Michael B. Gill

A Humean Account of Moral Pluralism

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Abstract

Pluralist views of morality hold that there are multiple fundamental moral principles, and that these principles can require incompatible courses of action. So on the pluralist view, there can be a basic, underived moral reason to perform an action and a basic, underived moral reason to refrain from performing it. This conflict may be not merely apparent but real, and there may be no way of dissolving the conflict. I argue that Hume's sentimentalist account of morality is pluralist, and also that Humean sentimentalism is the most powerful basis for moral pluralism.

Keywords

  • Moral Pluralism
  • David Hume
  • Sentimentalism
  • W.D. Ross
  • Threshold Deontology

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