Gustaf Arrhenius

Population Ethics and Metaethics

  • Abstract

Informations and abstract

Keywords: Population Ethics, Mere Addition Paradox, Repugnant Conclusion, Non-cognitivism, Justification

This paper focuses on the relations between population ethics and metaethics. Population ethics gives rise to well-known paradoxes, such as the paradox of mere addition. After presenting a version of this paradox, it is argued that a different way to dismantle it might be by considering it as a way to change our standard view of justification in moral theory. Two possible views are considered: a non-cognitivist approach to justification and to the explanation of inconsistency in morals; Parfit's suggestion that certain paradoxes might be «quarantined» without shaking our confidence in moral theories encapsulating them.

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