Andrea Giussani

Regulating Flat-rate Liabilities for Switched-off Buyers' Defaults in the Power Supply Market. Collective Interests, Free-riding, and Efficiency of the Justice System.

Are you already subscribed?
Login to check whether this content is already included on your personal or institutional subscription.

Abstract

Switched-off buyers' defaults are a usual feature of the power supply market. This free-riding problem may increase transaction costs. The relevant regulatory authority copes with it through the imposition of a flat-rate joint liability upon the new seller, the buyer and the distributor. This rule may foster efficiency, ultimately reducing the courts' workload. Hence, this regulation may be justified as a means to protect a collective interest.

Keywords

  • Collective Interests
  • Regulatory Law
  • Power Supply Market
  • Flat-rate Liability

Preview

Article first page

What do you think about the recent suggestion?

Trova nel catalogo di Worldcat