The contribution take on the decision no. 1 of 2014 of the Constitutional Court to analyse from a comparative perspective the relationship between constitutional judges and legislators in electoral matters from both the procedural and substantive standpoint. From the procedural standpoint, the decision to admit the referral of questions concerning the electoral system as set out in Law 270/2005 provides an occasion for examining in depth the theme of the 'justiceability' of electoral matters in other legal systems. From the substantive standpoint, the renewed interpretation of the principle of electoral equality handed down by the Constitutional Court in the decision no. 1 of 2014 has aroused interest about the origin and application of such electoral principle in the German system. A comparison with other constitutional experiences makes it possible to eplore the functions and the limits of constitutional review in electoral matters and more generally to enrich the debate over the tension between legitimation of constitutional courts and preservation of legislative discretion.