Rosaria Egidi

Wittgenstein's anti-Brentanian analysis of intentionality

Are you already subscribed?
Login to check whether this content is already included on your personal or institutional subscription.

Abstract

The paper outlines the itinerary that led Wittgenstein from the grammatical formulation of intentionality indicated in the Big Typescript and the "Umarbeitungen" of this work to the later normative-pragmatic conception put forward in the Investigations. In opposition to the Brentanian thesis of mental in-existence of intentions, two arguments will be highlighted: (i) the antireferentialist argument of the "intransitive" status of intentional propositions; (ii) the antimentalist argument that the meaning of intentional acts must not be sought in inner hidden processes, but is given by institutionalised forms of behaviour, linguistic customs, and public techniques underlying their use.

Keywords

  • Antimentalism
  • Antireferentialism
  • Intentionality
  • Praxis
  • Rules
  • Wittgenstein

Preview

Article first page

What do you think about the recent suggestion?

Trova nel catalogo di Worldcat