Pedro Rivas

A Nondiscursive Moment in Legal Reasoning. An Aristotelian-Matrix Approach

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Abstract

First, this article tries to establish that practical reasoning includes at least one nondiscursive element. Second, the article makes the case that while that element is not discursive in nature, it is not irrational. In the formation and development of reasons for a decision there are aspects in which there is no discourse; instead, there is finding of the solution or of the elements required to reach the solution. Based on the foregoing, I will try to show that such nondiscursive elements are highly rational. This assertion means that, instead of expressing the inexpressible given its irrational and incommunicable nature, these moments are paradoxically moments in which reason leads the access to reality, and reason does so in an accurate and precise manner

Keywords

  • Synesis
  • Aristotle
  • Legal Reasoning
  • Nondiscursive Moment

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