of upper classes. Structural links can also take place with limited spatial contiguity. According to Nelson and Nelson, this linked migration affects 3% of non-metropolitan counties in the US, representing “12% of the growth of Latino immigrants in non-metro rural counties” [2011, 450]. However, they also maintain that it is not limited to the US, as similar processes can be found in countries like Spain and Australia.

In some rural areas new migration is part of larger revitalisation processes. In some depopulated rural and mountain areas “a larger population can help to overcome a shortage of labour, increase local tax revenues and support the sustainability of public and private services in rural communities” [Simard and Jentsch 2009, 3].

Other areas still lag behind in marginal conditions, and new migration is not enough to counteract depopulation and economic distress. In these locations, migration usually entails lower human and social capital [Bayona i Carrasco and Gil-Alonso 2013; Lichter and Johnson 2009], and are inserted in seasonal and circular labour migrations, with enduring hard housing, social and economic conditions [Sarlo, Imperio and Martinelli 2014].

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3 For example, Park and Pellow [2011] show how poor migrant workers servicing amenity and leisure areas are “hidden” in segregated, separated, far areas in the case of Aspen, Colorado.
Rural migration can be related to rural industrialisation as well, thus having links with migration towards the other new destinations mentioned above (new gateways and small and medium-size towns). Rural areas closer to urban service centres, or at shorter distances from large urban areas, are the first to see new settlements [Hugo 2011].

This may happen where rural migration is part of a counter-urbanising process and made up of internal re-immigration flows. This may not be the case for new flows connecting transnationally rural areas in different countries, where the main factor seems to be the development of restrictive policies in traditional destinations, directing migration toward more isolated and less policed areas [Lichter and Johnson 2006; Bayona i Carrasco and Gil-Alonso 2013].

Immigration flows of poor workers in rural destinations can create “rural ghettos” – i.e. segregated concentrations of marginalised migrant groups in precarious housing situations (trailers, shantytowns, abandoned buildings, and the like). They are spatially concentrated, and separated by natives, both rich and poor [Lichter et al. 2008].

Rural ghettos seem quite common both in the US and in Mediterranean Europe [Colloca and Corrado 2013], connected to precarious labour conditions and to specific weaknesses in human and social capital among migrants in rural destinations [Diaz McConnell 2008].

4. Why Does Migration Outside Gateways Take Place?

A simplistic perspective may explain migration outside gateways as a metropolitan spill-over effect: an increasing stock of migrants can no longer be contained within the metropolitan core and “overflows” into surrounding areas.

Such an explanation has problems. First, it does not clarify yet the selectivity of migration processes towards new destinations. Second, as Ivan Light [2006] well shows in his study on Los Angeles, cities are not finite containers, and can expand their reception capacity until political and economic thresholds are reached.

A large part of the literature focuses on economic opportunities in new destinations [Singer, Hardwick, Brettell 2008]; both economic and technological innovations in production and communications and the availability of low-wage locations and sectors [Sassen 1995] may ease migration outside gateways. This calls for an analysis of location and organisational choices of employers and capital, which have an effect on the typology of workers that will be necessary to operate [ibidem]. Actually, migrants absorb a significant share of precarisation of labour conditions in new des-
tinations. So, they seem to follow a path of economic restructuring similar to other urban areas [Vias, Mulligan and Molin 2002].

According to Castles:

Migration researchers should seek to develop middle-range theories that can help integrate the insights of the various social sciences to understand the regularities and variations of a range of migratory processes within a given historical socio-economic constellation. Such middle-range theories can form the basis for a conceptual framework, which takes contemporary social transformation processes as a starting point, for understanding shifting patterns of human mobility. Such a conceptual framework would consist of a detailed mapping of the factors that influence migratory processes and of the connections between these factors. [2010, 1582].

Such trends should be placed in a theoretical approach to space and socio-economic relations. In other words, we have to consider “how space is continually re-structured and produced under capitalism” [Sheppard 2002, 310], defining market relations, stratifications and conflicts that are divided also along ethnicised lines and cleavages [Li 2009].

Such a perspective allows us to place the role of minority groups in local production systems outside the gateways. Migration has to be considered as part of the process of transformation of global “structures and institutions, which arises through major changes in global political, economic and social relationships” [Castles 2010, 1566].

A whole strand of literature in urban studies has underlined the new role – in political and economic terms – of territories in globalisation processes.

It first started with attention to global cities and regions, disregarding the link between the position of a city in power arenas and migration settlement processes [Glick Schiller, Çağlar and Guldbrandsen 2006]. A new interpretation of the role of smaller territories in contemporary neoliberal processes is needed. Small cities are not necessarily excluded from global processes, and the analysis of urban scales and hierarchies is not complete if focused only on top-tier urban and regional areas [Bell 2009]. Local processes are nested in larger scalar processes, thus necessitating broader contextualisation.

In this respect, the role of human mobility in structuring global processes has been neglected, as much as migration studies has underplayed societal contexts and broader social theory as a relevant variable in the analysis of migration processes [Castles 2010; Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2009].

Scale theory [Brenner 2004], with its grasp on rescaling processes, seems to provide a viable entry point to make sense both of the role of medium and small towns in urban hierarchies and of the role played by mobile social groups in such
transformations [Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2011]. As an approach that analyses the transformation of spatial relations under capitalist restructuring, it connects “the hierarchical differentiation and (re)ordering of geographical scales” [Brenner 2001: 593] in different arenas – “capitalist economies, state institutions, citizenship regimes, and urban systems” [Jessop, Brenner and Jones 2008, 390].

Favourable conditions for migration can be found selectively in rural areas, small and medium-size towns, suburbs, and second-tier metropolitan areas. They may play a role in the competition for volatile investments. These conditions include selective localisation processes, spatially and temporally uneven [Johnson 2006], in relation to local condition that may be effective for capital deconcentration. Costs (of land, housing, labour), accessibility (connection to transport networks), regulations (unionisation, economic policy, welfare and the availability of fit workforce) are among the issues at stake [Smith and Winders 2008].

Areas in lower-tiers of First World countries can provide mixed conditions of development and underdevelopment, which are attractive for some types of capital ventures. At the same time, when it comes to migration, they can become victims of their own success. Social relations and economic gains may start to clash.

When based on low-wage, labour-intensive, exploited employment, boomtowns need migrants as a source of cheap labour. Industrial (re)location in new destinations (and related migration processes) become a sort of outsourcing within the national borders, importing ‘cheap’ labour conditions and labour forces while keeping an arm’s length control over production processes.

In an ambivalent way, for these types of cities maintaining labour-intensive, cheap and often backward modes of production may be a condition for success. This may ground tensions with natives: on the one hand, there is a battle between the have-nots (natives left behind in the new developments, and newcomers); on the other hand, class conflict among newcomers and upwardly mobile established groups, with an increased polarisation of local society [Burton, Garrett-Peters and Eason 2011]. Natives’ accumulation of wealth and labour force qualifications may create a labour mismatch and a stronger dualisation of labour markets [Barberis 2014; Smith and Winders 2008].

Local consequences on native-newcomer relations are tied to scalar positions and development strategies: “just how a city is rescaled within this continuing quest for positioning has implications for the opportunities it provides for its migrants” [Glick Schiller, Çağlar and Guldbrandsen 2006, 616]. Attracting immigration is not necessarily an indicator of successful competitive outcome. Migration is often linked to the economic performance of an area, though we can see also flows – perhaps
residual, less consistent in absolute terms, but anyway relevant – towards weak and declining areas [Sassen 1995].

Migration can be related to downscaling [Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2011], a last resort for locked-in localized clusters or for fading ones that use immigrant networks and their “exploitability” to survive [Barberis 2014]. A mixed embeddedness approach here is necessary, understanding migration as part of broader social transformations [Castles 2010]. How renewal processes, industrial sectors, and social mobility are structured influences future community development [Carr, Lichter and Kefalas 2012] in relation to the ways in which newcomers are incorporated in the local society.

In the frame of a scale approach, this means that immigration and local development outside gateways cannot be studied alone, without placing them within broader scalar relations; interdependence with gateways, networks with other medium and small towns and rural areas in the same tier have to be explored. In this sense, migration outside gateways is likely tied to transformation within gateways, in turn interdependent with transformations at other levels – global and local – and to transnational migration processes [Li 2009].

Evolving migration trends are nested: we see emerging migration trends at regional levels (e.g., the Sunbelt in the US, the Mediterranean basin), tied to the interconnected roles they play, and to their specific contribution to global economies. Migration contributes directly (e.g., by allowing price competitiveness) or indirectly (e.g. servicing the development of these economies – in the building industry, as in personal and business services) to such developments.

Framing medium and small towns within a scalar approach is a key element in understanding what is going on in migration outside gateways, but is not exhaustive, and cannot explain all processes if not intertwined with other dimensions [Brenner 2001; Sheppard 2002; Jessop, Brenner and Jones 2008]. Scale is a good entry point, but our case studies show that networks and places also play relevant roles in understanding mobility.

Places recall the importance of context [Castles 2010; Brenner and Theodore 2002]: they create a path dependence on the accessibility of local society to newcomers, according to how the economy, politics, demography, built environment, and class structure have been historically produced and regulated [Carr, Lichter and Kefalas 2012; Ghezzi and Mingione 2007; Li 2009]. The interaction of place and scale is central to analysing the spatial division of labour in places at different scales [Jessop, Brenner and Jones 2008].

Networks influence the developments of flows, to a certain extent, beyond their economic functionality [Light 2006], and intersect with scalar processes – for example, through the role of transnational links [Li 2009; Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2011].
2011]. At the same time, places and networks can be functionalized to continuing processes of labour market exploitation and power asymmetries.

Actually, a constant among the case studies in this symposium is the persistence of exclusionary practices that rely on asymmetries (by gender, class, ethnicity) within networks and among cliques. Inequalities are often based on nativist discourses of belonging (that assert older residents’ primacy in the right to the city), and discriminatory regulations; ambivalently, they both oppose economic trends that alter the assumed status quo of the local community, and reinforce them by blaming the migrant victim. Cases from Italy, Spain and Sweden reported in this issue show worrying similarities in this respect.

Therefore, we have to consider the effects regulation have in steering migration outside gateways.

4.1. Rescaling Migration Policy

The geographical rescaling of immigration processes is tied to a set of related neoliberal policies:

“Since the early 1990s, the reproduction of neoliberalism has become increasingly contingent upon specifically urban strategies of various kinds. In other words, the point is not only that neoliberalism affects cities, but also that cities have become key institutional arenas in and through which neoliberalism is itself evolving” [Brenner and Theodore 2002, 345].

This includes also the rescaling of migration policies [Sheppard 2002].

We can identify quite a common trend, in Europe as in North America, of devolving immigration policy to local authorities due to

“the need to respond to locally specific challenges in regulating migration and, under the auspices of a neoliberal reorganization of public policy,” to “the general downloading of responsibility to lower levels of governance and a more market-based management approach” [Schmidtke 2014, 93].

Passing the buck – devolving responsibility without devolving resources – is part of the game in the politics of rescaling, which has a relevant role in politically divisive areas including migration [Kazepov 2010; Ellis 2006]. This raises conflicts that are framed according to the scalar positions of the actors involved. Scalar positions and relations define the various actors’ room of manoeuvre – in interacting with top-tier institutions as in competing with other locales for resources.

This trend can be seen in the realm of migrant (integration) policies, but also in the realm of immigration (control) policies, which have long been up to national
As a consequence, intra-national fragmentation of policy outcomes seems to increase [Varsanyi 2010; Caponio and Borkert 2010], creating a wide range of local models of incorporation and exclusion [Alexander 2007; Ambrosini 2012].

Rescaling of immigration policies happens in both explicit and implicit forms: explicitly, by devolving jurisdiction to local authority; implicitly, by leaving local authorities alone in coping with new migration trends. Rescaled measures can be shaped as local law enforcement or as shilly-shally chess games between actors at different scales and levels of responsibility [Light 2006; Varsanyi 2010].

Local ordinances have been a very active and contested field [Ambrosini 2013]. Acting on immigration policies, they have “rescaled the borders,” so to speak, imposing controls that produce dispersal and marginalisation. A condition of permanent emergency to manage fear and unease through security is a common dispositive that finds different expressions at global, national and local levels of government [Bigo 2002]. The case of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, has been widely studied and included in an increasingly rich literature on municipal exclusionary practices [Gilbert 2009; Varsanyi 2010].

These policies often have a “deflection effect,” turning migration away from one locale towards others [Light 2006]; so local exclusionary ordinances do not reduce the stock of migrants, but they play a role in defining marginality, destinations, dispersal and concentration. When enacted by large urban centres or nearby destinations, they may push people into non-gateway areas; when enacted in new destinations, they can further fragment and scatter newcomers.

Looking at the general impact of rescaling migration policy, downward labour assimilation seems reinforced both by exclusionary [Oberle and Li 2008] and incorporation policies. For example, policies related to wages, well-being and welfare protecting regular and integrated groups may reinforce the exclusion of the marginal ones. As Light [2006] shows, policies targeting poverty concentration and labour exploitation by enforcing rules on hygiene and safety can deflect migrants.

We may state that social vulnerability in marginal areas can be the penalty to pay to gain in competitiveness. Not by chance, in the last decades quite a relevant share of undocumented migrants have moved to non-traditional destinations, to escape more rigid immigration policies and controls [Ellis 2012]; this moves marginalized groups to marginal areas, creating a risky mix of social conditions for downscaling areas.

The parallel processes of incorporation and marginalisation in new destinations can also ground forms of activism in non-gateway areas. They are a relevant part of the political visibility of new minorities, not only as targets of exclusionary policy, but also as part of their political mobilisation, local activism, and active participation.
in community life [Li 2009]. How their visibility and proactivity is experienced by native groups is an open issue for the last part of our analysis.

5. Immigrants' Incorporation Into Small And Medium-Size Towns

Besides describing and interpreting immigration towards new destinations, researchers have investigated if there is any specificity in the social, economic, and political incorporation of migrants outside gateways, or, in more general terms, if small cities “find a meaningful and valuable use of their third-tierness, their localness, their smallness” [Bell and Jayne 2006, 2], according to their power structures and way of producing collective goods [Tosi and Vitale 2011]. Actually, we maintain that “cities that differ in scalar dimensions also may differ in their modes and pathways of incorporation” [Glick Schiller, Çağlar and Guldbrandsen 2006, 616].

The literature usually portrays two competitive hypotheses.

On the one hand, incorporation may be accelerated by the “strength of weak ties” and a positive structure of opportunity. In small towns, the formation of enclaves is less likely, and immigrant groups are somehow “compelled” to a larger set of social relations with natives, long-term residents, and multiethnic communities. This may be connected to faster linguistic and cultural adjustment (if not assimilation).

The process may be boosted by lower living and housing costs in new locations. The availability of empty housing stock, shorter labour queues, and good jobs in developing areas can speed up upward social mobility through higher homeownership rates, greater accessibility of economic sectors, and higher-wage positions [Singer, Hardwick and Brettell 2008]. Some studies have found substantial gains in labour participation and income for immigrants in rural areas [Donato et al. 2007], less severe impact of recession on housing outcomes in small metropolitan areas [Painter and Yu 2012], and higher chances of spatial assimilation [cfr. Gonzalez Wahl, Breckenridge and Gunkel 2007].

As a positive factor in settlement, segregation may be less likely. Arm’s length interactions and lower distances may limit the discriminatory effects of mobility and unequal distribution of resources that can be found in large cities [Asselin et al. 2006].

At the same time, new digital and traditional infrastructures (e.g., improved transport connections, social media] may be helpful in maintaining strong in-group relations without propinquity [Zelinsky and Lee 1998]. In this issue, Marzorati and

4 These effects may be more significant due to the positive selection of people moving to new destinations, which often have higher human capital [Lichter and Johnson 2009].
Bonizzoni show that ethnic-based grouping and solidarity is also possible in non-gateway contexts; strong ties and transnational links can be created in small and medium-size towns, too.

The importance of face-to-face interactions, which may limit stereotyping processes, and perceptions of the revitalisation of declining communities, may prove helpful in supporting welcoming attitudes – even “enthusiastic” ones [Hugo 2011]. Though, such a functionalist perspective may also limit the effective incorporation and legitimisation of newcomers as members of the community. For example, when considered less useful, even long-term migrant residents can be considered less legitimate to stay and less welcome [Bordandini and Cartocci 2009].

Here comes the darker side of small-town incorporation, and the alternative hypothesis. Incorporation may be slowed down by the lack (or weakness) of supportive in-groups, by the closure of localized natives’ bonding social capital. Natives may pose strict criteria of belonging and respectability [Haley 2009], with exclusionary if not racist values and regulations [Gilbert 2009; Burton, Garrett-Peters and Eason 2011; Gargiulo 2015].

The societal reception of changes in communities perceived as ethnically and socially homogeneous may engender a sense of loss.

“For both poor [rural] ghetto residents and established locals alarmed at the downward community spiral that areas of concentrated poor populations represent, emerging ghettos can stain rural residents’ identities. Along with shrinking local economies, the allure of cheap local housing, and an influx of poor populations from outside the local area, comes an increasingly visible reminder of unwanted community change for many local residents” [Burton, Garrett-Peters and Eason 2011, 98].

In this issue, Mayorga-Gallo shows another important factor, that new migration comes into contact not only with consolidated majority positions, but also with structured majority-minority relations (e.g. black-white ones).

Relevant literature identifies a number of factors and occurrences that may frustrate immigrants’ incorporation in new destinations.

Limited language skills, dispersal and isolation may affect intergroup contact; the small size of in-group (coethic) networks and the exclusion from established power relations may diminish chances of social mobility [Goerman 2006; Arbaci and Malheiros 2010].

Exclusionary policies may add up to social exclusion, and target in particular those considered “less deserving” (the poorest, the most visible minorities, scapegoat

5 See also Diaz McConnell [2008].
groups like Muslims and Roma, etc.). Exclusionary politics analysed by Marzorati and Bonizzoni in Italy, Scarpa in Sweden and Garzón in Spain show how widespread this issue is.

Even when not explicitly exclusionary, the difficulty of organising adequate policies in small towns with limited resources and poor expertise may result in scant accessibility of welfare provisions [Fennelly and Orfield 2008; Simard and Jentsch 2009; Hugo 2011]. In particular, areas confronting plural migration flows (in terms of legal status, origin, migration history, class, gender, and family arrangements) that need a nuanced understanding of ongoing processes may find it hard to cope with such an increased variability of welfare recipients.

Small labour markets may not provide chances for upward mobility and high wages, offering only labour-intensive, low-wage jobs [Simard and Jentsch 2009; Hugo 2011; Johnson 2006].

Considering the case studies collected in our symposium, it is worth exploring the role of spatial and social isolation in producing hardship.

Actually, there is evidence that forms of spatial segregation can also be found in medium and small cities and towns, and in mixed communities [Lichter et al. 2010] – even though their measurement can be more difficult, as census traits may be too large to grasp these phenomena. In this issue, Mayorga-Gallo (for the US) and Kreichauf (for Europe) show that usual index-based segregation research may be not so useful to describe race-based social barriers at the micro-level. In small communities, micro-level segregation may be more relevant and more negative, and become part of a “segmented assimilation” outcome [Gonzalez Wahl, Breckenridge and Gunkel 2007]. The case of Pakistani migrants in Desio, Italy, shows the coexistence of micro-segregation and ethnic mixing [Marzorati and Bonizzoni in this issue]. Scarpa shows the “Chicago-like” concentric zoning of population in Landskrona, Sweden, where immigrants live mostly in the city centre.

Evidence of concentration and segregation has to be contextualized. Even though spatial and relational proximity often do not lead to the creation of enclaves or ghettos strictu sensu, marginalisation processes are quite clear, and mostly based on social isolation and stigmatisation [Barberis and Cancellieri 2015; Burton, Garrett-Peters and Easton 2011; Kreichauf and Marzorati and Bonizzoni in this issue]. This kind of segregation can be underrated compared to that in metropolitan areas (in both scholars’ and local stakeholders’ views).

Emerging spatial conflicts are part of a larger set of transformations affecting mobile and non-mobile populations, with consequences for local communities: among downscaling areas, we have impoverished long-term residents and outmigration matched with new inflows; among upscaling areas, we have the migration of
higher and lower classes, increasing local polarisation, and long-term residents somehow in the middle between affluent amenity-seekers (professionals, retirees, etc.) and the poor minority workers.

Also in this case, we have a good range of evidence supporting a segmented assimilation hypothesis. Donato et al. [2007], for example, found that immigrants to rural America have declining naturalisation and English proficiency rates, and limited health care coverage. This is likely to make their economic success short-lived, and implies a worrying decoupling of economic and social incorporation.

Their initial success, tied to labour demand, may be short-lived, as the worsening socio-economic conditions of new migrants in micropolitan areas in the after-maths of the crisis show:

“Latinos in new destinations often fared better than their counterparts in traditional settlement areas in 2000, if measured by high rates of labor force participation and low unemployment. On the other hand, these work patterns did not translate neatly into lower rates of poverty or higher per capita incomes. Indeed, poverty rates were similar in new and established Latino areas and homeownership rates among Latinos were lower on average in new destinations. Latinos were also significantly more likely in new destinations to be living in crowded conditions (i.e., with more than one person per room). They also experienced more rapidly deteriorating economic conditions over the 2000s across nearly every type of well-being indicator we investigated. By 2010, living in new destinations was associated with myriad economic disadvantages, including higher odds of poverty, lower incomes per person, and lower rates of female labor force participation, compared to traditional nonmetropolitan Latino destinations. The clear implication is that Latinos in new destinations were not able to translate employment into a higher standard of living than their counterparts in established areas even in a time of relative prosperity. And, significantly, they experienced steep losses during the recession that followed” [Crowley, Lichter and Turner 2015, 89].

This evidence should warn against the enduring discourse on social cohesion and community-making in small contexts. “Small is beautiful” only for some: class stratification, marginalisation of minorities and ultimately power relations should remain central to the analysis of small and medium-size towns, as classical sociological works told us long ago [Lynd and Lynd 1929].

At the same time, the neat alternative between smooth and segmented assimilation hypotheses does not deserve more effort than it is worth. Accommodation and marginalisation may well coexist [Singer 2008]. In our opinion, it is more useful to understand under which conditions socio-economic incorporation can be successful. Different in-group and inter-group social networks, conflicts and cooperation, class and ethnic mixes, economic and governance structures, migrants’ scale-making pro-
cesses, characteristics of spatial organisation and the physical landscapes of medium and small towns should be explored and compared [Glick Schiller, Çağlar and Guldbrandsen 2006; Bell 2009].

Global, national and local dynamics intersect in defining diversity and group boundaries: “ethnic community formation and growth, place-specific processes of racialisation, and the spatiality of ethnicity” [Li 2009, 5] are related to specific scalar fixes and socio-economic relations that may well cut across superficial ethnic categories to show internal differentiation. This creates place-specific balances of ethnicised/racialised class conflicts and adjustments.

6. Conclusions

Medium and small towns do not lie in a common scalar position; there are upscaling and downscaling areas. However, as a common trend tied to their lower hierarchical position in global competition, it seems that they share some weaknesses in terms of their capacities to turn migration into a steady, long-term incorporation. They have their roles in the “new forms of social exclusion, injustice, and disempowerment that have been inscribed upon the urban landscape during the last few decades of neoliberalization” [Brenner and Theodore 2002, 345].

The relations between migration and position in urban systems may differentiate incorporation outcomes.

Future research should take into account the peculiarity of migration contexts outside gateways, and their interconnectedness with broader scalar and network processes. This is a point raised also in the final comment by Çağlar and Glick-Schiller in this issue. Starting from the point – also mentioned here – that “the scalar question is not about size but power,” they critically assess the contributions in this symposium, arguing that new concepts and methodologies are needed. In particular, “intersecting pathways of migrant and non-migrant displacement, emplacement, and city making represents a much-needed direction in comparative urban studies,” since “the positionality of each locality affects the opportunities, aspirations, and the ways in which the city’s residents, including newcomers with migrant backgrounds, construct social relations and seek to forge sociabilities.”

While we share this research agenda, on the one hand, we maintain that there can be space for a research on places and networks that doesn’t reduce every process to scale. Or, better, that can explore localities using scale as a background.

On the other hand, we should stress that the exploration of research methods appropriate for such an ambitious research agenda are far from being explored
enough. In particular, in quantitative terms, since the definition of relevant phenomena has not been operationalized enough, and usual aggregation areas can be inadequate to catch phenomena taking place at the targeted scale.

We agree that these issues call for a strong comparative agenda: comparing among urban hierarchies and scalar positions, and within them, and going beyond sociographic accounts of individual case studies [Singer, Hardwick and Brettell 2008; Bell and Jayne 2006; Glick Schiller, Çağlar and Guldbrandsen 2006]. That is, comparing similarities and disparities in migrants’ socio-economic positions in rural areas, small and medium towns, and new and old gateways – as well as comparing different rural areas and small and medium towns in similar scalar positions.

This is, again, a big endeavour. As mentioned above, there are problems of comparability of migration statistics [Bonifazi 2008]. For both qualitative and quantitative approaches, there is a need to operationalise context and its consequences in ways that are effective in comparative terms.

On the other hand, studying migration in small and medium towns, in contexts that can be more easily covered by researchers, may allow also a deeper understanding of interactions and social groups, taking into account how boundaries, groups, categories, and relations are structured reciprocally and asymmetrically, taking into account power hierarchies [Haley 2009].

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The State of the Art, and the Issues At Stake

Abstract: This article aims to provide an introduction to the whole Symposium, by analysing different trajectories of immigration outside gateways, focusing then on small towns, and defining specific scalar positions of small-scale urban contexts. Starting from a literature review and an analysis of European data, the authors aim to explain why immigration outside traditional gateways is selectively gaining momentum in different Western countries. Last, they will question what specific social, political, and economic incorporation is taking place in these new destinations.

Keywords: Small Towns; Immigration; Rescaling; Gateway Cities; Mobility Patterns.

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