Keywords: State Aid; Credit Institutions; Financial Stability; Banking Crises; Deposit Guarantee Schemes; Alternative Interventions; Least Cost Principle; Super Priority Rule.
The paper aims at designing a Dgs model according to which a national scheme
can intervene in a banking crisis without breaking Eu State aid rules. It is divided
in four parts. Firstly, it describes the new regulatory framework relating to Dgss
and the potential use of alternative interventions. Secondly, the 2015 EC decision on
Tercas and its impact at national level will be analysed. Thirdly, the paper will focus
on the 2019 General Court judgement, criticizing some of the remarks contained
therein. In the final part, the paper will compare the reached conclusions relating Dgs’ alternative measures to the interventions of the Srb. The final part will consider
the problem of the combination of the super priority rule ex art. 108 Brrd
and the least cost principle, meant as condition to activate alternative interventions.