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A Broken Kinship. The Fogliano of Reggio Emilia

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A BROKEN KINSHIP

THE FOGLIANO OF REGGIO EMILIA

The family of the Fogliano of Reggio Emilia is an interesting case study in the context of research relating to seigneurial kinship groups and their mechanisms. The lineage ruled over what was most likely the largest lordship in the region, and its members played a leading role in events on the chess-boards of both the city of Reggio Emilia and the surrounding countryside. However, such a powerful family was not as united as one might expect, and the divisions that pitted individual *domini* or entire branches of the lineage against each other occasionally reached levels of extreme violence. Nevertheless, these deep fractures did not affect kinship development, which only started to wane during the 1420s, when the Este gained an increasingly strong grasp on the region. The issue of divisions among the lords has not yet seen a specific thematization: with this paper is therefore proposed to frame, on the one hand, the reasons that led to the development and the definition of the fractures between the Fogliano; on the other hand, it is necessary to outline the reasons that allowed the family to thrive from the end of the 13th century to the beginning of the 15th century, with the aim of better understanding the segmentation mechanisms and the regulatory systems within a noble kin group.

Keywords: Fogliano, Reggio Emilia, Kinship, Family division, Lordship.

An Unexpected Beginning to a History of Violence

It seems almost redundant to say that families can be fragmented. As has been pointed out, «le lignage n'est pas toujours monolithique, solidaire et cohérent sous la conduite d'un aîné tout puissant, dont les parents partent à la guerre comme un seul homme contre la maison ennemie. De nombreuses tensions le traversent, qui aboutissent trop souvent à la voie de fait entre ses membres»¹. Examples of relationships between relatives deteriorating to such a point as to eventually result

in open warfare are too many to number, nevertheless, this issue is a particularly relevant one, especially when investigating and rethinking the fractures and divisions that impacted on family development in the late Middle Ages.

This theme is already well-known and has been widely investigated by historiography²; yet much remains to be said. One topic in particular that undoubtedly deserves further investigation is that of the unforeseen results of division, both those suffered and sought by a family, which could thus lead not to the unraveling of a lineage, but rather to its further development. In other words, the purpose here is to understand whether such fractures could in some way *build kinship*³, or, at least, strengthen the branches that were able to exploit such divisions to their own advantage. The aim of this paper is to offer some reflections on the broader processes that marked the developments of those seigneurial families that had so much weight in the Italian political (and social) landscape between the late Middle Ages and, subsequently, the Renaissance.

Moreover, this question is not confined solely to reflections on family history, which has undergone incredible development in historiography on the subject over the years⁴ (also with regard to the delicate relationship between politics and kinship)⁵, with, as has recently been highlighted, a constant opening of new research horizons, which have widened both thematically and methodologically⁶. However, many areas of shadow remain: in particular, what we are interested in addressing here is the issue (which has also already been thoroughly analysed⁷) of the fragmentations that a lineage may go through, as this theme allows us not only to delve into the balances and processes that involved a given family group, but also because this issue is closely linked to the political-institutional developments that affected central and northern Italy⁸.

Indeed, as will be observed in what follows, the dynamics that affected the Fogliano family (the case study taken into consideration here) were at the same time both motivated by and triggered by the institutional political developments that affected the city of Reggio Emilia and which, in turn, formed part of the broader movements of state formation developing throughout the peninsula: the fractures in the lineage soon took on political shades, identified during the 14th century initially in affiliation to the Guelph and Ghibelline factions, and subsequently in links with the regional powers (Visconti and Este) that exerted influence over Reggio Emilia. The agnates who found themselves in conflict with one another had the ability to exploit conflict as an element with which to strengthen certain branches of the lineage and with which to reconfigure their position in the local (and other) chessboards. The

subject of the contribution that local lineages made to the construction of regional states is a thriving (and relatively recent) field of research⁹. What is perhaps worth reflecting on is the role played in this context by a family marked by deep and violent divisions, and the counterintuitive contribution it made to the development of the emerging late-medieval regional states.

The background matter, onto which the analysis of the case under consideration is grafted, is therefore how it was possible for a family scarred by such deep and violent fractures to succeed in thriving from the 12th to the 15th century, in contexts marked by conspicuous evolution and significant changes to the power structures of reference: between the end of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th century Reggio Emilia experienced a series of changes in political organization. The communal experience, which was already under great strain, came to an end in the 1330s when the city fell into the hands of the Fogliano family. In 1335 the city was conquered by the Gonzaga, before coming under the control of Bernabò Visconti in 1371. The lords of Milan held it until the beginning of the 14th century, when – due to yet another political upheaval – the city came under Este rule¹⁰.

As already mentioned, the subject of analysis here is the kinship of the lords da Fogliano, a powerful lineage rooted in the countryside of Reggio Emilia which presents a number of characteristics that make it a particularly relevant case study for delving into the theme of kinship divisions (in terms of the relevance of the lineage, its articulation, the roles held by its members at both local and supra-local levels, the tight and never linear intertwining with different political structures, and so on).

Taking into account the broader context, this paper will consider the conflicts that marked the vicissitudes of this seigneurial family and its rural lordship, with the aim of understanding – as far as the sources at our disposal make it possible¹¹ – if and how these fractures impinged on the evolution of the lineage, and how the *domini* settled or, conversely, exploited these tensions to improve their own situation to the detriment of competing relatives. Three main aspects will thus be considered in this analysis: the divisions between relatives, caused by the structure of the lineage itself; the political fractures that overlapped with these; and finally, the ability of the lineage (or of specific branches) to prosper despite these fraught relationships. Far from wanting to offer merely a family history, the aim here is also to understand how a lineage with such characteristics was able to insert itself into complicated contexts, without losing its political relevance and indeed playing a prime role in the political, institutional and social developments of the region.

Before delving into the discussion proper, and in order to better understand subsequent developments, it is first necessary to briefly go over the early history and development of the kin group under consideration here.

The kinship of the *domini* of Fogliano had ancient origins¹². They rose to prominence at the dawn of the 13th century, when Guido da Fogliano married Verde Fieschi, sister of Sinibaldo, who would become Pope under the name of Innocent IV¹³. Leaving this noteworthy marriage alliance aside, what enabled the kin group to thrive in these early years was its unfaltering unity¹⁴. Staunch champions of the *pars Ecclesiae*¹⁵, the Fogliano managed to emerge unscathed from the violent factional clashes among families that swept the countryside¹⁶. The sum of these elements (the link with the Fieschi; the solidity of the lineage; its undoubted ideological and political orientation) was a harbinger of great fortune: when in 1243 Innocent IV was elected to the papal See, he immediately acted in favour of his relatives, thus also responding to his own needs¹⁷. The new pope did not hesitate to tamper with the election of the bishop of Reggio Emilia, appointing Guglielmo da Fogliano in 1244¹⁸.

Although the pope's intervention further strengthened the position of the agnates on the one hand¹⁹, on the other it led to the collapse of Reggio Emilia's fragile political system, which had already been weakened by a period of bitter conflicts, exacerbated by the widening rift between supporters of the Empire and those of the Church²⁰. After a brief moment of triumph, in 1245 the Fogliano were driven out of the city along with many other families of the *pars Ecclesiae*²¹, managing to return only in 1254²². When the struggles between factions were eventually quelled, the Fogliano increased their presence both in the countryside and the city, thanks to significant papal investitures, such as the castles of Querciola (1250, confirmed in 1252) and Carpineti (1254), two of what would have been among the main holdings of the lordship²³. In 1265, after a renewed outbreak of violence, the members of the *pars Imperii* of Reggio Emilia were expelled, ushering in a period of supremacy of the pontiff's supporters which lasted for two decades²⁴.

From what the extant and known sources allow us to infer, therefore, up until at least the mid-13th century the Fogliano behaved as a united kin group: all lords benefited from the connection with the papal court of Innocent IV²⁵, and the lineage stood united in the face of pressure from rival families. More generally, this situation was probably achieved thanks to two main elements: firstly, in this period an (all things considered) homogeneous affiliation to the *pars Ecclesiae* was a useful medium for the nobles to better define their shared political po-

sitions²⁶. Furthermore, for the years under consideration here it appears to be difficult to identify one branch of the family as more important (or overpowering) than the others. Two elements which could explain the substantial cohesion shown by the lineage until the first half of the 13th century²⁷.

All this would change during the two decades of the *pars Ecclesiae* dominance over the city: the development of the lineage, its growth in prestige and power, and its internal hierarchy, led to an expansion in the size and complexity of the lordship, which made internal relations more complex, eventually igniting clashes between the lords themselves. It is therefore necessary to search for the initial line of division between the Fogliano in the bloodline itself.

The Late Thirteenth Century: Rehearsals for Conflict

The first known clash within the kin group occurred in 1268, when Bertolino tried without success to occupy the castle of Scandiano, which had been built six years earlier by his cousin Giberto²⁸. This is an isolated episode, but it is quite representative of the growing turbulence developing below the seemingly still surface. Despite the rising tensions, and the assault against Scandiano, the backbone of the family and solidarity between kin would seem to have persisted: in 1283, for example, the three brothers Matteo, Bertolino and Niccolò da Fogliano were invested with the castle of Gesso by their uncle, Guglielmo bishop of Reggio Emilia²⁹. This was his last noteworthy act: Guglielmo died on August the 27th of that year³⁰, triggering a divisive climate among the family members³¹.

The reason underlying the clashes was the rivalry between the branches of the family that, by the 1280s, had become unmanageable, quickly acquiring different political nuances. The ruling faction of Reggio Emilia, riven by crisis, split into two different and opposing groups: the *Inferiori*, who maintained relations with the *pars Imperii*, and the *Superiori*, namely the most intransigent members, who were less inclined to dialogue with the other faction. This fracture involved the whole city, and several eminent families of Reggio Emilia chose one side or the other³²: the Manfredi and Roberti, for example, sided with the *Superiori*, while the Canossa, Manfredi and Luvisini formed part of the *Inferiori*³³.

Instead of choosing a side to stand on, the Fogliano family split in two: Bertolino and his brother Matteo joined the *Superiori*, while their cousins, Francesco and his brother Bernardo sided with the *Inferiori*³⁴. After a weak truce, concluded in 1286, clashes ensued in the following

years which led to alternate results: in 1287 the *Inferiori* were expelled from Reggio, while two years later it was the *Superiori* who had to leave the city³⁵. Thus, members of the same family could alternately take the helm of the city's government or be expelled, as was the case with the Fogliano³⁶.

In this context, Bertolino, Matteo and Niccolò fought their cousins occupying both the castle of Carpineti (of which Bernardo was provost) and Paullo (held instead by Francesco)³⁷. Despite these bitter divisions among the *domini*, however, the kin group as a whole did not seem to have weakened: while some of the lords were expelled from the city, others obtained prestigious political appointments. For instance, Bertolino da Fogliano was called to join the *Rettori del Pubblico*, a council made up by eight members, entrusted in 1287 with governing of the city³⁸, while Salimbene de Adam mentions Matteo da Fogliano as the most powerful man in Reggio Emilia³⁹.

Certainly, some had to deal more than others with difficult situations: the *Inferiori* – along with many *pars Imperii* families – managed to return in the city, and as a culmination of these conflicts, in January 1290, Reggio Emilia was handed over to the Este: significantly, the council that approved the transfer of the city to the lord of Ferrara was convened by Francesco da Fogliano⁴⁰. For those who had joined the *Superiori* the period of the Este lordship on Reggio Emilia was a difficult one⁴¹, and the family became polarised around different actors of the Italian political arena: the *Inferiori* championed the lord of Ferrara, while Matteo da Fogliano turned to the Correggio of Parma. In 1306 the *estrinseci* of Reggio succeeded in expelling Azzo VIII d'Este from the city, which fell, albeit only briefly, under the rule of Giberto da Correggio⁴².




FIG. 1. *The division between Superiiori and Inferiiori.*

As can be discerned from the events outlined above, the contours of the clash between the *Superiori* and the *Inferiori* gradually became blurred: the initially local style conflict, fought between families within a single city, progressively evolved and included new and important characters, such as the Este, who exploited the quarrel to extend their power. With regard to the Fogliano, it is important to stress that during this clash they never left the *pars Ecclesiae* side, at least formally. Both those who had joined the *Inferiori* and those family members who sided with the *Superiori* found protection in a «Guelph» lord⁴³, either from the Este or Correggio families⁴⁴.

For the Fogliano their links with the Church, and the benefits they could obtain from it, were still important. Furthermore there were no advantages in joining the *pars Imperii* side during the period that is being considered here⁴⁵. The fracture between Fogliano *Superiori* and Fogliano *Inferiori* was less dictated by ideology or contingent needs than by reasons internal to the kin group itself⁴⁶. The rapid growth of the power of the lineage and the segmentation of the family into different branches⁴⁷, spread across various strongholds which had been conquered over a fairly short time, was followed by an equally fast development of rivalry between relatives, which translated into a low-intensity conflict. Rather than breaking up into many branches, during these years the family split in two, and within each group the lords were able to express a considerable cohesion capacity against the other branch, even though this was not an obstacle towards defusing – as far as possible – moments of conflict, as demonstrated by the (albeit unsuccessful) truce of 1286.

From what it is possible to glean from the sources known to date, the clashes that took place between 1286 and 1306 never went beyond a few intra-family skirmishes (an image that is also conveyed by the currently known documentary landscape), however, the seeds that would lead to an escalation of violence during the 14th century had already been sown: on the one hand, the lords used factionalism as an instrument through which they could better define the positions they took (caused by the development of agnation and which, in turn, were influenced by such political-ideological decisions); on the other hand, when necessary, the Fogliano were able to look beyond the urban boundaries, and to seek the protection of important figures to obtain advantages.

Liminal Choices and Political Opportunities

As has emerged from the previous pages, the history of Reggio Emilia is marked by many moments of conflict, which profoundly influenced its development. Between the end of the 12th and the beginning of the 13th century, Reggio Emilia experienced the ascendant phase of its parabola, during which it succeeded in engaging with the families of the *contado* from a solid position, while at the same time establishing itself as a prominent centre among the important cities along the *via Emilia*⁴⁸; with the wars against Frederick II the *comune* entered its descendant phase, weakened in the face of more powerful rural families who, over the years, had managed to gain fundamental room for manoeuvre in urban institutions⁴⁹, to the extent that this profoundly influenced its policies, as observed during the clashes of 1286-1306; clashes that also led to a loss of independence for the city in favour of the Este family.

Moving on to the 14th century, the commune entered a definitive crisis. Of course, the city was formally governed by communal institutions, but in reality they found themselves increasingly at the mercy of the powerful seigneurial families who had their bases in the surrounding countryside and the fulcrum of their political interests in Reggio Emilia. The surreptitious penetration of the lords into the urban institutions, the tumultuous events (for which see below) brought about by the descents into Italy of Ludwig the Bavarian and John of Bohemia, the cession of Reggio Emilia to the papal legate Bertrand du Pouget in 1326: all these events dramatically eroded the resilience of the urban institutions. It is no coincidence that it was in the first thirty years of the 14th century that the seeds were sown that would lead to the transition from a *comune* to a lordship – a transition for which the Fogliano, among others, were responsible and played a leading role in bringing about⁵⁰.

As far as the lords are concerned, extant documents suggest that after the end of the struggle (1306) that broke out 20 years earlier, the lords experienced a period of family peace and strengthened their position in Reggio Emilia⁵¹, something that took place during a period that remained very tense, marked as it was by intense warfare among local families⁵². This apparent tranquillity concealed new and deeper fractures: although during 1320s a large part of the family was still bound to the Church and to the Guelph faction⁵³, it is highly probable that afterwards some members of the kinship group progressively moved closer to the Ghibelline faction.

At any rate, it was the descent into Italy of emperor Ludwig the Bavarian and subsequently of John of Luxembourg, king of Bohemia,

in the late 1320s and 1330s, that dealt the final blow to the Fogliano's unified affiliation to the Guelph faction. These circumstances set in motion a chain of events that would eventually lead the lords to their greatest success in urban politics: in 1331 the Fogliano and Manfredi families obtained the vicariate over the city from the king; two years later the Fogliano ousted the Manfredi and were «facti [...] dompni in generali consilio». Their lordship over the city lasted until 1335, when Reggio was occupied by the Della Scala, who then handed it over to the Gonzaga⁵⁴.

These events triggered a redefinition of the lineage's internal hierarchy, probably on the basis of pre-existing divisions and of the lords' need to better define their respective positions and rivalries. This was the case, for example, of Giberto: one of the main promoters of the shift undertaken by the lineage towards the Ghibellines, as early as 1322 he occupied Paullo, capturing Simone da Fogliano and his son Manfredino⁵⁵. From the end of the 1320s, therefore, the Fogliano found themselves in opposing factions – but this time, unlike what had happened at the end of the thirteenth century, the fractures appear to have been more pronounced: while the rift between *Superiori* and *Inferiori* took place within the common *pars Ecclesiae* front, in this case the lords sided with opposing groups⁵⁶. Ultimately these dynamics were instrumental in better defining pre-existing divisions. The lords were not driven apart by their different political loyalties. Quite the contrary, kinsmen whose unity had already been torn apart opportunistically identified those political groups whose allegiance could yield political advantages and help weaken rival relatives. Furthermore, in this case (in contrast to what had taken place in the late thirteenth century) it is loyalty to the Ghibelline faction that brought about the greatest advantages to the Fogliano.

Despite its short duration, the lordship over Reggio Emilia is one of the most remarkable signs of the kinship group's ability to achieve meaningful political results despite its internal fractures. Following the loss of the city, the family strengthened its presence in the countryside⁵⁷. The expulsion from Reggio Emilia did not deprive the lineage of a common political compass, since the politics of the Fogliano were already fractured⁵⁸: indeed, lordship over the city was obtained thanks to the new Ghibelline loyalty of many – but not all – members of the house, and while some lords turned to Ludwig the Bavarian and John of Bohemia in search of advantages, others remained staunchly bound to the Church. This is the case of Guido Savina, who in his *cartulari* proffers an image of the family compactly united in Guelph loyalty and tied to the pope⁵⁹. This is undoubtedly a confected picture, but one

that also responds to pragmatic requirements. Guido Savina's intention was to recount the history of the kin group by listing all of the concessions received from the Church from the thirteenth century onwards (up to the more recent ones of the 1320s). But this account was written at a moment in which the family was already split into many branches, whose divisions became increasingly pronounced over time⁶⁰.

After the loss of Reggio Emilia, at the twilight of cooperation within the kin group⁶¹, a progressive increase in violence can be observed over time as expressed in conflict between agnates⁶². Engaged in bitter warfare against the Gonzaga of Mantua, new lords of Reggio, the Fogliano deployed unprecedented levels of violence. In 1354, for example, Bertolino and Francesco (both sons of Giberto, one of the main champions of the war against the Gonzaga to recover Reggio) asked Mattiolo da Fogliano for an audience. Their objective, they explained, was to lead an expedition against the Gonzaga. Mattiolo welcomed them into the castle of Scandiano and then the slaughter began: Bertolino and Francesco, with the help of Guido Manfredi, captured Mattiolo, one of his children and two more relatives. All of the prisoners were killed and Mattiolo's castles were occupied⁶³.

The reason for this dramatic outbreak of violence is probably to be sought in two different motives⁶⁴: on the one hand, the close relationship that Mattiolo enjoyed with the Gonzaga could have been a problem for other relatives⁶⁵, given that as early as 1341 the relationship between the *dominus* and the institutions of Reggio and its new lords had become tighter⁶⁶; on the other hand, the 1354 coup allowed Giberto's sons to take an important share of the domain, thus strengthening their own positions at the expense of those of another branch of the family⁶⁷.

Such episodes, therefore, were not merely a matter of blind hostility. On the contrary, together with the elusive political position of the kin group, these violent events were an expedient through which the branches of the lineage could hope to survive and prosper, not as one family, but as single lines of a wider group. During the second half of the fourteenth century such issues became even more evident.

The Use of Violence and Political Ambiguity as Survival Strategies

The use of violence to tighten the intricate and shattered web of the lineage around a single branch of the family (thus acquiring better control over the lordship), or even in the hands of a single lord, can clearly be seen in a second episode, which illustrates a different situation

to which the lineage had to adapt. By the end of the fourteenth century the Fogliano found themselves caught up in the tensions caused by the emergence of regional states. In 1371 Bernabò Visconti conquered Reggio Emilia, which the Este had also set their eyes on⁶⁸. This change triggered new internal upheavals within the kin group⁶⁹, which again pragmatically exploited political polarisations to respond to internal fractures and conflicts. In other words, the allegiance of one of the lords (or of one of the family branches) to the Visconti would result in another branch getting closer to the Este, and vice versa⁷⁰.

The different branches chose who to side with by evaluating which front could provide protection and effective political support, with the aim of weakening rival relatives and strengthening their position in the local political arena. When the allegiance to one side no longer guaranteed sufficient advantages, or when internal imbalances within the lineage made it necessary, the Fogliano would nonchalantly change sides (by exploiting treaties of *adherentia* to bind themselves to either party)⁷¹, constantly redefining the balance of power. Therefore, if one branch decided to change sides, the opposing relatives would follow suit, and so on⁷².

Dynamics of this kind are deeply embedded in the fourteenth-century scenario considered here. From the communal (and post-communal) world observed in the preceding pages, we now find ourselves in a panorama populated by emerging regional states, within which there were numerous bodies that made up these new entities, including the rural lordly families themselves, with whom the princes were obliged to maintain a close dialogue, whether political or military. In their role of glue between centre and periphery⁷³, of transmission belt between community and princes, in their patronage in favour of the *homines* of the *contado*, the rural lords of the 14th-15th centuries were exposed to incredible opportunities for growth and development – opportunities that, nevertheless, had the consequence of redefining the internal balances of a lineage and causing the asymmetrical growth of one branch over another, or even the rise of a single individual to the detriment of others, with the consequent deployment of conflictual practices, by an agnation affected by such dynamics, to regain its lost balance and to increase its relevance on local (and other) horizons.

What happened in 1372 is another clear example of this pragmatic use of violence in pursuit of political advantages. Francesco (the same lord who took part in the attack of 1354) and Guido Savina (a namesake of the figure mentioned above), both sons of Giberto, supported the Este against Bernabò Visconti. During that year, however, Francesco was taken prisoner. Seeking to capitalize on this success,

Bernabò entered negotiations with his brother, without ever receiving an answer from Guido Savina. As a consequence, Francesco was put to death on December 7th, and his estate was thus inherited by his brother. Guido Savina was now at the head of a vast and powerful *dominatus*, probably the strongest in the region, and it was only then that he started negotiations with Bernabò. Thus in 1373 Guido Savina abandoned the Este front and joined forces with Bernabò by signing an *adherentia* in favour of the Visconti⁷⁴.

By sacrificing one family member another branch became stronger, even though this episode triggered a long and harsh war between Guido Savina and his sons, on one side, and his nephews⁷⁵, who were seeking revenge against an *oncle usurpateur*, on the other⁷⁶. The elimination of rivals, the propagation of violence to new and different actors, the search for a bond with the main political actors in the region: this same pattern underlies the violent feud for the castle of Rondinara, which involved four different branches of the kin group in 1392-1393, and ended with the death of both of the main contenders for the castle⁷⁷.




FIG. 2. Branches of the Fogliano Family at the end of the 14th century.

As one can see, the events presented so far are marked by a number of common dynamics: through the alignment with the apparatuses of Guelphism and Ghibellinism, or through allegiance to supra-local powers (Visconti and Este) present in the region, the Fogliano were able to identify and profit from the opportunities provided by supra-re-

gional factions. Their ambition to rule over the city undoubtedly failed; however, the various branches of the family were successful in identifying opportunities to gain advantages and secure important positions, even though these were redefined and updated according to events.

In the first quarter of the fifteenth century, however, things began to change⁷⁸. After the peace of 1420 between the duke of Milan, Filippo Maria Visconti, and the marquess of Este, Niccolò III, the presence of these two families in the countryside surrounding Reggio Emilia became increasingly significant, hindering the ability of local lords to engage in political bargaining. With the concession of Reggio Emilia in fief to the marquis, in 1421⁷⁹, he was able to thwart the rural lordships of the region, which included that of the Fogliano. In the following years, the family lost many castles to Ferrara, and the lordship began to fade. Some of the Fogliano lords managed to keep their holdings, but only because they were used by the Este as governors of the castles they once held; in other words, they became officials in the service of a stronger power, but were no longer independent *domini*⁸⁰.

Cracks and Fractures: Some Examples for an (Initial) Comparison

Before proceeding with some concluding remarks, it might be useful to compare the experience of the Fogliano with that of other lineages, with the aim of better appreciating both the elements peculiar to Fogliano kinship and those shared with other families (without any pretense of exhaustiveness, but rather from a purely impressionistic point of view).

Remaining in the Reggio Emilia area, it is for example possible to note that there are several lineages that display internal fractures and divisions: the kin group of the lords of Canossa, for example, is one that is marked by deep fractures, which often took on violent and bloody connotations. In the second half of the 14th century, the family was embroiled in the activity of Gabriotto da Canossa, who attempted to assume a gradually increasing presence in the balance of the lineage (following a path somewhat similar to that observed for Guido Savina). His violent death at the hands of his cousin Niccolò also marked the beginning of the decline of Canossa power⁸¹. The *domini* da Correggio appear to have been equally fragmented⁸², particularly following the death of Giberto, lord of Parma, and the end of their lordship over the city (1344). Lacking a political compass that could guide their policies, the different branches of the kin group pursued different strategies⁸³, marked by tensions and clashes as much between cousins as between

brothers⁸⁴. There are, of course, also exceptions to the rule: the da Sesso lords, for example, were able to express an «uncommon cohesion» throughout the 14th century⁸⁵. However, it would appear that the most significant lineages of the region, and the most highly stratified ones, were – on average – also those marked by the swiftest recourse to violence⁸⁶.

Extending our gaze, the powerful Pallavicini appear equally marked by divisions. During the 14th century, the lineage experienced a strong internal hierarchization: a main branch, which evolved in a dynastic sense (progressively dividing the inheritance among the various heirs), was juxtaposed with secondary branches that instead assumed the structure of the *consortile*. In the case of the Pallavicini family, it is also possible to identify many examples of tension between agnates, particularly between brothers at times of hereditary succession. There are many examples of the occupation by force of other individuals' possessions, of aggression, of seeking support from different powers in an attempt to undermine rival agnates, and so on, especially following the death of Rolando Pallavicino in 1453. This division, however, did not take on political connotations, and did not overly undermine the Ghibelline alignment of the lineage. This tendency toward tension between siblings ultimately exhausted the lineage's strength and caused its pulverization, to the benefit of the rival lineage of the Rossi, who were able to remain united until their head-on clash with the duke of Milan in the 1480s⁸⁷.

If we were to shift our analysis to a different area it would be possible to observe different scenarios. A fitting case-study is that of Piedmont, another region that, in a similar fashion to the Reggiano, is characterized by weak cities and by a strong presence of powerful lordships⁸⁸. Among the regional lineages, which went through progressive divisions, and an increasing complexity of family structures, one does not seem to find the same striking recourse to violence as a means of conflict management (and as an opportunity to be exploited) that can be detected elsewhere⁸⁹. On the other hand, the case of the marquises of Saluzzo is quite different, for whom it was precisely internal clashes, along with structural weaknesses in marquissate power, that caused them to weaken considerably between the 13th and 14th centuries. Somewhat similar situations can be observed with the marquises of Incisa and Ceva: as noted, in fact, «più le strutture consortili sono rigide e articolate più sono violenti e distruttivi i conflitti all'interno dei singoli gruppi»⁹⁰.

If we move on to a further context, such as that of Turin for example, it is possible to find families marked by a strong hold on kinship ties as well as lineages marked by a weaker control, which between the 14th and 15th centuries leads to disintegration. Unlike what has been observed

for the Fogliano, however, for these urban lineages the political horizon plays an (all things considered) contained role in kinship management choices⁹¹, in favor of other needs, such as preserving and managing wealth. Thus, it is possible to find families that attempt to stop their ramifications (while at the same time risking their extinction), while other families are broken into many branches, each of which has its own agenda (something that is particularly well observed for those families who have properties in the city as well as in the countryside). However, once again, even in a lineage sided in the common loyalty for the *Populus* (such as that of the da Cavaglià family), it is possible to observe how economic fluctuations and financial activity are the origin, and not the consequence, of the separation of the different branches of the lineage⁹². Nevertheless, in none of these cases does there appear to be an actual active use of violence among the strategies deployed by a lineage with heavily stratified divisions, as observed in the case of the Fogliano.

Another area that undoubtedly deserves consideration is Tuscany. In this region there is also evidence of families that, burdened by their own extension, by their own division into different branches (focussed on the castles possessed by the lineage), by the crumbling of the patrimonial estate, and by the lack of a political point of reference around which to gather, experienced complicated fractures. The Guidi, Alberti, and Pazzi di Valdarno are just some of the names that can be mentioned to recall lineages marked by such dynamics⁹³, which are in some ways in line with what has been observed for the Reggio Emilia area, also by virtue of the small size and repeated crises that the cities around which these families gravitated were experiencing (such as Pistoia and Arezzo)⁹⁴.

Unlike the context of Reggio, where it was the modification of political structures during the 15th century that progressively weakened the Fogliano's capacity to survive, in the Tuscan case the fatigue of the seigniorial lineages, and the exhaustion of their resources (accomplice, also, their fragmentation) can already be perceived towards the end of the 14th century, also due to Florentine policies aimed not at integrating but rather at digesting the various local lordships into the territorial dominion that was progressively being built up, both through forms of political-diplomatic subordination and by conducting effective military campaigns: between the 14th and 15th centuries, in fact, the Tuscan *dominati* were destined towards progressive dissolution⁹⁵.

Considering these examples, (which are small in number and merely illustrative), the Fogliano case-study remains a particularly relevant one. A true *discord tree*, as it has been effectively defined⁹⁶, the Fogliano

show particularly pronounced and relevant dynamics, making the lineage a privileged field of observation for aspects such as the management of fractures, the use of violence, and the exploitation of agnates' weaknesses to one's own advantage. Above all, unlike other kinships, in which the most violent moments of fracture were often a preamble to the decline of the lineage itself, this was not the case for the Fogliano, whose disappearance is to be found not solely and not so exclusively in the dispersion of resources in infighting, but rather in the closure of the political spaces in which they had long moved (and from which they were accustomed to gaining advantages and opportunities).

Concluding Remarks

To sum up, solidarity within the Fogliano kin group seems to be limited to fathers and sons, while there would seem to have been profound divisions between uncles and nephews, or between cousins, or even between brothers⁹⁷: the examples illustrated thus far are related to clashes between these groups of relatives. Therefore, as has already been pointed out in the historiography, while the relationships of agnatic nature do not work properly among the lords, a different perspective comes from the relationships of cognatic nature: the marriages with other families of the countryside (such as the Luvisini, or the da Baiso) is the way by which the lords strengthened and consolidated pre-existing political relationships and interests, so as to pursue common objectives (although, of course, this type of link could also be disavowed if circumstances required it)⁹⁸. Although it is difficult in the current state of research to give an account of the actual number of members of the Fogliano family, it is reasonable to state that it was one of the largest in the Reggio Emilia area, and the size of the family itself must have been an important element of destabilisation, a pattern found in other cases as well, such as the aforementioned conflicts that erupted within the Canossa and the Correggio families, for example. In a chessboard characterised by limited space and resources, the large number of lords opposed by old enmities and new rivalries, together with the other elements mentioned above, must have been a touchpaper for conflict.

Summarising what has been described so far, we can identify three lines of division within the Fogliano. The first one lies in the structure of the family itself: the fight between the *Superiori* and *Inferiori* in 1286-1289 is a clear example of these new violent dynamics within the kin group, which were motivated by the growth of kinship, the increase in its power in the city as well as in the *contado*, the loss of political

reference points, and which found their structuring in the political polarisation of the second half of the 13th century. Connected to this first fracture, a second – albeit short-lived – element of dissidence among the lords was the division, based on pragmatic considerations, between those who adhered to Guelph faction and those who sided with the Ghibellines; a polarisation that at the same time delineated already existing rifts and gave rise to deeper divisions. The dynamics characterising this second factor somehow evolved into the third line of division: indeed, these two name tags (*guelfi* and *ghibellini*) were shed rather quickly. What really mattered in the long run was understanding which regional State it was best to ally with in order to safeguard one's political position while keeping enough autonomy⁹⁹. This was particularly relevant both for those branches that were able to phagocytize other segments of the lineages, and were thus in need of political legitimation for the new positions they held, and for those groups of lords in difficult circumstances, who sought protection.

As much as the abovementioned factors have been central to undermining the unity of the kin group, violence was (one of) the mediums with which the Fogliano regulated family dynamics¹⁰⁰. Conflicts among lords could be either relatively mild, as attested by the struggle between *Superiori* and *Inferiori*, a long-lasting clash but – at least as far as we know – without major outbreaks of violence; or else they could descend into brutal warfare and bloodshed, as shown by the events of 1354, 1372 and 1392-1393.

Despite the paucity of sources, it is possible to note an increase in violence over time, which would seem to have reached its peak in the second half of the fourteenth century. The reasons for this may be different: diminished space for action in the countryside, increasing distance between the different branches of the lineage, the need to strengthen positions in order to survive the expansion of regional states, etc. What must be stressed is how the exacerbated use of violence, wherein one member – or one line – of the family could overwhelm the others, only explains survival over the short term and not the family's strength over the long term. While these episodes show the ability of individuals or groups of lords to enhance their positions to the detriment of other relatives, they do not fully explain the ability of the family as a whole to survive and prosper as a group of agnates alternately collaborating or fighting between each other. Indeed, there are cases of lineages that (also) found their end in the contrasts between the agnates: this is the example of the lords from Cavalcabò, who found themselves depleted by the very incompatible policies of the agnates, who

nel corso del Trecento [...] vissero una vera e propria esplosione demografica: è logico che, in maniera simile a quanto avvenne per altre famiglie signorili padane nel XIV (e nel XV) secolo, la proliferazione delle linee producesse conflitti per la definizione delle gerarchie interne al casato, spesso alimentati dalle potenze maggiori, a loro volta chiamate in casa e strumentalizzate dai protagonisti¹⁰¹.

There is, in fact, a second and better explanation to how the Fogliano managed to survive for such a long time, despite their violently fraught relationship. As a general rule, the kin group was able to penetrate the grey areas of the neighbouring regional states, thus constantly redefining their position, gaining – or retaining – advantages and achievements. This tendency can be detected following, or concurrent with, activities such as holding posts as itinerant officials and military service for other powers, which made the Fogliano both a resource and a threat to the neighbouring powers, allowing the family to prosper over a very long period of time. Thanks to their castles, perched as they were on the hills and mountains surrounding Reggio Emilia, the *domini* were in fact able to take advantage of continuous warfare in the region. If the struggle between the Visconti and the Este on the one hand contributed to fracturing the family, on the other it placed some of the branches in an advantageous situation¹⁰²: the regional powers were eagerly looking for allies, and single lords, or groups of lords, were willing to negotiate to fight in their service, obtaining castles, villages or other forms of legitimation in return. What was supposedly an element of weakness became an element of strength: the military prowess of the Fogliano was highly sought after by warring parties¹⁰³. To a broken kinship, fractured by violence, with each family branch constantly looking for a way to thwart rival relatives, remaining within ambiguous political areas was of capital importance since it enabled them to thrive and to pursue their political ambitions in complete autonomy.

In spite of their bloody history, it was not in violence that the Fogliano found their end: on the contrary, as we have pointed out, conflict was often an opportunity for the agnates who knew how to use it to the detriment of others, and the marked segmentation of the family was a resource that allowed its branches to find as many interlocutors as possible. When the appeal of the Fogliano to these interlocutors wore off, the family gradually lost prominence on the political stage. For emerging regional states, which were progressively becoming more stabilized, the convulsive dynamics of the Fogliano were incompatible, and the lords who found themselves immersed in this new context had to reconfigure their elements of strength¹⁰⁴.

In a scenario like that of Reggio Emilia, characterised by a city whose institutions had weak control over the surrounding countryside, many different local lordships and two powers which polarized the region and multiplied the political advantages, the Fogliano – even though split into many branches – managed to thrive for quite a long time¹⁰⁵. Once they no longer had the possibility to change sides according to the circumstances, due to the exhaustion of political room for manoeuvre and the (territorial and institutional) strengthening of neighbouring regional states, their internal divisions ultimately weakened them. Certain exponents of the kin group attained important roles during the fifteenth century (such as Corrado Fogliani Sforza d'Aragona, stepbrother of Francesco Sforza, duke of Milan)¹⁰⁶, but the golden age of the Fogliano, based on an unflinching presence in the countryside, nonchalant recourse to violence and an ability to pursue ambitious political goals, was over – and with it, their preminence in the region.

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Notes

¹ M. AURELL, *Rompere la concorde familiare : typologie, imaginaire, questionnements*, in Id. (dir.), *La Parenté déchirée: les luttes intrafamiliales au Moyen Âge*, Turnhout 2010, pp. 9-59, p. 11. On the elements that on the contrary gave cohesion to a lineage: J.-C. MAIRE VIGUEUR, *Cavalieri e cittadini. Guerra, conflitti e società nell'Italia comunale*, Bologna 2004, pp. 365-74.

² It would suffice here to refer to AURELL (dir.), *La Parenté déchirée* cit.

³ The reference is to the important monographic collection *Costruire la parentela*, «Quaderni storici», 86 (1994).

⁴ A fundamental historiographical and thematic framework on the theme of the family, in its broadest sense, in M. GRAVELA, *Il corpo della città. Politica e parentela a Torino nel tardo Medioevo*, Roma 2017, pp. 9-32. See also EAD., *Modelli familiari nelle aristocrazie europee del tardo medioevo. Confronti storiografici fra Italia e Gran Bretagna*, in D. ZARDIN (a cura di), *Lombardia ed Europa. Incroci di storia e cultura*, Milano 2014, pp. 3-21, pp. 9-16.

⁵ See the bibliographical overview on this theme in GRAVELA, *Il corpo della città* cit., pp. 22-6.

⁶ For some very recent considerations: J.A. SOLÓRZANO TELECHEA, *Introducción. La familia urbana: matrimonio, parentesco y linaje en la Edad Media*, in Id., J. HAEMERS, C. LIDDY (eds), *La familia urbana. Matrimonio, parentesco y linaje en la Edad Media*, Logroño 2021, pp. 13-7.

⁷ And it is in fact the specific theme of AURELL (dir.), *La Parenté déchirée* cit.

⁸ See P. SAVY, *Une famille de seigneurs dans l'Italie du XV^e siècle: fonctionnement de l'Etat et appartenance sociale à la lumière d'une étude de cas*, in M. AURELL (ed.), *Le médiéviste et la monographie familiale: sources, méthodes et problématiques*, Turnhout 2004, pp. 201-11.

⁹ Here we are referring to the 2015 PRIN *La signoria rurale nel XIV-XV secolo: per ripensare l'Italia tardomedievale* (Rural lordship in the 14th-15th centuries: rethinking late medieval Italy),

P.I. Sandro Carocci. Among the publications of this research project, in particular, see F. DEL TREDICI (a cura di), *La signoria rurale nell'Italia del tardo medioevo. 5. Censimento e quadri regionali*, Roma 2021.

¹⁰ For an initial historical overview, see: A. BALLETTI, *Storia di Reggio nell'Emilia. Completata da un indice analitico dei nomi*, Rome 1925 (anastatic reproduction: Roma 1968); F. BOCCHI, *Il comune. 1115-1290*, in M. FESTANTI, G. GHERPELLI (a cura di), *Storia illustrata di Reggio Emilia*, vol. I, San Marino 1987, pp. 97-111; G. MONTECCHI, *I conflitti tra le signorie. Reggio tra XIV e XV secolo*, in ivi, pp. 145-60; F. CENGARLE, *Gerarchie e sfere di influenza nella pace di Milano del 1420: il Reggiano tra Filippo Maria Visconti e Niccolò III d'Este*, in G. BADINI, A. GAMBERINI (a cura di), *Medioevo reggiano. Studi in ricordo di Odoardo Rombaldi*, Milano 2007, pp. 306-25.

¹¹ Future studies on the subject will hopefully provide new and more in-depth findings. Research on the Fogliano presents the difficulty of the lack of a unitary family archive: that in the castle of Scandiano, for example, was destroyed in 1408. G.B. VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano*, Modena 1822 (anastatic reproduction: Sala Bolognese 1997), p. 65. The main sources regarding the Fogliano family (particularly for the 14th century onwards) are kept in the state archive of Reggio Emilia and range from private notarial records to public documents (issued for example by the Visconti or Este families), as well as correspondence concerning individual lords. In addition to archival sources, local chronicles are also useful for reconstructing the family's history.

¹² F. DEL TREDICI, *Il profilo economico della signoria lombarda. Il caso dei Visconti e quello dei Borromeo (secoli XIV-XV)*, in A. GAMBERINI, F. PAGNONI (a cura di), *La signoria rurale nell'Italia del tardo medioevo*, vol. I, *Gli spazi economici*, Milano 2019, pp. 21-54, pp. 22-3. For an essential bibliography on the Fogliano we refer, for the sake of brevity, to what is contained in F. BOZZI, *Da Fogliano*, in Del TREDICI (a cura di), *La signoria rurale* cit., pp. 353-9. Many fundamental works, still indispensable today for reconstructing the family's history, are presented in the following notes.

¹³ VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., pp. 31-1; R. DE ROSA, *Un matrimonio tra Genova e Reggio nel XIII secolo*, in «Bollettino storico reggiano», 77 (1992), pp. 29-31.

¹⁴ As pointed out – albeit perhaps with an emphasis that needs to be tempered – by G. CASAGRANDE, *Note sulla famiglia dei Da Fogliano*, in *Il territorio querciolese e la valle del Tresinaro. Atti del Convegno di studi storici*, Viano, 24-25 maggio 1980, 2 voll., Reggio Emilia 1982, II, pp. 309-17, p. 314.

¹⁵ The kinship probably emerges from the ranks of the bishop's *milites*. Ivi, p. 311. On the evolution of the terms of *Pars Ecclesiae* and *Pars Imperii*, and subsequently Guelphs and Ghibellines: R.M. DESSI, *I nomi dei guelfi e ghibellini da Carlo I d'Angiò a Petrarca*, in M. GENTILE (a cura di), *Guelfi e ghibellini nell'Italia del Rinascimento*, Roma 2005, pp. 3-78.

¹⁶ L. ARTIOLI, C. CORRADINI, C. SANTI (a cura di), *Chronicon Regiense. La Cronaca di Pietro della Gazzata nella tradizione del codice Crispi*, Reggio Emilia 2000, pp. 14-8, and ALBERTI MILIOLI, *NOTARII REGINI Liber de temporibus et aetatibus et Cronica imperatorum*, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores*, vol. XXXI, Hannover, Impensis Bibliopolii Hahniani, 1903, p. 505.

¹⁷ On the one hand, in fact, the pontiff had trusted partisans in Reggio Emilia to oppose Frederick II; on the other, he could also pursue strategies that involved the Fieschi as a lineage. G. MILANI, *L'esclusione dal Comune. Conflitti e bandi politici a Bologna e in altre città italiane tra XII e XIV secolo*, Roma 2003, pp. 95-6; M.P. ALBERZONI, *La chiesa cittadina, i monasteri e gli ordini mendicanti*, in R. GRECI (a cura di), *Storia di Parma*, vol. III/1, *Parma medievale. Poteri e istituzioni*, Parma 2010, pp. 261-321; P. BAGLIANI, *Innocenzo IV*, in *Enciclopedia dei papi*, II, *Niccolò I, santo-Sisto IV*, Roma 2000, pp. 384-92; F. BERNINI, *Innocenzo IV e il suo parentado*, in «Nuova rivista storica», 24/6 (1940), pp. 178-99. See also O. ROMBALDI, *Querciola e i feudi della Chiesa reggiana, in Il territorio querciolese e la valle del Tresinaro. Atti del Convegno di studi storici*, Viano, 24-25 maggio 1980, 2 voll., Reggio Emilia 1981, I, pp. 65-86, pp. 74-5. The Fogliano found themselves in open conflict with the *filoimperiali* during the struggles of the mid-13th century, with particularly serious consequences. BALLETTI, *Storia di Reggio nell'Emilia* cit., pp. 78-87, pp. 134-8.

¹⁸ For a comparison with the dynamics between Innocent IV and the Sanvitale and Rossi of Parma, also related to the Pope, and with the Fieschi, his family of origin; BERNINI, *Innocenzo IV e il suo parentado* cit., pp. 178-99. In relation to Fieschi and Sanvitale, see also ALBERZONI, *La chiesa cittadina, i monasteri e gli ordini mendicanti* cit., pp. 261-321, pp. 303-12. For the election of Guglielmo: BALLETTI, *Storia di Reggio nell'Emilia* cit., p. 84; C. CORRADINI, *Fogliano (de Foliano), Guglielmo da*, in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, vol. XLVIII, Roma 1997, pp. 469-73, p. 470; ARTIOLI, CORRADINI, SANTI (a cura di), *Chronicon Regiense* cit., p. 26; C. CORRADINI, *Chiesa e società a Reggio Emilia nella prima metà del secolo XIII: pace, lotte intestine e divisioni*, in L. PAOLINI (a cura di), *Il vescovo, la chiesa e la città di Reggio in età comunale*, Bologna 2012, pp. 127-54, pp. 147-54; ALBERTI MILIOLI, *Liber de temporibus* cit., p. 515.

¹⁹ For an overview of the development of lineages after the beginning of the 11th century and their agnatic evolution: D. HERLIHY, *La famiglia nel medioevo*, Roma-Bari 1987, pp. 103-14; H. BRESCH, *L'Europa delle città e delle campagne (secoli XIII-XV)*, in A. BURGUIÈRE et al. (a cura di), *Storia universale della famiglia*, vol. I, *Antichità, Medioevo, Oriente antico*, Milano 1987, pp. 395-430, pp. 401-5; J. CASEY, *La famiglia nella storia*, Roma-Bari 1991, pp. 39-50; D.W. SABEAN, S. TEUSCHER, *Kinship in Europe. A New Approach to Long Term Development*, in D.W. SABEAN, S. TEUSCHER, J. MATHIEU (eds), *Kinship in Europe. Approaches to Long-Term Development (1300-1900)*, New York-Oxford 2007, pp. 1-32, pp. 4-16. On the agnatio, and its distinction from cognatio: G. POMATI, *Legami di sangue, legami di seme. Consanguineità e agnazione nel diritto romano*, in «Quaderni storici», 86 (1994), pp. 299-334, pp. 301-26.

²⁰ ARTIOLI, CORRADINI, SANTI (a cura di), *Chronicon Regiense* cit., p. 28; BALLETTI, *Storia di Reggio* cit., p. 86. This, however, did not prevent the Fogliano from gaining strength in the countryside. ROMBALDI, *Querciola* cit., p. 74.

²¹ BALLETTI, *Storia di Reggio* cit., p. 86; CORRADINI, *Fogliano, Guglielmo da* cit., p. 470; A. POLONI, *Vitalità economica e sperimentazioni politiche a Reggio dall'inizio del Duecento al regime guelfo* (1265), in BADINI, GAMBERINI (a cura di), *Medioevo reggiano* cit., pp. 193-214, p. 209.

²² On August 17th of 1253 a truce was concluded between the Fogliano, Roberti (*pars Ecclesiae*) and da Sesso (*pars Imperii*); on October 28th the bishop Guglielmo returned to the city. CORRADINI, *Fogliano, Guglielmo da* cit., p. 470. This was also due to the effort of Innocent IV. MILANI, *L'esclusione dal Comune* cit., p. 140.

²³ O. ROMBALDI, *Carpineti nel medioevo*, in *Carpineti medievale. Convegno di studi matildici. Carpineti, 25-26 settembre 1976*, Reggio Emilia 1976, pp. 53-181, pp. 81-2, 96-129 e 136-42.

²⁴ VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., p. 39; F. FABBI, *Le nobili famiglie Reggiane e il predominio del Comune nel periodo dantesco*, in *Reggio ai tempi di Dante. Atti e memorie del Convegno di studi per il VII centenario della nascita di Dante, Reggio Emilia, 16-17 ottobre 1965*, Modena 1966, pp. 63-84, p. 66; BOCCHI, *Il comune* cit., pp. 108-9. For these years, marked by the development of the *Populus* in Reggio: POLONI, *Vitalità economica* cit.

²⁵ The gratitude of the Fogliano family towards the pope is evident, for example, in the will of Bonifacio da Fogliano, who died on 27 June 1270. C. CORRADINI, *Fogliano (de Foliano), Bonifacio da*, in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, vol. XLVIII, Roma 1997, pp. 459-61. However, one could point to many examples throughout the period considered here: as early as the 1330s Guglielmo da Fogliano had been *podestà* of Foligno, then of Viterbo, and had followed Frederick II to Rome to the aid of Gregory XI. CORRADINI, *Fogliano (de Foliano), Guglielmo da* cit., p. 469. Again, between 1252 and 1254 (the year he went to Foligno to obtain the podesteria) Bonifacio da Fogliano, papal chaplain, acted as rector of the duchy of Spoleto. A. SANZI, *Storia del Comune di Spoleto dal secolo XII al XVII seguita da alcune memorie dei tempi posteriori*, I, Perugia, Volumnia, 1972 (ristampa anastatica dell'edizione Foligno 1879), pp. 83-6. Although the death of Innocent IV in 1254 did not cause any upheaval in the Fogliano's policies, it did bring about changes in relations with Rome, from which the Fogliano could no longer expect the flood of investitures and assignment of roles and offices that they had enjoyed in previous years. CORRADINI, *Fogliano (de Foliano), Bonifacio da* cit., p. 460.

²⁶ As happened in other contexts, «de dispute inter familiare, elle se transforme en ligne de partage des eaux politiques entre les futurs lignages guelfes et leurs homologues gibelins». G.

CASTELNUOVO, *La noblesse déchirée en Italie communale (XIII^e-XIV^e siècles)*, in AURELL (dir.), *La Parenté déchirée* cit. pp. 269-78, p. 273.

²⁷ C. VIOLANTE, *Alcune caratteristiche delle strutture famigliari in Lombardia, Emilia e Toscana durante i secoli IX-XII*, in G. DUBY, J. LE GOFF (a cura di), *Famiglia e parentela nell'Italia medievale*, Bologna 1981, pp. 19-82, pp. 31-40; F. Leverotti, *Famiglia e istituzioni nel medioevo italiano*, Roma 2005, pp. 73-100.

²⁸ VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., p. 39. Clashes between cousins are among the most frequently attested in sources. AURELL, *Rompere la concorde* cit., p. 32.

²⁹ C. CORRADINI, *Fogliano (de Foliano), Matteo da*, in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, vol. XLVIII, Roma 1997, pp. 480-2, p. 480.

³⁰ ID., *Fogliano, Guglielmo da* cit., p. 472. After his death, the kinship tried to make Francesco da Fogliano his successor in the bishopric, but the plan failed. ROMBALDI, *Carpinetti* cit., p. 138.

³¹ «La scomparsa del vescovo Guglielmo segnò per l'agnazione l'inizio della stagione dei bandi e degli esili, presto accompagnati dalla nascita di discordie intestine. Almeno dai primi del Trecento i Fogliano sembrano infatti aver smarrito la solidarietà al loro interno, ma anche quell'identità guelfa che era stata la fortuna del casato». A. GAMBERINI, *La città assediata. Poteri e identità politiche a Reggio in età viscontea*, Roma 2003, pp. 227-42, p. 229.

³² On this theme: MILANI, *L'esclusione dal Comune* cit., pp. 147-50 e 166-74.

³³ CORRADINI, *Fogliano (de Foliano), Matteo da* cit., p. 480.

³⁴ ARTIOLI, CORRADINI, SANTI (a cura di), *Chronicon Regiense* cit., pp. 77-81; VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., p. 39; BALLETTI, *Storia di Reggio* cit., pp. 142-3; CORRADINI, *Fogliano, Bertolino da* cit., p. 458; ID., *Fogliano, Matteo da* cit., p. 480; FABBI, *Le nobili famiglie* cit., pp. 68-74. A list of the leaders of the two factions is in C.S. NOBILI (a cura di), *Salimbene de Adam*, Roma 2002, p. 924. On the clashes between brothers and cousins: AURELL, *Rompere la concorde* cit., p. 23-33.

³⁵ BALLETTI, *Storia di Reggio* cit., pp. 142-6.

³⁶ GAMBERINI, *La città assediata* cit., p. 229.

³⁷ F. FABBI, *Il castello e la villa di Carpinetti*, Reggio Emilia 1955, p. 14. The castles of Gesso dei Malapresi and Montalto were occupied as well. G. GIOVANELLI, P.L. GHIRELLI, *Leguigno. Vicende di contea e di parrocchia*, Leguigno 1998, p. 25; FABBI, *Le nobili famiglie* cit., p. 73.

³⁸ BALLETTI, *Storia di Reggio* cit., p. 145; *Memoriale potestatum Regiensium Gestorum iis temporibus ab anno 1154 usque ad annum 1290 auctore Anonymo Regiense*, in *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, vol. VIII, Milano, Ex Typographia Societatis Palatinae, 1726, coll. 1069-180, coll. 1168-74.

³⁹ Together with another Fogliano – Niccolò – Guido Roberti and Monaco da Bianello. NOBILI (a cura di), *Salimbene*, p. 1090. For a comparison with the consequences that inter-family divisions could have in Tuscan urban contexts, see CASTELNUOVO, *La noblesse déchirée* cit., pp. 270-6.

⁴⁰ ALBERTI MILIOLI *Liber de temporibus* cit., p. 577; ARTIOLI, CORRADINI, SANTI (a cura di), *Chronicon Regiense* cit., p. 81; BALLETTI, *Storia di Reggio* cit., p. 146. During 1290 it is known that Bertolino and Niccolò da Fogliano were among the *Superiori*; while Bernardino, Francesco, Simone and Guglielmo da Fogliano were among the *Inferiori*. The main characters involved in the polarisation, therefore, did not change their position. FABBI, *Le nobili famiglie* cit., pp. 74-5.

⁴¹ VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., pp. 41-2; CORRADINI, *Fogliano (de Foliano), Matteo da* cit., p. 481; FABBI, *Le nobili famiglie* cit., p. 75.

⁴² O. ROMBALDI, *Aspetti della vita economica del Comune di Reggio dal 1306 al 1327*, in *Reggio ai tempi di Dante. Atti e memorie del Convegno di studi per il VII centenario della nascita di Dante. Reggio Emilia, 16-17 ottobre 1965*, Modena 1966, pp. 181-230, p. 186; FABBI, *Le nobili famiglie* cit., pp. 76-7. For Giberto da Correggio: G. MONTECCHI, *Correggio (de Corigia, da Corezo), Giberto da*, in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, vol. XXIX, Roma 1983, pp. 439-44.

⁴³ Quotation marks are necessary here, as the terms *guelph* and *ghibelline* would only have appeared in northern Italy at the beginning of the 14th century. S. RAVEGGI, *L'Italia dei Guelfi e dei Ghibellini*, Milano 2009, pp. 7-14.

⁴⁴ FABBÌ, *Le nobili famiglie* cit., pp. 64, 76-9.

⁴⁵ «La fedeltà continua dei membri della famiglia nei confronti del partito filo-papale [...] è il denominatore comune di tutte le vicende che vedono i Da Fogliano protagonisti in questi anni». CASAGRANDE, *Note* cit., p. 312. However, «la dialogicità degli inferiori coi ghibellini (in quel tempo banditi dalla città) è in parte dovuta al fatto di trovarsi alleati contro il comune avversario». GIOVANELLI, GHIRELLI, *Leguigno* cit., p. 24. On the embedding of families in political parties: LEVEROTTI, *Famiglia e istituzioni* cit., pp. 101-26. «Se il termine famiglia è già di per sé piuttosto generico, l'oggetto risulta ancora più vago considerando che nel Medioevo la famiglia poteva assumere anche il carattere di una consorteria o inserirsi nel gruppo più esteso della fazione, in cui i rapporti di consanguineità e di alleanza si mescolano». GRAVELA, *Modelli familiari* cit., p. 8.

⁴⁶ VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., p. 39. On this theme: P. CAMMAROSANO, *Aspetti delle strutture famigliari nelle città dell'Italia comunale: secoli XII-XIV*, in DUBY, LE GOFF (a cura di), *Famiglia e parentela* cit., pp. 107-23, pp. 114-23.

⁴⁷ Reconstructions of the intricate Fogliano family trees can be found in VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., p. 73; P. LITTA, *Famiglie celebri italiane. Fascicolo 47. Carraro di Venezia-Fogliano di Reggio*, Milano 1834; ROMBALDI, *Carpineti* cit., p. 137; GIOVANELLI, GHIRELLI, *Leguigno* cit., p. 22; GAMBERINI, *La città assediata* cit., pp. 302-3. The family trees in this paper are based on the most recent historiographical findings, which may lead to discrepancies with older reconstructions.

⁴⁸ G. BADINI, *Matilde di Canossa*, in FESTANTI, GHERPELLI (a cura di), *Storia illustrata di Reggio Emilia* cit., pp. 81-96; ROMBALDI, *Carpineti* cit., pp. 96-142.

⁴⁹ GAMBERINI, *La città assediata* cit.

⁵⁰ L. GIOMMI, *Come Reggio venne in potestà di Bertrando del Poggetto (1306-1326)*, in «Atti e memorie della R. Deputazione di storia patria per le province modenesi», V, 13 (1920), pp. 1-154.

⁵¹ In 1319, following a renewed outbreak of violence, Bernardino provost of Carpineti, along with his brothers, nephews and other members of noble families, were exiled from Reggio Emilia. VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., pp. 44-5.

⁵² BALLETTI, *Storia di Reggio* cit., pp. 155-69; MONTECCHI, *I conflitti tra le signorie* cit., pp. 149-51; P. GOLINELLI, *Fogliano (de Foliano), Guido Savina da*, in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, vol. XLVIII, Roma 1997, p. 478-9.

⁵³ This is demonstrated, for example, by the confirmation of the fundamental fortress of Carpineti by Pope John XXII and Frederick III of Austria, the «anti-emperor» opposed to Ludwig the Bavarian. For an overview of the two characters and the conflicts between them: M. CLAUS, *Ludwig IV. und Friedrich der Schöne*, in M. BECHER, H.W. VON DEN KNESEBECK (hg.), *Die Königserhebung Friedrichs des Schönen im Jahr 1314. Krönung, krieg und kompromiss* Köln-Weimar-Wien 2017, pp. 255-70; C. TROTTMANN, *Giovanni XXII*, in *Enciclopedia dei papi*, vol. II, *Niccolò I, santo – Sisto IV*, Roma 2000, pp. 512-22.

⁵⁴ ARTIOLI, CORRADINI, SANTI (a cura di), *Chronicon Regiense* cit., pp. 184-209; the quote is from p. 198.

⁵⁵ ROMBALDI, *Querciola* cit., p. 76. The provost Bernardino da Fogliano, with the sons and the nephews of his brother Francesco, occupied the castles of Baiso, Paullo and Sabbione: Paullo was immediately taken from him with a stratagem by Giberto and Giovanni Riccio da Fogliano, who took Simone and his son Manfredino prisoner. The *comune* immediately sent its militia, together with Giovanni and Matteo, sons of Nicolò da Fogliano, to recover these castles, and first of all they took Sabbione, where they imprisoned Giovanni and Becchesio, sons of Simone. Then Baiso was placed under siege, but its defences stood for a while. Bernardino managed to call Francesco Bonaccolsi for help, who routed the besiegers and captured Giovanni Riccio and Matteo da Fogliano. FABBÌ, *Le nobili famiglie* cit., p. 83. The following year Giberto was

captured by the sons of Simone. ARTIOLI, CORRADINI, SANTI (a cura di), *Chronicon Regiense* cit., pp. 144, 152. See also P. GOLINELLI, *Fogliano (de Foliano), Giberto da*, in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, vol. XLVIII, Roma 1997, p. 465-8, p. 465. This was probably a consequence of the new division between Fogliano *intrinseci* and *extrinseci* broke out few years before. VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., p. 45.

⁵⁶ The abbot and scholar Girolamo Tiraboschi outlines, perhaps a little too sharply, the two new family sides: «la famiglia medesima de' Fogliani era divisa [...] furono condannati come ribelli Bernardino, Simone, e Giovanni figli del fu Francesco, Guglielmino di Giovanni, Alberto, Rolandino, Bechese e Manfredino figli di Simone, Bernardo, Aimerico, Franceschino e Niccolò detto Guercio del fu Guglielmello, e alcuni figli naturali di Francesco e del detto Simone. Nel partito Guelfo al contrario erano Guido Savina Guglielmino e Niccolò del fu Matteo, Tommasino, Guido Riccio, Giovanriccio, Giberto, Guglielmino, e un figlio di Paolo, detto Niccolò, tutti fratelli e figli del fu Niccolò fratello del suddetto Matteo». G. TIRABOSCHI, *Memorie storiche modenesi*, vol. I, Modena, Presso la Società Tipografica, 1793, p. 168.

⁵⁷ GOLINELLI, *Fogliano, Giberto da* cit., p. 466. On this theme: G. CHITTOLINI, *Signorie rurali e feudi alla fine del medioevo*, in G. GALASSO (a cura di), *Storia d'Italia*, 4, *Comuni e Signorie: istituzioni, società e lotte per l'egemonia*, Torino 1981, pp. 589-676, pp. 615-45, pp. 659-67, and ID., *Il particolarismo signorile e feudale in Emilia fra Quattro e Cinquecento*, in ID., *La formazione dello Stato regionale e le istituzioni del contado. Secoli XIV e XV*, Milano 2005, pp. 199-224.

⁵⁸ «Nei primi tre decenni del sec. XIV il casato tende a dividersi in molti rami, spesso in lotta tra loro». A. TINCANI, *Grandi famiglie feudali e signorili del territorio reggiano*, in G. COSTI, G. GIOVANELLI (a cura di), *Storia della Diocesi di Reggio Emilia-Guastalla*, vol. II, *Dal medioevo alla riforma del Concilio di Trento*, Brescia 2012, pp. 59-86, p. 85. On the theme of the politics followed by a family, even in terms of conflictuality within their members: CASEY, *La famiglia nella storia* cit., pp. 53-84. For a methodological and bibliographical framing on conflicts in communal Italy: A. ZORZI, *I conflitti nell'Italia comunale. Riflessioni sullo stato degli studi e sulle prospettive di ricerca*, in ID. (a cura di), *Conflitti, paci e vendette nell'Italia comunale*, Firenze 2009, pp. 7-41, pp. 7-21.

⁵⁹ Guido Savina da Fogliano was one of the leading exponents of the lineage in the early 14th century. GOLINELLI, *Fogliano, Guido Savina da* cit.

⁶⁰ A. GAMBERINI, *La memoria dei gentiluomini: i cartulari di lignaggio*, in ID., *Oltre le città. Assetti territoriali e culture aristocratiche nella Lombardia del tardo medioevo*, Roma 2009, pp. 159-75, pp. 160-7. Also: F. BOZZI, *La memoria di un signore del primo Trecento: i cartulari di Guido Savina da Fogliano*, in «Studi di Storia Medioevale e di Diplomatica», n.s., 1 (2017), pp. 111-43, pp. 115-38.

⁶¹ «Tra gli anni Venti e Trenta del Trecento il casato sembrò ricompattarsi grazie d'un lato al consolidamento dell'asse signorile avuto in occasione dell'investitura imperiale del 1320 [...], dall'altro alla nomina di Giberto, Giovanni e Guidoriccio di Niccolò a vicari imperiali di Reggio insieme a Azzo Manfredi». I. LAZZARINI, *Reggio 1335: la città, la signoria, gli statuti*, in BADINI, GAMBERINI (a cura di), *Medioevo reggiano* cit., pp. 225-43, pp. 232-3.

⁶² In 1349, for example, Giberto tried to take the castle of Toano from Guglielmo, and Ugolino tried to occupy the castle of Gesso dei Malapresi. ROMBALDI, *Carpinetti* cit., p. 141.

⁶³ «Ipsi [Bertolino, Francesco and Guido] eum [Mattiolo] proditorio modo ceperunt et aceperunt signa castrorum que immediate pacifice habuerunt et ipsum cum filio parvulo et Gulielminum filium dompni Nicolai de Foliano et unum fratrem ipsius Nicolai, quos omnes mactari fecerunt et etiam illum perum parvum; hec sunt opera nobilium reginorum.» ARTIOLI, CORRADINI, SANTI (a cura di), *Chronicon Regiense* cit., p. 288. The event is briefly recalled in VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., p. 53. The narration of the event could be emphasised by the chronicler's hostility towards the Fogliano: P. ROSSI, *Levalossi, Sagacino – Della Gazzata, Pietro*, in B. ANDREOLLI *et al.* (a cura di), *Repertorio della cronachistica emiliano-romagnola (sec. IX-XV)*, Roma 1991, pp. 234-8, pp. 237-8; see also C. CORRADINI, *Giudizi sui Fogliani pronunciati da Pietro della Gazzata nel Chronicon Regiense e in Il territorio querciolese e la valle del Tresinaro*, vol. II cit, pp. 343-52. On the relevance of the heraldic crests in expressing identity and in defining family

segmentation: M. PASTOUREAU, *Medioevo simbolico*, Roma-Bari 2005, pp. 193-222. On the role of the heraldy during interfamily clashes: L. HABLLOT, *Le lignage brisé: les armoires comme signes des conflits familiaux au Moyen Âge*, in AURELL (dir.), *La Parenté déchirée* cit., pp. 401-10, pp. 404-9.

⁶⁴ Caution is needed when using chronicles in this context: «Les sources décrivant les violences familiales sont-elles un «miroir» des événements ou, au contraire, un «mirage» en raison de leur nature édifiante et de leur vision fortement influencée par l'idéologie et l'imaginaire? Il est vrai que les chroniques, les homélies ou l'iconographie, subjectives, exemplaires ou codifiées, n'appartiennent pas à la même catégorie générique que les actes notariés ou les registres judiciaires». AURELL, *Rompre la concorde* cit., p. 11.

⁶⁵ While for some members of the Fogliano family (such as Giberto) hostility to the Gonzaga was almost a constant, this was not the case for others. In August 1354 for example «Ugolino Fogliani entrato in discordia con Giberto consegnò la Torricella ai Gonzaghi [...] Ma Giberto in breve ricuperolla». VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., p. 53. For this episode: *Chronicon Regiense ab anno MCCLXXII usque ad MCCCLXXXVIII* auctoribus Sagacio et Petro de Gazata Regiensibus, in *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, vol. XVIII, Milano, Ex Typographia Societatis Palatinae, 1731, coll. 1-98, col 75; ARTIOLI, CORRADINI, SANTI (a cura di), *Chronicon Regiense* cit., p. 284. For another example of cooperation between Gonzaga and Fogliano, in 1344 Alberto Gonzaga, having a dispute with Filippino Gonzaga lord of Reggio, recovered to the Fogliano in Scandiano. VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., p. 51.

⁶⁶ The Gonzaga had placed Arceto, held by Mattiolo da Fogliano, under siege. On June 10th the besieging forces moved back to Mantua, threatened by Alberto della Scala; the following day Mattiolo handed the castle to Reggio, and a garrison was placed there in the name of the Gonzaga. ARTIOLI, CORRADINI, SANTI (a cura di), *Chronicon Regiense* cit., p. 225.

⁶⁷ The hostility against the Gonzaga was *almost* a constant, as mentioned earlier. In fact, in 1344, having made an agreement with the Gonzaga, Giberto occupied Migliarina and Fossoli, which belonged to the Monastery of Saint Prosper. C. CORRADINI, *La Chiesa di Reggio nella "crisi" del Trecento*, in COSTI, GIOVANELLI (a cura di), *Storia della Diocesi* cit., pp. 27-57, pp. 33-4.

⁶⁸ GAMBERINI, *La città assediata* cit., pp. 245-9; MONTECCHI, *I conflitti* cit., pp. 150-2.

⁶⁹ In truth, the Fogliano siding with either the Visconti or the Este family began before Bernabò conquered the city: in the defeat that Bernabò Visconti had suffered at Solara in 1362, Guido da Fogliano (who was fighting for him) was taken prisoner with other members of the family. They were then released in the peace agreement concluded two years later. VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., p. 53.

⁷⁰ Even during these events the family was polarised on opposite sides: in 1370, while Francesco and his nephew Guglielmo were in the service of the Este, Guido da Fogliano was in Bernabò's army. Ivi, pp. 55-6. In the same years Guido Savina and Aldigherio da Fogliano entered in the city with the troops of the Este, during the attempted occupation of the city by the marquis. *Memoriale potestatum Regiensium* cit., col. 1176.

⁷¹ This kind of contract was made between two political powers of different weight: usually, the stronger one granted protection and legitimation, while the weaker one provided troops, infrastructures and military bases (like a castle) in service of its *superior*. About this topic may it be allowed here to refer to F. BOZZI, *Le spire della vipera. Le aderenze viscontee fra Tre e Quattrocento*, Milano 2021, pp. 11-20, and the bibliography there included.

⁷² A detailed analysis of the many *adherentie* concluded by the Fogliano between the 1370s and the beginning of the 15th century is in GAMBERINI, *La città assediata* cit., pp. 230-9. See also N. GRIMALDI, *Di alcuni feudatari reggiani nel secolo XIV*, in *Studi di storia, di letteratura e d'arte in onore di Naborre Campanini*, Reggio Emilia 1921, pp. 163-82, pp. 164-8, and BOZZI, *Le spire della vipera* cit., pp. 51-70, 112-41.

⁷³ E. FASANO GUARINI, *Center and Periphery*, in J. KIRSHNER (ed.), *The Origins of the State in Italy, 1300-1600*, Chicago-London 1996, pp. 74-96.

⁷⁴ VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., pp. 55-7; GRIMALDI, *Di alcuni feudatari* cit., pp. 168-72; ROMBALDI, *Querciola* cit., p. 77; TINCANI, *Grandi famiglie* cit., pp. 85-6. It is analysed in its

deeper implications by GAMBERINI, *La città assediata* cit., pp. 233-6; ID., *La faida e la costruzione della parentela. Qualche nota sulle famiglie signorili reggiane alla fine del medioevo*, in ID., *Lo stato visconteo. Linguaggi politici e dinamiche costituzionali*, Milano 2005, pp. 245-64, pp. 254-6. A marriage was also concluded between a daughter of Bernabò and Carlo. *Chronicon Regiense* cit., coll. 81-2.

⁷⁵ In his will Francesco named as his heirs his sons Giberto, Marco, Martino and Pietro Anglico, and among their tutors Guido Savina himself was named. Francesco's will, of course, was never respected. GRIMALDI, *Di alcuni feudatari* cit., pp. 172-8. The heirs of Francesco managed to regain the castles of Scandiano and Levizzano, but this only superficially damaged the *dominatus* of Guido Savina. GAMBERINI, *La città assediata* cit., p. 234.

⁷⁶ G. LECUPPRE, *L'oncle usurpateur à la fin du Moyen Âge*, in AURELL (dir.), *La Parenté déchirée* cit., pp. 147-56.

⁷⁷ For an in-depth analysis of the Rondinara feud: GAMBERINI, *La faida* cit., pp. 246-53. The episode is recalled also in VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., p. 63, and ROMBALDI, *Querciola* cit., p. 79. Odoardo Rombaldi commented that «altri membri della consorteria dei da Fogliano preferirono all'ordinata convivenza l'aggressione e l'eliminazione dei rivali». ROMBALDI, *Carpinetti* cit., p. 142. On the mechanisms that regulated feuds and *vendette* within Italian society: A. ZORZI, *Legitimation and Legal Sanction of Vendetta in Italian Cities from the Twelfth to the Fourteenth Centuries*, in S.K. COHN Jr, F. RICCIARDELLI (eds), *The Culture of Violence in Renaissance Italy*, Firenze 2012, pp. 27-54, pp. 32-54, and M. GENTILE, *La vendetta di sangue come rituale. Qualche osservazione sulla Lombardia fra Quattro e Cinquecento*, in F. SALVESTRINI, G.M. VARANINI, A. ZANGARINI (a cura di), *La morte e i suoi riti in Italia tra Medioevo e prima Età moderna*, Firenze 2007, pp. 209-241. Indispensable are the pages, on the «culture of hatred» and on the methods that regulated the conflicts, in MAIRE VIGUEUR, *Cavalieri e cittadini* cit., pp. 388-425.

⁷⁸ Even though for the first two decades of the century the Fogliano still impacted on the balance of the region. Giberto da Fogliano, for example, lost the castle of Levizzano, which was occupied by Polo da Fogliano, and San Romano, which was taken by with more three castles by Cesare da Fogliano, who also occupied the castle of Baiso. After the death of Gian Galeazzo Visconti in 1402 Carlo da Fogliano, with his brothers Jacopo and Beltrando, became *adherens* of the marquis of Este. When, shortly afterwards, Ottobuono Terzi occupied Reggio, Carlo swung between the two characters. When the clashes between the Terzi and the marquis started again Jacopo da Fogliano fought with the latter, while Carlo occupied Scandiano, starting in 1408 a new conflict with Guido da Fogliano, who turned to Muzio Attendolo Sforza for help. VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., pp. 62-6.

⁷⁹ F. CENGARLE, *Gerarchie e sfere d'influenza nella pace di Milano del 1420* cit., 316-23.

⁸⁰ VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., pp. 66-9; ROMBALDI, *Querciola* cit., p. 79-82; TINCANI, *Grandi famiglie* cit., p. 86. In some cases, loyalty to the Visconti family continued despite the Este's advance: this is the example of Giovanni Taliano, son of Carlo da Fogliano and grandson of Bernabò Visconti. GIOVANELLI, GHIRELLI, *Leguigno* cit., pp. 33-4.

⁸¹ GAMBERINI, *La città assediata* cit., pp. 165-77. «Le relazioni che uniscono e oppongono i da Fogliano richiamano quelle che stringono e dividono i nobili della montagna [...]. Le rivalità, che lacerarono i da Fogliano, non risparmiarono i da Canossa». ROMBALDI, *Carpinetti* cit., pp. 143-7.

⁸² F. BOZZI, *Da Correggio*, in DEL TREDICI (a cura di), *La signoria rurale* cit., pp. 343-51.

⁸³ On the caution associated with the use of this term: GRAVELA, *Il corpo della città*, cit., pp. 26-30.

⁸⁴ The Correggio, like the Canossa and the Fogliano, exploited – or attempted to exploit – the political polarizations in the region between the Visconti and Este to their advantage. Moreover, after the sale of the city of Parma to the marquis of Este in 1344 the sons of Giberto da Correggio in fact each pursued their own political design, unable to unite around a common project and ready to seek new alliances to overpower their rival relatives. GAMBERINI, *La città assediata* cit., pp. 194-208.

⁸⁵ Ivi, pp. 148-54 (the quote, translated, is from the last page).

86 For an overview: TINCANI, *Grandi famiglie* cit.

87 L. ARCANGELI, *Un lignaggio padano tra autonomia signorile e corte principesca: i Pallavicini*, in M. GENTILE, P. SAVY (dir.), *Noblesse et États princiers en Italie et en France au XV^e siècle*, Roma 2009, pp. 29-100, pp. 46-68. Even in the case of the Rossi of Parma, however, «come è stato più volte osservato, la parentela costituisce un campo di legami ma anche di conflitti: e questo vale sia per i Rossi che per alcune delle famiglie con cui essi si sono imparentati, Torelli e Scotti, divise entrambe da contrasti violenti che si riflettono anche negli schieramenti assunti dai loro esponenti durante la guerra del 1482». EAD., *Principi, homines e «partesani» nel ritorno dei Rossi*, in EAD., M. GENTILE (a cura di), *Le signorie dei Rossi di Parma tra XIV e XVI secolo*, Firenze 2007, pp. 231-306, p. 249. See also M. GENTILE, *La formazione del dominio dei Rossi tra XIV e XV secolo*, in *ivi*, pp. 23-55. On the clashes between Rossi and Pallavicini: ID., *Cultura della vendetta e pratiche di resistenza nello stato territoriale: osservazioni sull'aristocrazia territoriale lombarda (XV secolo)*, in C. CALLARD, E. CROUZET-PAVAN, A. TALLON (dir.), *La politique de l'Histoire en Italie. Arts et pratiques du réemploi (XIV^e-XVII^e siècle)*, Paris 2014, pp. 287-97, pp. 294-7.

88 See, for example, M. GRAVELA, *Piemonte nord-occidentale. Scheda di sintesi*, in DEL TREDICI (a cura di), *La signoria rurale* cit., pp. 7-10, A. FIORE, *Piemonte sud-orientale. Scheda di sintesi*, in *ivi*, pp. 21-6, and L. PROVERO, *Piemonte sud-occidentale. Scheda di sintesi*, in *ivi*, pp. 27-31.

89 See the papers in DEL TREDICI (a cura di), *La signoria rurale* cit., pp. 107-242.

90 FIORE, *Piemonte sud-orientale* cit., p. 22.

91 Recently, on the relationship between lineages and cities: M. GRAVELA, *Curie, fortresses and palaces. Family groups and urban space in late medieval Italy*, in SOLÓRZANO TELECHEA, HAEMERS, LIDDY (eds), *La familia urbana* cit., pp. 375-400.

92 GRAVELA, *Il corpo della città* cit., pp. 173-223.

93 P. PIRILLO, *Le signorie territoriali dell'Appennino fiorentino tra crisi e strategie di sopravvivenza*, in *La Toscane et les Toscans autour de la Renaissance. Cadres de vie, société, croyances. Mélanges offerts à Charles-M. de La Roncière*, Aix-en-Provence 1999, pp. 207-16; ID., *La signoria dei conti Guidi tra dinamiche di lignaggio e poteri territoriali*, in F. CANACCINI (a cura di), *La lunga storia di una stirpe comitale. I conti Guidi tra Romagna e Toscana. Atti del Convegno di studi organizzato dai Comuni di Modigliana e Poppi, Modigliana-Poppi, 28-31 agosto 2003*, Firenze 2009, pp. 267-90; M. BICCHIERAI, *La signoria dei conti Guidi in Valdarno. Osservazioni ed ipotesi*, in G. PINTO, P. PIRILLO (a cura di), *Lontano dalle città. Il Valdarno di Sopra nei secoli XII-XIII. Atti del convegno di Monteparchi-Figline Valdarno (9-11 novembre 2001)*, Roma 2005, pp. 83-116.

94 M. LUZZATI, *Firenze e la Toscana nel medioevo. Seicento anni per la costruzione di uno Stato*, Torino 1986, pp. 103-28; G.P.G. SCHARF, *Le intersezioni del potere: i Guidi e la città di Arezzo nella seconda metà del Duecento*, in CANACCINI (a cura di), *La lunga storia* cit., pp. 119-38.

95 G. CHERUBINI, *La signoria degli Ubertini sui comuni rurali casentinesi di Chitignano, Rosina e Taena all'inizio del Quattrocento (note)*, in «Archivio storico italiano», 126 (1968), pp. 151-69; G. CHITTOLENI, *Note sul comune di Firenze e i «piccoli signori» dell'Appennino secondo la pace di Sarzana 81353*, in D. RAMADA CURTO, E.R. DURSTELER, J. KIRSHNER, F. TRIVELLATO, *From Florence to the Mediterranean and Beyond. Essays in Honour of Anthony Molho*, Firenze 2009, pp. 193-210; S.M. COLLAVINI, *I signori rurali in Italia centrale (secoli XII-metà XIV): profilo sociale e forme di interazione*, in «Mélanges de l'École française de Rome. Moyen Âge», 123/2 (2011), pp. 301-18.

96 «L'albero della discordia: i Fogliano». GAMBERINI, *La città assediata* cit., p. 227.

97 For the fights between fathers (and mothers) and sons, uncles and nephews, old and young: AURELL, *Rompere la concorde* cit., pp. 12-23. A clear example, for the Po Valley context, comes from the Pallavicini lineage, where conflicts between brothers (often triggered by different treatment by their fathers at the time of succession) heavily scarred the lineage during the 15th century. ARCANGELI, *Un lignaggio padano* cit., pp. 54-64.

⁹⁸ «In un contesto in cui la conservazione o l'appropriazione delle risorse (in primo luogo dei castelli) non si fondava sulla coesione degli agnati, ma al contrario, trovava nell'estensione della parentela – e nella parcellizzazione dei diritti connessa ad ogni successione ereditaria – il suo elemento di maggiore destabilizzazione, la consanguineità non aveva la forza per definire un orizzonte di solidarietà [...]. La solidarietà parentale fra i Fogliano sembrerebbe dunque funzionare meglio nei rapporti di cognazione (almeno fino a quando questa non viene rinnegata) che in quelli di agnazione, dove tiene nei rapporti verticali (padri/figli) ma non in quelli orizzontali. Già lo spazio di una generazione poteva, infatti, essere sufficiente per rendere usurata un'ascendenza comune, per aprire un abisso di "inimicizia" fra zio e nipote, fra cugino e cugino, perfino fra fratello e fratello». GAMBERINI, *La faida* cit., pp. 251-3. This issue is summed up in GRAVELA, *Modelli familiari* cit., p. 15-6.

⁹⁹ Of course, sometimes an *adherentia* was not enough, and more onerous agreements were established. In 1375, for example, Giberto, firstborn son of Francesco (hanged in Reggio) and – perhaps – previously in the service of the Este army, occupied the castle of Scandiano, held by Guido da Fogliano, who was *adherens* of the Visconti: he received help from Bernabò and rebuilt the castle of Salvaterra, from where Giberto and his son Carlo started to fight back – however, in order not to succumb, they were eventually forced to hand over the castle to the Este for further protection. VENTURI, *Storia di Scandiano* cit., p. 62.

¹⁰⁰ In order to regulate the internal mechanics of the family, peaceful dynamics could – clearly – also take place: after the investiture of 1320s, in order not to have conflicts in the administration of Carpineti Guido Savina obtained a complete renunciation by the descendants of the late Francesco da Fogliano. Ivi, p. 44; the same episode in GIOVANELLI, GHIRELLI, *Leguigno* cit., p. 29. Sometimes the Fogliano found themselves in the conflictual affairs of other families: as in 1308, when Bernardo and Bertolino da Fogliano were appointed «arbitri seu arbitratore et amirabile compositore» of a dispute between two branches of the Canossa. CASAGRANDE, *Note* cit., p. 314. As clearly stated, in fact, three practices regulated the conflict in communal Italy: revenge as a mechanism for balancing conflict; feud as a way for managing the networks of friendship and enmity over time; peace as a political objective both for private and public powers. ZORZI, *I conflitti* cit., p. 39. For a comparison of the dynamics that marked, even during conflictual moments, different types of lordship: L. PROVERO, *Pluralità di poteri e strutture consortili nelle campagne del Piemonte meridionale (XII-XIII secolo)*, in «Mélanges de l'École française de Rome. Moyen Âge», 122/1 (2010), pp. 55-62, pp. 55-9 (for Piedmont), and S.M. COLLAVINI, *Formes de coseigneurie dans l'espace toscan. Réflexions préliminaires à partir de quelques exemples en Maremma (fin XI-XIII^e siècle)*, in «Mélanges de l'École française de Rome. Moyen Âge», 122/1 (2010), pp. 35-54, pp. 36-48 (in particular, to frame the dynamics that marked the management *pro indiviso* of lordships). On the *consortes* in Piedmont: G. TABACCO, *Il rapporto di parentela come strumento di dominio consortile: alcuni esempi in Piemonte*, in DUBY, LE GOFF (a cura di), *Famiglia e parentela* cit., pp. 83-8. See also G. BUTAUD, *Remarques introductives. Autour de la définition et de la typologie de la coseigneurie*, in «Mélanges de l'École française de Rome. Moyen Âge», 122/1 (2010), pp. 5-12; HERLIHY, *La famiglia nel medioevo* cit., pp. 114-9; VIOLANTE, *Alcune caratteristiche* cit., pp. 50-7.

¹⁰¹ M. GENTILE, *Dal comune cittadino allo stato regionale: la vicenda politica (1311-1402)*, in G. ANDENNA, G. CHITTOLINI (a cura di), *Storia di Cremona. Il Trecento. Chiesa e cultura (VIII-XIV secolo)*, Azzano San Paolo 2007, pp. 260-301, p. 290.

¹⁰² The events relating to the castle of Bebbio highlight the role of *adherentia* in strengthening one's position: held by Carlo da Fogliano, it was occupied by his cousin Gaspare. However, the former managed to recover his possessions thanks to his bond with Gian Galeazzo Visconti, while the latter saw his position increasingly weakened. GAMBERINI, *La città assediata* cit., pp. 240-2. See also GIOVANELLI, GHIRELLI, *Leguigno* cit., pp. 31-2.

¹⁰³ GRIMALDI, *Di alcuni feudatari* cit., p. 165.

¹⁰⁴ In some cases surviving through the modern age. G. PICASSO, *Le carte dell'archivio Sforza Fogliani di Castelnuovo all'Università Cattolica di Milano*, in «Aevum», 62 (1968), pp. 270-90. Fundamental are the pages of G. CHITTOLINI, *Ascesa e declino di piccoli stati signorili*

(*Italia centro-settentrionale, metà Trecento-inizi Cinquecento*). *Alcune note*, in «Società e storia», 31 (2008), pp. 473-98.

¹⁰⁵ Another example of cooperation between the lords comes from the 15th century: both Giovanni Taliano and his uncle Giacomo sided with the Visconti against the Este. Although in 1427 Giovanni Taliano's brother, Guido Savina (third of his name), gave the localities of Leguigno and Sarzano to the Este family, he too probably went over to the Visconti side the following year, helping his brother in recovering Leguigno. GIOVANELLI, GHIRELLI, *Leguigno* cit., pp. 35-9. There is an «apparente contradiction entre solidarité et conflits», which are «deux modalités de relation en quelque sorte complémentaires, dont il est difficile de mesurer le poids respectif, mais qui sont produites par un système où la parenté sert de cadre à un ensemble de rapports autres que de seule parenté». A. GUERRAU-JALABERT, *Observations sur la logique sociale des conflits dans la parenté au Moyen Âge*, in AURELL (dir.), *La Parenté déchirée* cit., pp. 413-29, p. 424.

¹⁰⁶ M.N. COVINI, *Fogliano, Corrado da*, in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, vol. XLVIII, Roma 1997, pp. 462-5. On the familiar models of late Middle Ages: LEVEROTTI, *Famiglia e istituzioni* cit., pp. 149-67.

