Abstract

Has the Constitutional Court changed since Italy introduced a majoritarian electoral system? And if so how? This article underlines the growing trend of constitutional case law to devise a kind of constitutional politics as an entrenchment against the most blatant deviations from the constitutional riverbed by politicians tout court, albeit within a jurisprudential framework that has the overall aim of safeguarding the self-determination of politics within its own sphere of action. The effort made by the Italian Constitutional Court would appear to be the highest level of synthesis between the constitutional values dealt with in the case and the best possible political compromise. Finally, the role of the Constitutional Court in the protection of fundamental rights has increased a great deal with respect to the past. Indeed, the Constitutional Court has exercised this function by using all the resources at its disposal even if this implies putting aside the allocation of powers (especially between the State and the Regions). Particular attention should be given to the «dialogue» between the European Courts thanks to which, on one hand, a single body avoids becoming a true and proper permanent constituent power, on the other, the Constitutional Court extracts itself from political contingency.