Paolo Legrenzi Carola Salvi

Dual processes in reasoning and judgement

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This paper deals with a theory of hypothetical thinking developed by Evans (2007), concerning dual processes in reasoning and judgment. The theory map on the distinction between processes described as heuristics (fast, parallel, implicit, high capacity) and analytic (slow, sequential, explicit, low capacity). Some new experimental data about probabilistic thinking and the results obtained through two classical tasks of hypothetical reasoning are discussed from the point of view of lateral transfer (Singley and Anderson). If people are able to extract the invariant and abstract structure from different versions of the same reasoning task, they are supposed to think at S2 level. If it is not possible to transfer the solution, then it is plausible that the solution itself has been reached thanks to S1. Finally, the dual theory of hypothetical thinking is discussed from the broad point of view of the different methods and issues concerning rationality and problem solving.


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