Informations and abstract
Keywords: Interlocking Directorates; Minority Shareholdings; Regulation; Competition.
The paper considers the Italian regulation of interlocking directorates (Id) in the financial sector, enacted in 2011, in order to address the competitive concerns arising from the existence of an extensive web of personal links between insurance, banking and asset management companies which might facilitate collusion. The paper compares the extent of Id in the financial sector in Italy before and after the enactment of the said regulation, namely in 2008 and 2015. It is shown that in 2015 Id are still a pervasive - although to some extent decreasing - feature of the Italian financial sector as a whole. However, the evolution and characteristics of Id differ across industries within the financial sector; in particular, over the period taken into consideration, the frequency of Id shows a significant decrease in the insurance industry, a more limited reduction in the banking industry and an unexpected increase among asset management companies.